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INTRODUCTION 
After Wade Hampton and the Red Shirts had 
"redeemed" South Carolina from Radical Republican govern- 
ment in 18?6, the aristocratic tradition of the state's 
political system appeared to return to its pre-Civil War 
status.  South Carolina society, however, had undergone 
many changes as a result of the War and Reconstruction, 
and they were to have a profound effect on the state's 
politics.  Small farmers, who now constituted the bulk of 
the population, grew to distrust the old conservative oli- 
garchy because it was no longer responsive to agricultural 
interests.  One such farmer was Ben Tillman who led a suc- 
cessful political movement to overthrow the Bourbon aris- 
tocrats. 
Named after its leader, Tillmanism was essentially 
a middle class farmer movement which sought to control the 
state Democratic Party for its own purposes. Many of the 
other discontented members of the lower classes believed 
that the overthrow of the aristocracy would mean a new 
white democracy which would be attuned to their needs. 
Most of their grievances were very similar to those that 
Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman (Baton 
Rougei  Louisiana State University Press, 19^). 70-81. 
Tillman voiced in behalf of the farmers, but once Tillman- 
ism was established, the masses found that they were little 
better off. 
Tillmanism made no class distinction in its appeal 
to oust the old aristocracy, but it was basically an agrar- 
ian movement that never offered much for the poor man. 
Tillman himself was a middle class farmer turned politician 
and the reforms he called for reflected the needs of his 
own class.  In a negative sense though, everything that 
Tillman opposed, such as the aristocracy and the Negro, was 
believed by the lower classes to contribute to their mis- 
fortunes.  The overthrow of the aristocrats in 1890 was by 
the common people, but it did not mean the end of class 
rule.  Instead it determined which class would rule. 
During Tillman's campaigns the agrarian issue be- 
came submerged under a general "reform" movement purporting 
to end- aristocratic privilege. Tillman exorted the up- 
country against the low country, the county against the 
city, the white man against the black, the poor against the 
rich, and the common man against the aristocrat. He made 
no distinction between farmer and worker, but spoke in 
general for those who were discontented with the status quo. 
In almost every way Tillman appealed to the white masses. 
His background, appearance and his speech could be identi- 
fied by nearly all farmers, sharecroppers, and tenants as 
3 
their own.    He was  the first political leader in South 
Carolina   to arise from  the  common people and  speak  for 
them.     To insure its success,  Tillmanism,  while a middle 
class  farmer movement,   extended its negative appeal  to all 
the disgruntled members of the lower classes.    All  those 
in social and  economic bondage,   except the Negro,   came to 
believe that Tillman,   the rural Moses, would lead them  to 
2 
a  democratic promised land. 
During Tillman's two terms as Governor,   South 
Carolina witnessed no radical reforms in behalf of the 
masses.    With the exception of the State Dispensary system, 
most of the reforms were only the completion of the pro- 
posals that  the Farmers' Association had asked for from 
its earliest beginnings.    All agricultural  education was 
centered at Clemson College;  Winthrop College was  estab- 
lished at Rock Hill as an industrial  school for girls,   the 
lien law was repealed,  and a new constitution was written. 
Upper class  privilege suffered little from   the  effects   of 
Tillmanism while the lower classes were not greatly im- 
proved.     There was scarcely any change in the social and 
2W.   W.   Ball,   T_he State That  Forgot   (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Co.,   1932),   207-208.    Ball was the conserva- 
tive editor of the Charleston News and Courier during the 
Tillman and Blease  eras.     In his book he bemoans  the  demise 
of aristocratic  leadership by the  "sorry advent"  of white 
democracy in South Carolina politics.     See alsoj  D.   D. 
Wallace,   South   Carolina.  A   Short History   (Chapel Hill:     Uni- 
versity  of  North Carolina Press,   195U»   597-622,   for a 
balanced appraisal  of Tillmanism by a South Carolina   up- 
country historian. 
economic  structure  of  South Carolina after Tillman  came  to 
power,  but there was a  significant political change. 
White political supremacy was  enlarged and  strength- 
ened by two measures.     In  1892   the primary system   replaced 
the party convention a:   the means of nominating candidates 
for office and  "that /an^/ not the election of Tillman was 
the real revolution in South Carolina politics,"       Candi- 
dates were now forced to face a  popular plebiscite rather 
than be selected at a machine convention.     This was a  real 
step toward a more democratic government in South  Carolina, 
at least for the whites.     Using the Mississippi plan of 
disfranchising the Negro,   the new Constitution of  1895 was 
written almost  exclusively to remove the Negro from South 
Carolina politics.    Property and residence qualifications, 
a poll tax,  and a  literacy test were required before a 
person could vote in the general  election.     Criminals, 
lunatics,  and paupers were not to be allowed to vote.     It 
was  certain that  such qualifications would disfranchise 
most of the Negroes,  but there was also the danger that they 
would exclude a great many poor whites as well.     The solu- 
tion was twofold*     whites  could vote in the primaries,  but 
Negroes  could not;  and there was a temporary "understanding 
3Simkins,  Pitchfork Ben Tillman.  ^85. 
Ball,  T_h_e_ State That Forgot.   236. 
clause" in lieu of the property qualifications.  In 
general, every white man in the state was assured of a 
vote, and every Negro was almost certain to be disfran- 
chised,-' 
In the final analysis, Tillmanism only accomplished 
a program of moderate agrarian reforms, but indirectly it 
gave every white man an opportunity to have a voice in 
Sourth Carolina politics.  For the common man the direct 
primary was the "most glorious achievement" of Tillmanism, 
A new form of democracy had been introduced into South 
Carolina politics, 
Tillman had many political lieutenants while he 
was in power in South Carolina.  Practically all of them 
were farmers turned politicians as he himself had been. 
With only one exception, none of them ever rose to anything 
like the state and national prominence that Tillman 
achioved.  That one exception was Coleman Livingston Blease, 
a professional politician who had never been a farmer, 
Blease first entered politics as a Tillmanite candidate in 
1890 and was elected to the state House of Representatives 
*D. D, Wallace, "The South Carolina Constitutional 
Convention of 1895." XtL£ Sewanee Review. IV (1895-1896), 
3^8-360, 
George M. Koester, "Bleasism," The Greenville 
(South Carolina) Piedmont, September 9, 1916.  This is the 
first of a series of thirty-two articles which attempted to 
analyze the political appeal of Blease, but it actually 
dealt more with Tillman than with Blease, 
' 
in that year.     There he became closely associated with 
Tillman and in the years that followed,  he was known as 
the Tillmanite  leader in the South Carolina House.    During 
the years  in which  they were friends,  Blease learned much 
from Tillman of the art of catering to the common man  for 
political gain.    Blease had to imitate what was natural to 
farmer Ben Tillman.    Although a gifted speaker,  Blease 
copied many of Tillman's  "speechifying" platform mannerisms 
in  order that  he might also become the "poor man's  friend. 
Blease,  however,  was no mere imitator of Tillman,   nor was 
he a true representative  of a  certain class of people. 
Tillman was a  farmer and a representative  of farmers;  Blease 
was a politician and attempted to present  himself as repre- 
sentative  of the common people.     While Tillman was actually 
something  of a reformer,  Blease  campaigned  in the name  of 
reform,  but accomplished little. 
Just as Tillman had a hard-core following  of 
farmers,  Blease developed a  following  of textile workers in 
the state.     Tillman had referred to this group as  the 
9 
"damned factory class,"    but Blease realized the political 
Allan A, Michie and Frank Ryhlich,   Dixie Demagogues 
(New Yorki    Vanguard Press,   1939)t  265.    The term  the "poor 
man's friend" was often used to describe; either Tillman or 
Blease. 
o 
Simkins,  Pitchfork Ben Tillmnn.  489. 
9Ibid..  p.  485. 
potential in their growing numbers about  the turn of the 
century.    Capitalizing on the discontent  of the cotton mill 
workers,  Blease became a major figure in South Carolina 
politics  until 1938.     During this time he ran for the  office 
of governor of South Carolina  eight times and  for the United 
States Senate five times.    He was  elected only three timesi 
as governor in 1910 and  1912 and as Senator in 1924, 
During his career he was  one of the most controversial and 
outspoken politicians in the history of South Carolina. 
It is the purpose  of this thesis to examine the influence 
of Cole L. Blease  on South Carolina politics and the signi- 
ficance of his role in the history of that state. 
Although no biography of Blease exists, there are 
many short biographical sketches of his public career. The 
following is a selected list of such sketches 1 
Congressional  PI rectory (Washington»     U,  S, Government 
Printing Office,   1929)7 104. 
National  Cyclopaedia  of American Biography.   1898  (New 
York 1    James T.   White Company,   1916)  XV,  276. 
Yates Snowden,  A History of South Carolina  (Chicago* 
Lewis Publishing Company,   1920),   III,   175-176. 
D.  D. Wallace,   yhe History of South Carolina.  IV, 
961-962. 
Who's Who  in the South (Washington!    Mayflower Pub- 
lishing Company,   1929).   85. 
Who Was Who in America.   1897-1942  (Chicago!    A.  N. 
Marquis  Company,   1942),   106. 
graphical Directory of. the American Congress.   1774- 
  '(Washington!     U.   S.   Government Printing Office, 
I96T),  564-565. 
CHAPTER   I 
THE MILL HANDS 
Tillman had wakened the political consciousness  of 
the white masses,  hut his reforms had not really improved 
the  condition of the poorer classes.    As Francis Butler 
Simkins,  Tillman's biographer wrotet 
He had aroused certain classes without satis- 
fying them.     The  tenant farmers and the small land- 
owners were hopping the same clods they had hopped 
before they heard  of Tillman.     Tillman's  'damned 
factory class'  /the cotton mill workersy multiplied 
with  the  expansion of cotton manufacturing but did 
not develop the  economic and cultural resources 
necessary to use the colleges and other shining 
achievements  of Tillmanism.1 
By 1910 new cotton mills were established all  over 
the South Carolina  up-country and old mills were expanding. 
Mill villages such as Clinton,  Greer,  Pelzer,  Pacolet, 
Honea Path,  Liberty,   Whitmire,  and Newberry doubled and 
2 
even tripled in population from  1900 to 1909.       The mills 
sent  out agents into the countryside to recruit mill workers. 
These labor scouts were usually carefully selected men who 
1Simkins,   Pitchfork Ben. Tillman.  ^85. 
2 
U.  S.  Department  of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census,  Thirteenth Census  of the  United States.   1910* 
Population.  II.   6^9. 
either seemed pleased with mill work or were persuasive 
talkers. Most of the workers whom the agents recruited 
came from the poorer agrarian classes, commonly called 
gullyjumpers and clodhoppers. Most of these people were 
unsuccessful tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and small land- 
owners. Except for the Negroes, these people were on the 
bottom of the South Carolina social Strata.  Lured to the 
mills by the security offered by regular wages, the mill 
workers hoped to improve their economic and social posi- 
tions. To say the very least, they were disappointed. 
The ex-cotton farmers had a difficult time adjust- 
ing to their new environment.  The principal cause of their 
frustration seems to have been their intense individualism. 
They were accustomed to dealing with landowners as one man 
to another. As one contemporary notedt 
it was still difficult for them to realize that they 
were not working for any individual as an individual— 
that they were working for a corporation, complicated, 
technical, highly organized, and involved.  These men 
were individuals} they were cotton farmers who had 
moved to town.3 
Just as they had in the fields, the mill workers had to 
struggle merely to exist.  Though they made more money than 
they had previously, they were still poor.  Every member of 
the family had to work in order to survive.  Wages averaged 
around ten cents an hour in 1910 for males, while women and 
^Ben Robertson, Red Hills and Cotton (New Yorki 
Alfred A. Knopf and Co., 19^2), 28. 
10 
children were usually paid less. The workers could complain 
to their overseers, but often found it hard to understand 
why they were sympathetic with their grievances but could 
do nothing about them. 
Other elements in addition to long hours and low 
wages caused discontent among the mill hands. Most mills 
owned all the houses in which the workers lived and charged 
rent at a rate of about twenty-five cents a room.  For this 
reason few took much pride in their shabby, rented houses. 
The mills in general controlled the entire mill village 
for they owned not only the houses, but also the churches, 
the schools, and the stores. This led to an almost com- 
plete segregation of the mill operatives from the other 
elements of the South Carolina social sttructure.  Such 
segregation and economic deprivation led to social ostra- 
cism.  No one seemed to have forgotten that Negroes were 
the only laborers before the Civil War.  If a man had to 
work for wages and was not able to own anything himself 
he could count for very little in the eyes of the better 
elements of South Carolina.  No one really seemed to care 
how bad conditions were in the mills as far as the workers 
were concerned.  The Charleston News and Courier ran a 
special series on the cotton mills in the state and 
^George M. Koester, "Bleaseism," The Greenville 
(South Carolina) Piedmont. September 7» 1916. 
11 
concluded only that the workers were better off than they 
had been before.  The reporter conceded, "Those who work 
in the cotton mills haven't accumulated a fortune, but nor 
have they met with marked success in other callings."-5 The 
mill hands escaped their old nicknames of "gullyjumpers and 
clodhoppers" only to receive a new one from the better 
elements of South Carolina society—"lintheads," 
Many mill workers resigned themselves to their 
fate.  No doubt many would have agreed with the opinion of 
one of their fellow workers, "You sure do have to slave 
your life away at the mill and you get nothing for it, but 
there is nothing else for poor folks to do,"  Some, however, 
moved from mill to mill ' oping, but without success, to 
find a better life. Most tried to take pride in what 
little they had.  Work in the textile mills was strictly 
for whites. As one student of the mill operatives ob- 
served, "The whites who had the least self-assurance as to 
their social standing or whose economic position was least 
secure were naturally those who felt the most bitterness 
toward the Negro."'  The textile workers' hatred for the 
^August Kohn, The Cotton Mills of. South Carolina 
(Charleston*  The Daggett Printing Co.), 22. 
°Louis MacDonald, Southern Mill Hillst  A Study of. 
Social and Economic Forces in Certain Textile Mill Villages 
(New Yorki  Columbia University Press, 1929), 7^. 
Marjorie A. Potwin, Cotton Mill People of the 
Piedmont (New Yorki Columbia University Press, 192?), 
58-59. 
12 
Negro was probably fiercer than that of any other class  of 
people in South Carolina.     When asked his  opinion of Negroes, 
a typical mill hand repliedi 
I don't have no use for them anyway.    I  don't 
bother with niggers.     They ain't fit.     The niggers 
in this  country are about to take it.     They would 
take the mills too if they could get in. but  they 
can't.° 
Likewise other workers  had contempt  for immigrants 
since they might be competitive labor.    One worker expressed 
his feelings by saying,   "I  don't want to see a pack of 
furriners  coming down here to get the jobs away from  the 
white folks."9 
The cotton mill workers  often felt  that  they are 
trapped once they had begun working in the mill.    Most 
seemed to want a better opportunity for their children,   but 
few saw any hope of keeping their offspring out  of the mills. 
Many children had to work in order to help support their 
families.    This  of course interfered with their education, 
which was at best poor.     The state public  education syctem 
was poorly run and the mills did little to assist the 
schools.     Even if a  child was able to attend school regu- 
larly,   he was  likely to receive a poor education.    One mill 
hand summed  up the common attitude of the mill people when 
she said,   "There is no chance for the children of such as 
^acDonald,   Southern Mill Hills.   72. 
9Ibld..,   71. 
13 
..10 us. 
The dismal life on the mill hill naturally led its 
inhabitants to seek refuge in religion. Most of the workers 
had been staunchly religious before they came to work in 
the mills. Every mill village had at least one church, 
usually owned and operated by the mill and not by the 
people.  The workers were too poor to build a church or to 
pay a minister's salary. The predominant number of mill 
churches were Baptist or Methodist, but other Protestant 
denominations were sometimes represented. The mill churches 
usually carried on highly emotional services, emphasizing 
rewards in the hereafter rather than here and now.  For 
many, especially the women, the church was the only out- 
side activity where one could find relief from the dismal 
mill life. 
The men, however, found a means of escape by join- 
ing one or another of a multitude of secret fraternal or- 
ganizations. Almost every male mill worker was a member of 
at least one of the secret societies. Here they banded 
together to assume new identities in the regalia and para- 
phernalia of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, the 
Improved Order of Red Men, Loyal Order of Moose, Knights 
of Pythias, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Woodmen 
10Ibid.. 78. 
in. 
of the World and that nemesis of everything that the mill 
worker hated, the Ku Klux Klan. In these organizations a 
mill hand might also give vent to his negative feelings, 
in the company of men of like minds. In the KKK these 
negative feelings occasionally might be expressed in a 
cross-burning or a lynching rather than mere discussion. 
Whatever their stated purposes, these secret orders in 
South Carolina were quite commonly used by the mill opera- 
tives to express their opinions, if only among themselves. 
As the outlook of the mill hands was exceedingly 
negative in other areas, so were their political views. 
Of Tillman's reforms the only one that really benefited the 
lower classes was the direct primary.  Tillman's departure 
from state politics to the United States Senate left the 
poor classes without a champion. The meager demands for 
reforms begun by Tillman practically disappeared when he 
left the state scene.  Actually Tillman had taught the 
masses to vote, not in a positive manner, but rather a ne- 
gative one.  No politician needed to present a positive 
platform of reform to woo the mill workers at the pollsj 
he had but to speak out against what they hated.  Tillmanism 
had conditioned the lower classes to vote in this manner. 
As one writer stated about the mill voters, "They vote to 
defeat rather than to promote." 
11 Potwin, Cotton l-'.j 11 People of the Piedmont. 52. 
15 
With Tillman  in Washington,   the turn of the century 
opened with a  resurgence of conservative political power in 
South Carolina.     Governors Duncan C. Heyward and Martin 
Ansel resembled  the Bourbon politicians of pre-Tillman days, 
and were labeled by some newspapers as "reactionaries."    To 
the mill workers  they became symbols of all the things they 
hated and an obstacle to legislation that might benefit 
them.    All  that the masses needed was a popular leader,  such 
as Tillman had been,   to rally their political support. 
Coleman Livingston Blease emerged as  such a  leader during 
this period.12 
Blease sought the vote of  the poor and discontented 
in general and the mill workers in p rticular.     During the 
bulk of his political  career,  he  could always depend on 
carrying most  of  the mill precincts.     Usually the outcome 
of the election was decided by the performances  of Blease 
and his opponents  on the stump,  but he could always rely 
on a  strong nucl   us of voters from the mill workers.    Blease 
had learned a great deal about the common man's attitudes 
in his father's hotel and livery stable as well as  from 
Ben and Jim Tillman and Josh Ashley.     In addition Cole 
learned much directly from  the mill people themselves  from 
mill village to mill village and   talking to workers  indi- 
vidually.     Cole knew a  great number of the factory workers 
12 Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman. ^86. 
16 
personally and called them by their first names.     "In his 
heyday he probably knew more workers personally than any 
13 
other man in the state," For many years his electioneer- 
ing never ceased 1  when he was not actually engaged in a 
campaign on the stump,  he was befriending the mill  opera- 
tives individually. 
Bleose also penetrated the mill hill society by 
joining  every secret  order that he could.    Although it is 
not known whether Blease was ever a member of the Ku Klux 
Klan,  he was  extremely active in all the rest.    He was 
often elected to high  offices in the fraternal organiza- 
tions and proudly boasted that he was  "the only one who has 
represented  three of the State fraternal bodies  in National 
Grand Bodies."        Blease's membership in these orders was 
a valuable political asset as far as his influence on the 
mill workers was concerned.     Here he became an intimate 
friend to the mill  hands as he did in his door-to-door 
canvass. 
In addition to making personal  friends with many 
of his  supporters,  Blease deliberately strove to become 
13Potwin,   Cotton Mill People  oX ihe Piedmont.   98. 
Yates Snowden,  History of South Carolina  (Chicago t 
Lewis Publishing Company,   1920),   II,   1057, 
1^Ibid..   IV,   96^. 
17 
"the poor man's friend."    With  earthy rhetoric,   he appealed 
to the poor white's common beliefs,   prejudices,  hatreds, 
and fears.     Coley,   as they affectionately called him,  won 
the heart of every  "linthead" and "gullyjumper" with his 
emotional harangues.    As  one perceptive commentator wrote: 
He spoke for the poor man.     That was  it!     He was 
the mouthpiece for the poor man's discontent.     He 
articulated the poor man's  unexpressed  emotions, 
ambitions,  and disgruntlementsj   did it garishly,   did 
it sentimentally,  did it courageously,  and he gained 
his leadership because he did it,*0 
When Coley spoke on white supremacy,   individualism, 
the sa;,ctity of white womanhood,  and  economy in government, 
the poor whites listened and approved.     Often his stomp 
speeches were punctuated by outburts  from the audience 
such as:     "Tell about it,   Coley!"j  or,   "Goddermighty ain't 
17 he a man!"   '     Blease's ability to arouse their feelings 
was almost  uncanny.    One writer noted that nobody could 
"more quickly catch the superficial  feeling of an audience 
than Governor Blease.     His   oratory is  that   of Billy Sunday, 
1R headed in the other direction." Testimonies  of loyalty 
such asi     "I'd put  in my vote for Coley if I was astanding 
16 James C.  Derieux,   "Crawling Toward the Promised 
Land," Ihe. Survey.   XLVIII   (April-September,   1922),   178. 
17Ib_id..,   176. 
18 W.  K.   Tate,   "After Blease:     A   New Program   for 
South Carolina,"   The Survey XXXIII   (February 27,   1915)#   577. 
18 
knee-deep in hell:" or,   "Coley,  I'd put in my vote for you 
if you was  to steal my mule,"  9 were not uncommon. 
Many of Blease's  opponents  could not understand 
how he inspired such  unquestioned devotion from the poor 
white without  offering a program of social and  economic 
reforms.    The poor whites,   however,  had only a choice be- 
tween Coley and the traditional  conservatism of the state 
Democrats.     Without making specific reference to Blease, 
William Watts Ball,  the South  Carolina apologist for the 
Bourbon Democrats,   lamented,   "Duped as  the mill workers 
are by the shallow, but plausible demagogues,  they are not 
blamable for following them often in preference to better 
20 men who neglect them altogether,"        Likewise,   one poor 
white supporter of Blease stated,   "Kven though Coley don't 
ever    do a durn thing for us poor fellows,   he does at least 
promise something,  and that's more than any of the others 
21 promise to do." 
Blease did not have to do anything  for his people 
as long as he was against everything that they deplored. 
In their eyes  Coley fought  courageously against his political 
1^0,  L,  Warr,   "Mr.  Blease of South  Carolina," 
American Mercury.   XVI  (January,   1929)•   29. 
20W.  W. Ball,  T_he State That Forgot  (Indianapolisx 
Bobbs-Merrill  Inc.,   1932).   2?6. 
21Warr,   "Mr. Blease of South Carolina,"  29. 
19 
enemies, the newspapers, the aristocracy, foreigners, 
business interests, and the Negro,  The poor whites grew 
to consider Coloy Blease as their leader against common 
enemies. If nothing else, he gave them hope to improve 
their lot through political action.  So it was that Cole 
L, Blease, a townsman and a lawyer, became the hero of a 
class of people whose background diverged sharply from 
his own, Ben Tillman had been a farmer and then a farmer 
politicianj Cole Blease had never been a factory worker. 
CHAPTER II 
• THE "STABLE BOY" FROM NEWBERRX 
Cole L, Blease often spoke with pride of his child- 
hood background and related that "the stable boy was born 
without a silver upoon in his mouth, but had silver on his 
lips."  Coleman Livingston Blease was born on October 8, 
1868, the son of a respectable Newberry hotel and livery 
stable proprietor.  Cole also demonstrated a talent for 
oratory at an early age. While he was a student at New- 
berry College, he entered an oratorical contest, and al- 
though he did not win first prize, his hearers were so 
pleased with his performance that they awarded Cole a gold 
watch chain. Later at South Carolina College, now the 
University of South Carolina, the young Mr, Blease won a 
prize in a debating contest sponsored by the Clariosophic 
Literary Society, But Cole's boast that he was a stable 
boy with a talent for speaking in his youth, was not the 
whole truth, 
Blease deliberately tried to identify himself with 
the common people. As David D, Wallace, the historian of 
South Carolina, observed:  "Mr, Blease represented himself 
1Cole L, Blease, Annual Message. January 12. 1£1_5. 
(Columbiai  The R. L, Bryan Printing Co., 1915)» ^2. 
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as more common than he actually was."      After all Cole's 
father owned  the stable end hotel in which he worked, and 
although the family was not rich  even by local  standards, 
the Blease business was  "operated successfully  over a  long 
period  of time."       None of Cole's ancestors were aristo- 
crats,  but neither were any of them poor. 
The Blease hotel was a place where men gathered to 
drink and to talk.     No doubt at any  early age Cole had 
learned much about local  up-country feelings on race, 
religion,  and politics.    In this atmosphere he not only 
listened but also became quite a sociable  talker himself. 
Before he was twenty-one years  old,   he maintained that he 
could call  "nearly every white man and woman in my county 
and a  large majority of the colored,     by their first names." 
He learned what the people of his area  thought and felt and 
he knew how to talk to them. 
In addition to his public school and livery stable 
education,   Cole attended three  colleges—an opportunity 
denied most poor South Carolinians.    Blease revealed  his 
political ambitions while he was a boy as well as other 
426. 
*D.   D.   Wallace, The. Histor/ Qf  South  Carolina.   Ill, 
3Ibid..  IV,   964. 
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characteristics ho later displayed in his political 
career.    The reason he did not win the oratorical contest 
was that the  judges  found his speech was not exactly ori- 
ginal ;  their misgivings were confirmed when a  faculty mem- 
ber discovered that Cole's message was remarkably similar 
to another that  had appeared in the Davidson College 
Monthly.    Though he had already won the prize,   he was  ex- 
pelled  from the debating society,  and shortly after left 
the school.     Undeterred by this setback,  the young Cole 
entered Georgetown University at Washington,  D,   C. and com- 
pleted a  law course there in 1889.      As a young man he 
showed ability as a  public  speaker though he had little 
concern for what he said.     Oratory,  notoriety,  and ambition 
seem to have come naturally to him:and he used the firnt 
two to further the last. 
Blease's appearance scarcely suggested a champion 
of the poor.     In fact he looked much  like an aristocrat, 
very meticulous in his dress,  and usually wearing dark 
Prince Albert suits,   hand-tailored in Charleston.    In his 
younger years  Cole usually wore a  string tie and in later 
years when he switched to white suits  to match his hair and 
moustache,  he habitually wore a bow tie.    Another obvious 
feature of his dress was a broad-brimmed black felt hat 
which was more often in his  hand than on his head.    His 
^Columbia  State. August 19,   1908. 
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most highly prized ornament, however,  was the gold watch 
chain ho had won while at Newberry College.    A number of 
fraternal badges also adorned the chain that Cole almost 
always wore.     Tall,   slender and erect,   he was described in 
his  older years as  "a perfect imitation of a  Confederate 
colonel." 
After completing his work at Georgetown University, 
Cole was admitted  to the South  Carolina bar and as soon as 
he began his  career as a  lawyer he  entered politics. 
Although he was not yet twenty-one years old, Blease ran 
for the state House of Representatives in 1889.    The elec- 
tion was typical  of many of those to comei    Blease lost. 
The next year,  however,   he was victorious for several rea- 
sons.     His father Henry Blease,  a well respected citizen 
of Newberry,   campaigned for him.    It was the Tillman Re- 
form Movement,  however,   that was mainly responsible for 
Cole's  election.     Cole called himself a Tillmanite and went 
to the  South  Carolina House of Representatives in 1890. 
The young  legislator did not take long to estab- 
lish himself as a   Tillmanite once he got to Columbia.    Re- 
elected in 1892 Blease was then recognized as Tillman's 
personal leader in the House of Representatives.     Cole also 
became acquainted with James H.  Tillman,  Benjamin R.'s 
963. 
D.   D.  Wallace,   The History  of South  Carolina.   IV, 
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nephew and Joshua D. Ashley,  an  illiterate but rising mem- 
ber of the House.    Both of these men were radical  champions 
of  the poor and advocates of what Ben Tillman  called   "the 
darker phases   of Tillmanism."       Though Blease was a   clever 
man,   rarely was  he original.    Ben Tillman provided Blease 
with much to imitate,  but Jim Tillman and  "Citizen Josh" 
Ashley added the radical touch to Blease's  thinking and 
words.    Jim Tillman could outdo his uncle at Negro bait- 
ing,  and he and  "Citizen Josh" were the heroes  of the grow- 
ing number of mill hands in the up-country.    Both men were 
known for their crude language and violent tendencies.     Jim 
Tillman's  career was  cut short after a bitter campaign for 
governor in 1902,  when he shot and killed Narcisco G. 
Gonzales,   editor  of the Columbia   State.    Although Gonzales 
was  unarmed and the murder appeared to be premeditated, 
Tillman was acquitted and went free.    Blease always main- 
tained that Jim's attack on Gonzales was  justified because 
of the slanders Gonzales had written about him.    Even if 
Josh Ashley had possessed the intelligence to become a  real 
leader of the mill people,  his chances were ruined when he 
led a  successful  lynch mob.    Blease was the only member of 
this  unsavory triumvirate who was  clever enough to remember 
that actions spoke louder than words.    Blease always  talked 
a  lot but never did much; and thus was more successful in 
7Simkins,   Pitchfork Ben Tillman.   488. 
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politics than Jim Tillman or Josh Ashley. 
Under the influence of the younger Tillman and 
Ashley, Blease began to cultivate the support of the cotton 
mill operatives as early as 1892.  Whe factory owners com- 
plained that if a bill limiting labor to a sixty hour week 
were passed, the economy of the state would be ruined, Cole 
defended the bill introduced by Citizen Josh by replying 
that "If we have to buy capital by murdering women and 
children, for God's sake, let it go, let it go!"8 
Cole ran for a third term in the House, in 1894, 
but again was defeated. Returning to Newberry and his law 
practice, he remained active in state politics.  In 1896 
and 1900 he was a presidential elector on the Bryan ticket, 
and in 1897 he was elected mayor of Helena, a small town 
near Newberry.  Then in 1898 Blease went back to the South 
Carolina House for another term? two years later he ran 
for lieutenant governor against Jim Tillman and lost. After 
serving as Newberry city attorney for several years, Blease 
was elected to the state Senate in 190^. After his term 
9 
he returned to Newberry and was elected mayor in 1909. 
Francis B. Simkins, The Tillman Movement in South 
Carolina (Durham:  Duke University Press, 1926), 176-177. 
9Wallace, TJie_ History p_f South Carolina. IV, 963. 
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During this period Dlease had made two unsuccessful 
attempts to become governor.     In 1906 he began the first 
of his  eight campaigns for the governorship  of South 
Carolina.    Blease,  Richard I. Manning,  and Martin Ansel 
were the three major  candidates  for the Democratic nomin- 
ation.     In selecting Manning as  the target of his attacks, 
Blease had made a  tactical error.    Manning was from a 
family that was  easily identified with the ante-bellum 
aristocrats.     Five of his ancestors had been governors  of 
the state before  the Civil War.    Blease was quick to point 
out that Manning represented the Bourbon interests, while 
he himself was an advocate of reform.    Blease also strongly 
defended the controversial State Dispensary,  although while 
serving in the House,   he had introduced a prohibition bill 
in 1892.    Blease was probably effective in securing 
Manning's defeat  in the primary,  but the colorless Ansel 
had won when the ballots had been counted.     Cole had lost, 
but he did receive about twenty thousand votes,   cast 
largely in up-country counties,   the home of the textile 
workers. 
After his  showing at the polls in 1906, Blease was 
encouraged to compete  once more for the governorship in 
10Ronald   D.  Burnside,   "The Governorship  of Coleman 
Livingston Blease  of South Carolina,   1911-1915"  (unpublished 
Ph.D.^dissertation,   Indiana University,   1963)»  U« 
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1908. Actually his campaign never ceased after 1906. He 
travelled all over the state, making speeches and friends, 
and concentrated these efforts in the textile piedmont. 
By taking special interest in the individual workers, 
Blease won them to his cause. As one writer said, "Coleman 
L. Blease sought out every available vote and awoke the 
mill people to political activity." 
Despite the fact that tradition assured the governor 
of South Carolina a second term, Blease was eager to 
challenge Ansel on a stumping tour of the state in June of 
1908.  In the ensuing campaign, Blease clouded any relevant 
issues by reducing the political debates to personal 
attacks on Ansel's character, denouncing him as a "nigger 
lover" because he had made "one of those infernal baboons" 
a notary for the state. Furthermore, Blease declared him- 
self as opposed to Negro education altogether and implied 
that since Ansel had made no statement on the subject he 
must have been in favor of it. Later, when it was pointed 
out that Tillman had also appointed Negro notaries, Blease 
replied that he did not always approve of Tillman's actions. 
In the same spirit, Blease appealed to mill workers directly 
by opposing Tillman's idea to bring immigrants into the 
state to work in the factories, since "foreigners are 
11 Potwin, Cotton I'-UH People of the Piedmont. 45. 
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1? worse  than Negroes." 
The  newspapers made the fatal mistake  of lowering 
themselves to Blease's  level by attacking his personal 
life.     Blease was accused of being personally immoral,  a 
drunkard,  and a nigger lover himself.    Cole lost the elec- 
tion,   but the newspapers  overdid their attacks  on him by 
exaggerated accusations  that anyone  could see were false. 
The chief beneficiary of all the publicity was Blease, 
After a  later    hard-fought campaign,   he said, 
I have been criticized and pretty severely cri- 
ticized and I  love criticism.     If it had not been 
for the newspapers in South Carolina,   I would never 
have been  elected.     Their abuse and vituperation did 
more to  elect me than anything I   ever did,13 
Blease received close to ^0,000 votes  in 1908, 
just  short of the number needed  to defeat Ansel,     The news- 
paper attacks had certainly helped him, but the biggest 
reason for his impressive showing at the polls was his 
cultivation of the mill  operative vote.    Blease had worked 
hard  for a number of years to gain the support of these 
people and in 1910 his hard work would pay off. 
2299. 
12 Spartanbur.q Herald.  August   22,   1908. 
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Chapter III 
THE  ELECTION  OF   1910 
Early  in 1910  the Newberry  lawyer announced that he 
would again bo a candidate for the office of governor in 
the Democratic primary to be held  in August.    Although 
many of the candidates  often declared their intentions  to 
run for office as early as the preceding January or February 
before the  election, most of the real campaign action did 
not  usually begin before the latter part of June.    At that 
time the state Democratic Farty would issue the  "stump" 
itineraries.    From the end of June to the end of August 
the candidates would travel  over the entire state,  all  of 
them  speaking  on the same platform at the county seats as 
designated by the schedule.     This plan gave all the voters 
an opportunity to compare each of the candidates with his 
opponents and a  chance to meet each candidate as well, 
"Stump Day" had become something of a holiday since 
its inauguration by Tillman.    The women prepared fried 
chicken and washtubs  of lemonade for the listeners before 
the candidates  spoke from such impromptu platforms as 
wagons  or truck beds.    Although women were sometimes present 
at the speech making,   they rarely took much interest in the 
electioneering proceedings,   even after the enactment of the 
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Nineteenth Amendment.    Politics were left to the "menfolks" 
for their  entertainment and participation during the late 
summer and early fall of election years.     These political 
rallies,  to say the least, were usually quite colorful and 
lively as the candidates  employed every conceivable antic 
to attract potential voters and to harangue their opponents. 
The audience also felt as free to interrupt speakers with 
shouts  of approbation or disapproval as did the candidates 
themselves.    A  good  stump speaker might  even parry remarks 
with the audience.     For about fifty years  or more an 
office-seeker's success  in South Carolina politics was 
usually dependent to a great  extent on his performance on 
the hustings.    All in all it seemed like a good idea for 
it brought  the politicians into direct contact with the 
people 80 that  the voters might make an informed decision, 
at  the polls. 
Except  for the exclusion of women,   it also appeared 
on the surface  that stumping was a democratic institution. 
It  should be remembered that the campaign was for the Demo- 
cratic party nominations.    If a  candidate won the primary, 
the formal  election in November was only a formality that 
made his election official.    Voting in the Democratic  state 
For some interesting  later pictures of activities 
on the South Carolina stump seei     "Carolina  Jubilee," 
Newsweek   (August  22,   1930).   I1*, 
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primaries was usually heavy, while in the November general 
election only a fraction of the primary vote was cast. 
The obvious reason for this anomoly was, of course, to 
prevent the Negro from voting while still permitting the 
franchise to many whites who would otherwise be disfranchised. 
In fact the state constitution written in 1895 at the in- 
stigation of Ben Tillman, took away many whites' voting 
rights as well as those of the Negroes.  The real problem 
in South Carolina politics was that for many years, before 
and after the Civil War, the Ne.'^ro population was greater 
than the white.  Reconstruction was still a bitter memory 
in many white South Carolina minds and the fear of Negro 
rule was ever present in state politics.  When Tillman had 
captured the Democratic Party's gubernatorial nomination in 
1890, a group of conservative Bourbon Democrats led by A. C. 
Haskell had "bolted" from the party to run on an independent 
ticket in the general election.  The "Haskellites," as they 
were called, however, committed the arch sin in South 
Carolina politics by appealing to the Negroes for support. 
Only through intimidation had the blacks been kept from 
the polls (at least so the Tillmanites believed).  Without 
explicitly violating the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, 
the Constitution of 1895 robbed the average Negro in South 
2Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman. 163-168. 
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Carolina of his right to vote, but the primaries allowed 
propertyless and penniless whites, who were also disquali- 
fied, to cast a vote for the man of their choice.  Thus 
for many years South Carolina had an extremely limited 
form of democracy in which only white males participated. 
Despite the fact that the Negro had been eliminated from 
the election process, one idea was intuitively and intensely 
believed by every white who had only recently received a 
voice in the state governments  if the system were changed 
at all to allow Negro voting rights, the whites would again 
be subjected to "Black Rule."  This fear was very real for 
many poor white Democrats.  From the fear came more preju- 
dice and hatred for the Negro so that the race issue was 
always deeply intertwined in South Carolina politics. 
Appealing to racial and other prejudices, a whole series 
of politicians were able to win the confidence of the white 
voters. Men, like Pitchfork Ben Tillman, Cole Ble8se, 
Cotton td Smith, Olin D. Johnston, and Strom Thurmond, by 
the sheer force of their personalities and the manipulation 
of inflamatory issues were elected to high offices in 
South Carolina. So it appears that many successful South 
Carolina politicians were racist demagogues although they 
might disagree on other issues.  Cole L. Blease was above 
all else a professional politician who often managed to 
weave the race question into many issues of the 1910 cam- 
paign for the governorship of South Carolina. 
M* 
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Blease announced in April that he would run on the 
same platform   that he  had held in his   two previous cam- 
paigns.     In itself the platform  created no stir in the 
statej   as  D.   D.   Wallace  stated,   "Blease's platform and some 
of his measures  looked  fair  enough."3    None of the provi- 
sions  seemed radical at all;  in fact  they were in keeping 
with the state's traditional conservatism in government. 
The candidate stressed  that  the financial condition of the 
state was  the main issue of  the campaign and promised an 
honest,   fair,   impartial administration,  which would strive 
to keep  "forever"   the legislative,   judicial,  and  executive 
branches  separate,   while at  the same time working in hsr- 
mony.     Such an administration v.ould guarantee the enforce- 
ment  of the law:,  of the state and federal constitutions 
while insuring  justice  through trial by  jury.      Blease then 
enumerated a  twelve-point "reform" programi    biennial ses- 
sions  of the state legislature;  liberal pensions for Con- 
federate veterans;   liberal but not extravagant appropria- 
tions  for the state institutions  of higher learning!  a good 
free school  system   "so that  every white child may be given 
a  good  common education," but absolutely no compulsory 
^Wallace,   History of  South  Carolina.   Ill,   b2k. 
Blease would  later be accused   of attempting  to 
subvert all these measures  that he proposed. 
3^ 
school law; opposition to the higher education of Negroes, 
and a declaration "in favor of white taxes only for white 
education," strict enforcement of vagrancy laws, a marriage 
registration law, a flat rate of two and one-half cents 
per mile on South Carolina railways; "good roads, good 
morals, and honest government?" local option whiskey laws 
and total opposition to any type of barroom? opposition to 
any restriction on the rights of Democrats to vote in pri- 
mary elections; operation of the state government on a 
"liberal but not extravagant" budget, with a reduction of 
taxes." 
In many ways the platform appealed to poor whites 
without offending the comfortable, A promise of reduc- 
tion in taxes was bound to be approved by most voters as 
would the pledge of economy in government.  The proposals 
on education also favored the poor whites.  Instead of 
spending large sums on the state colleges which few of the 
poor were able to attend or on Negro education, educational 
funds would be used to build a common school system for 
all whites, Blease's declaration that higher Negro educa- 
tion was dangerous and his proposal that no white tax money 
be spent on Negro schools were also attractive to poor 
whites. The conservative threat to purge the Democratic 
Club rolls of ineligible voters alarmed many whites who 
1910. 
5"Mr.   Blease's Platform,"   Columbia  State.  April  25, 
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could easily be disqualified since the poor could not meet 
the property requirement or pay the poll tax, much less 
pass the literacy test. Blease assured them that he was 
against any such restrictions on their primary voting pri- 
vileges. 
The real issue in the campaign was not finance as 
Blease had stated, but the liquor question. Ben Tillman's 
"baby," the State Dispensary system, had been killed by 
legislative decree. Afterwards most of the state's counties 
had adopted prohibition, but a few counties, such as 
Charleston, operated their own liquor systems. Many ele- 
ments in South Carolina had begun to favor state-wide pro- 
hibition by 1910 because of the charges of corruption in 
the local dispensaries and of the widely shared misgivings 
about the evils of drink. Blease seemed to be the stronger 
of the local option candidates, although Thomas G, McLeod 
appeared to have the support of the Charleston pro-liquor 
interests.  Claudius C, Featherstone was the leading pro- 
hibition candidate, followed by F. H. Hyatt.  John G. 
Richards, who ran for governor almost as often as Blease, 
had no definite position on the liquor question, but seemed 
to favor local option.  The leading state newspapers 
generally opposed prohibition. Although they might not 
endorse a candidate, they were usually in agreement with 
their denunciations of Featherstone as a prohibition 
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leader. 
Feathernto. e was not harassed by the editorials, 
but based most of his campaign on an appeal for statewide 
prohibition.  While the other candidates argued over each 
other's pronouncements on prohibition, Blease calmly stated 
that the decision should be left to people and not the 
office seekers. Although he promised to abide by the will 
of the people in the matter, Blease flatly stated that he 
enjoyed a drink of liquor occasionally himself, proving to 
some that he was not a hypocrite on the issue. Blease also 
presented prohibition as a threat to law and order since 
those who would want liquor would try to get it illegally. 
Prohibition then he argued, led to bootleggers "in the form 
9 
of free niggers backed by white men."  Such frankness and 
apparent honesty on the behalf of the candidate from New- 
berry won the approval of many voters on the stump. 
While the other candidates debated endlessly over 
prohibition, Blease elucidated the platform issues which 
the other candidates rarely mentioned or bothered to pro- 
nounce upon.  Only Blease and F. H. Hyatt gave any serious 
attention to economy in the state budget.  On other important 
issues such as compulsory education, suffrage restriction, 
Burnside, "The Governorship of C. L. Blease," 1*4-25. 
Columbia. State. August 9» 1910. 
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railroad rates, Confederate pensions, and Negro education, 
Blease had left no doubt as to his position. Although his 
main appeal was emotional, in some respects, Blease 
sounded quite reasonable to the average South Carolina 
voter.  For example, his comment on Negro education that it 
"ruins a good farm hand, makes a bad convict," made good 
sense to many whites. 
As the campaign progressed, the newspapers made the 
mistake of opposing Blease as well as Featherstone. Led 
by the Columbia State, the South Carolina press, with the 
exception of the Newberry lawyer's hometown paper and a few 
other small weeklies, sought to discredit him altogether, 
deploring his tactics on the stump, especially his appeals 
to prejudice, Blease's opposition to compulsory educa- 
tion was considered to be evidence that he was surely not 
the "poor man's friend" since the children of lower in- 
come families stood to benefit most from a free education. 
The press failed to realize that Blease wa3 catering to the 
strong individualism of the poor by insisting that parents, 
not the state, had the right to control their children. 
Similarly, the newspapers erred in supporting primary re- 
strictions which would remove the voting privileges of the 
poor. Blease replied by calling the editors and reporters 
various unflattering names and accusing them of showering 
^Charleston News and Courier. August 16, 1910. 
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him  with   "vituperation and abuse."9     if   elected,   Blease 
promised to introduce a  severe  libel law in the General 
Assembly to protect the  state's  citizens from the slander 
of the press. 
Finally,   the end of August and the primary election 
arrived.     Thomas McLeod,   the local optionist,  was favored 
to win by the  Charleston News and Courier,   but such a  pre- 
diction meant  little since  the News and  Courier had sup- 
ported McLeod throughout the campaign.     To be sure,   few 
political  ob. "irvers predicted that Cole L.  Blease would 
gain a plurality in the first primary,  but  such was the 
case.    Featherstone tallied slightly over 30,000 votes to 
come in second,  almost  3,000 short of Blea3e's totalj 
McLeod placed a strong third? the other candidates received 
only fractions  of the previous  counts.    Because no candi- 
dates had a majority, a run-off  primary in September 
10 matched Blease with Featherstone. 
The outcome  of the  first  primary had really placed 
the newspapers in a predicament.    Most had supported 
neither Blease nor Featherstonej   in fact,  both had been 
denounced by the press.     Now the papers had  to make a 
choice between two  candidates,   of whom they had previously 
90ne of Blease's favorite phrases. 
10Burnside,   "The Governorship of C.  L. Blease,"  25. 
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disapproved. Again the Columbia State assumed the initia- 
tive by declaring that there was no choice in the matter— 
Cole L. Blease was definitely not the man for the office. 
Prohibition, which had been the main issue in the campaign, 
should now be ignored, declared the press.  Such was the 
editorial logic given to the voters by the state newspapers. 
The issues were no longer important, but the personalities 
of the candidates were.  "The issue is one of men not 
measures," declared the State.   Inspired by the State's 
spearhead thrust, the other papers joined with it in 
launching a series of attacks on Blease, some of which 
unfounded, others true. The real error committed by the 
press, however, was to overstate their case. 
Blease was accused of changing his views on liquor 
whenever it wss convenient to do soj of accepting graft 
funds during the days of the corrupt state dispensary com- 
mission i  and of frequenting "blind tigers." Such unproven 
charges were easily denied by Blease.  The epitome of edi- 
torial folly, however, was reached by the State only a few 
days before the run-off primary.  The State issued a poli- 
tical cartoon depicting a noble female figure, representing 
the state, holding a sword labeled "the ballot" to defend 
herself against a horrible buzzard. Blesse's head adorned 
^Columbia Stale, September 5, 1910. 
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the ugly body on which was written "Dispensary Grafters, 
Ignorance,  Race Prejudice,   Lawlessness,   Demagogy, Blind 
Tiger3,   Injustice,   Class Prejudice,"    Below the cartoon 
12 were the words,   "The Menace." 
The effort to discredit Blease,   however,  only re- 
sulted in the making of a popular martyr,  -*    Many voters 
had little desire to support a cause that defamed its 
opponents.    After there attacks, many voters  disassociated 
themselves with the anti-Blease movement and became active 
Bleaseites.    The State's  tactic  of demanding that the 
voters vote against a candidate rather than for one back- 
fired.    On election day Blease polled over 56,000 votes 
compared to Featherstone's  total  of approximately 50,000. 
Even if the newspapers  could not  explain why,  Blease was 
to be governor.    The defeated conservative forces  offered 
no opposition in the November general election as they had 
against Tillman in 1890 and Blease was  officially elected 
14 governor by the qualified  electorate. 
After his election although many of his  opponents 
believed him  unfit  for office,  some conservatives hoped 
that Blease would calm down his bombastic oratory and be- 
come a  capable governor.     They may have been  encouraged by 
12 Ibid.. September 8, 1910. 
13Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman. 490. 
l4Burnside, "The Governorship of C. L. Blease," 29. 
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Senator Tillman,  who speculated that Blease would  "dis- 
appoint his  enemies" and embark on a  successful administra- 
tion.     But Blease  had  forgotten neither the harassment  of 
the  opposition nor the statements he had made in campaign. 
As far as he was  concerned,  the battle,   far from being 
ended,   had only begun. 
The strenuous  campaign had obviously weakened  the 
governor-elect's physical condition and he had been under 
the  care  of his physician for some weeks before the inaugur- 
ation.     There was  even some speculation as to whether or 
not Blease would be able to attend the ceremony or if in- 
deed  the  ceremony would take place at all.     Everything, 
however,   occurred as planned.    On January 17,   1911  Coleman 
Livingstone Blease,  apparently still quite ill,   took the 
oath   of   office  of Governor  of South  Carolina,     Immediately 
thereafter,   he announced to the audience assembled in the 
capitol  that he would be unable to deliver his  inaugural 
address  because  of  illness.     Instead,   the reading clerk 
would make the speech for the Governor.     It was  one of the 
few occasions  in Blease's career when another was allowed 
to speak  for him.   ' 
The inaugural address,  which sounded much like his 
stump speeches,   contained no words  of forgiveness for his 
■^Charleston News and  Courier.   January  18,   1911. 
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enemies. Calling his election the "greatest political vic- 
tory in the history of South Carolina," Blease condemned 
not only the gentlemen of the press but also ministers who 
had given vent to "malice and slanders of the most virulent 
and malicious nature." 
After his bitter indictment of his political enemies, 
Blease continued with a miscellany that touched on a variety 
of subjects.  He proposed that legislation be enacted to 
prohibit the use and sale of cocaine and other harmful 
drugs. Rather than encourage the "evil, habitual drinking 
of coca-cola, pepsi-cola /sic7 and such like mixtures," 
Bleasu believed it would be b. tter for the people if they 
had "nice, respectable places where they could go and buy 
a good, cold, pure glass of beer, than to drink such in- 
jurious concoctions."  Speaking of the liquor issue, the 
governor proposed that the present law be expanded to allow 
the counties to decide if they wanted county dispensaries, 
privately-owned liquor stores, or prohibition.  This issue 
should be voted on in the primaries not "in a general elec- 
tion where the Negro might be and is the balance of power." 
Blease further asked for laws to prohibit the sale of toy 
guns in the state to prevent children from becoming vio- 
lent at an early age.  Executions of condemned criminals 
should be made public in order to impress young potential 
trouble makers. As a final measure to prevent the corrup- 
tion of youth, the legislature should enact a law prohibiting 
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boys  under sixteen from smoking cigarettes. 
The remainder of his proposals were chiefly con- 
cerned with a  strange mixture of finance,  race and  educa- 
tion.    Echoing his  campaign promises,  Governor Blease 
called for "a poor government and a rich people."    To 
achieve this purpose,   taxes and state institutions  of higher 
learning should be reduced and the resultant  savings appro- 
priated to the public school system.    Furthermore,   taxes 
paid by whites were to be used only for white  education. 
The Governor reiterated his belief that it was   "a serious, 
grave mistake to educate negroes."    Blease particularly 
desired that white children learn histoi j from books 
written by Southern authors to perpetuate the glory of the 
South.     Children should be taught to love old  Confederate 
veterans  so that anyone who did not was  "either a Yankee 
or had negro blood in his veins."    With regard to the 
Negro,  Blease stated that he was a  friend to the black 
race,  but  that South Carolina was a   "white man's country 
and will continue to be ruled by white men,  regardless of 
the opinions and editorials of quarter or half-breeds and 
foreigners.     The pure-blooded Caucasian will always  defend 
the virtue  of our women,  no matter the cost.     If rape is 
committed death must follow!"    In conclusion,  Blease asked 
that God direct and guide him as governor,  and promised a 
"fair and  impartial" administration to all citizens,   "both 
.16 
M 
black and white."' 
To the audience of Bleaseites  that packed the gal- 
leries,  it was the kind of speech they had  come to hear 
their triumphant hero make.    The newspapers retaliated by 
criticizing the new executive's  speech as  the "worst state 
paper"  ever delivered,  and declared it sufficient  evidence 
to prove that Blease was unfit for office.     The real reason 
that Blease had been unable to deliver his address, accord- 
ing to the press,  was that he had become intoxicated during 
a victory celebration and was too inebriated to read his 
speech the next day.     The editorial accounts forecast that 
the governorship of Blease would begin a new ora  of fac- 
tionalism and political partisanship in the state.     The 
majority of his proposals were worthless and the  only hope 
for South Carolina lay in Blease's prayer for divine assist- 
ance.    Richard C.  Hemphill of the Richmond Timos-Dispatch. 
wrote,   "If God fails,  what then?    We tremble to think! ,.,17 
l6Journal  pX Ihe Senate  o£ iM State p_f South 
Carolin?.   1911   (Columbia:     Gonaales and Bryan,   1911),   77-89. 
17Richmond Times-Dismtch.   January 20,   1911. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION, 1911-1912 
V. 0. Key in his book Southern Politics has ob- 
served thatt 
South Carolina's chief executive has limited 
power. He controls the state constabulary. He has 
the power of appointment to state offices except 
many of the really important state agencies. He can 
grant pardons, send messages to the state legislature, 
and exercise the power of veto; yet he has the 
narrowest sort of power of direction of state ad- 
ministration.  'There's nothing to it except the 
honor* is the common attitude.! 
Cole L. Blease had anything but "the common atti- 
tude" about the powers of the governor of South Carolina. 
He deftly used every resource of his new office to anta- 
gonize his enemies and to reward his friends. Blease 
neither disappointed his enemies in their predictions of 
factionalism and partisanship nor forgot the promises he 
had made in his campaign. 
On January 21, 1911, he announced in the first of 
his hundreds of messages to the General Assembly that he 
had revoked the commissions of every notary public in the 
state.  The notaries "carry much more power than is 
thought," and he said, he intended to fix some qualifications 
1V, 0. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation 
(New Yorki Alfred A. Knopf, 19^9). 150. 
and a   limitation   to the term  of  office.2    By  this measure 
he accomplished   several  purposes.     Since notaries   have been 
appointed without  time limitations by his preceding poli- 
tical  enemies,   the governor removed opposition at  the 
local  level and  later rewarded his "friends" by appointing 
them to the vac nt  offices.    In regard to his action con- 
cerning the notaries Blease  later  commented,   "I  expect  to 
see that  some of my friends receive at least some consider- 
ation from this administration,     I  do not propose to 
appoint my enemies to office upon recommendations by any- 
body,   unless  I  cannot find a  friend who is competent and 
worthy of the position."-^    Another reason given for re- 
voking the notaries'  commissions was that Governor Ansel, 
his predecessor had made an "infernal nigger" a notary. 
In addition to ridding the state of black office holders, 
Blease boasted that his revision  of notary commissions was 
a  victory for economy in government.    By charging two dol- 
lars  for each  new commission,  the  executive claimed to have 
saved  the taxpayers' money by providing a new source of 
Journal  of  the House  of Representatives   of  the 
State  of South  Carolina.   1911   (Columbia«     Gonzales  and 
Bryan,   1911),   130.     Hereafter cited as House Journal. 
^House Journal.   1911.   3^7;   Richmond  Times-Dispatch. 
February 5.   1911. 
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Before public amazement  over Blease's   change in 
the notary system had  faded,   the Governor engaged in 
another attempt to test the powers of his  office.    Although 
the Governor of South Carolina has th    power to appoint 
persons  to certain state offices,  according to the state 
Constitution he must abide by the recommendations of ap- 
pointees given by the proper body.     The governor,   in short, 
has the power to commission,   but not to designate.    The 
state  supreme court  often nominated special  judges for 
circuit courts when no circuit  judges were available.     Such 
was the case,  when in February,   19H»   Chief Justice Ira B. 
Jones  sent the name of a nominee for special  judge.    Blease 
had les.rned  of the need  for a  special  judge and without 
waiting for a recommendation from the state supreme court, 
appointed one of his friends  from Newberry to the position. 
Then he  sent a  letter to Chief Justice Jones explaining 
that he was within his rights as Governor in the action 
and that a  "large majority of the people of South Carolina 
Reports and  Resolutions  of the General Assembly  of 
the  State  of South   Carolina.   1915   (Columbia»     Gonzales and 
Bryan,   1915),   202.     Hereafter   cited as Reports and Resolu- 
tions.     For a revealing  letter concerning the Blease stra- 
tegy  in  revoking   the notary commissions,   see, A.  W,   Hasty 
to Governor C.  L.  Blease,  January 24,  1913* Governor C.  L. 
Blease MSS,   South   Carolina Department  of Archives and 
History.     Hasty advised Blease to "cut off  some heads in 
Greer since those men are against you." 
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had elected me as governor,"5 giving him  the mandate to 
exercise  such power.     Shortly thereafter,  Blease sent a 
special message to the General Assembly asking for the 
specific power to appoint special  judges without  recommen- 
dations  from  the court.       So it appeared that the governor 
knew he had the power to commission but not without re- 
ceiving appointments from the Supreme Court.    Blease none- 
theless interpreted his power of appointment as a  device 
to reward his friends. 
In the foregoing case Blease*s  effort to  expand 
his power as governor failed.    His friend was  unwilling to 
accept the position when he learned that he had not been 
recommended by the Supreme Court.    Nor did the legislature 
give the governor the power to appoint  judges.    Later the 
Supreme Court ruled that  the executive must respect the 
judgment  of the judiciary in the area  of appointments. 
None of this deterred Blease in his pursuit of the appoin- 
tive power.    When denied  the right to appoint  judges, 
Blease refused to commission an;,   special  judges at all. 
As a  final measure Blease offered a list of those he deemed 
eligible for special   judgeships to the Supreme Court and 
^Columbia. State,   February 3.   1911.    ?or a  fuller 
description  of Blease's   conflict with  the  state Supreme 
Court,   see Burnside,   "The Governorship  of C.  L. Blease," 
46-50. 
6Senate Journal.   1911.   520-521,   682-69^. 
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declared  that he would  only commission special  judges whose 
names appeared  on  the  list  or whose names  he might  add 
later.     When the Supreme Court refused to follow his dic- 
tum and  sent  him another nominee's name for special  judge, 
Blease  flatly stated again that he would make no appoint- 
ments during his administration except those on his 
eligible list.     To  underline his position he declaimed, 
"Ira B.   Jones can mandamus or Godamus or do anything he 
pleases.     I am not going to appoint t-rnest Moore as  special 
•7 
judge."' 
Such remarks were well received by many Bleaseites 
who admired the frank language  of their governor.    Others 
sought  to prove that Blease was  infringing on the powers 
of the  judiciary.     Whatever their opinions or Blease's 
purpose,   the controversy between the executive office and 
the   court was not  resolved while  he was Governor.     Likewise 
he appointed his friends  to office whenever possible and 
withheld  commissions   from his  enemies whenever he could. 
Although Blease  often referred to the power given 
him by a majority of the people to  justify his action in 
the matter of appointments and  other affairs,   he ignored 
the  fact that the legislature was also an elected body. 
During his  first administration,   there were few Bleaseites 
in   the i;tate  Senate  or House  of Representatives.     By 
7Columbi,:  State.  March 26,   1911. 
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contrast Tillman had commanded a majority of followers in 
both houses  of the General Assembly,   even in his second 
administration.     Consequently,  relations between the legis- 
lature and the executive were stormy,   to say the least. 
The General Assembly strongly resented the governor's  de- 
mands  sent in the  form  of special messages and very rarely 
paid any attention to his words.     Often infuriated at being 
ignored,  Blease found ways  to chastise the legislature for 
its  unwillingness  to obey his wishes. 
The main weapon in the Blease arsenal was the power 
of executive veto.     This was used  effectively in forcing 
the General Assembly to read the governor's veto message 
if nothing else.     Only on a  few occasions did the legis- 
lature  sustain his vetoes;  usually the bills in question 
were repassed into law by the required majority.    In 1912 
Blease approved  of only 15 acts and  joint resolutions of 
over  300 passed by the General Assembly.       His attitude 
seemed   to be  that   if the General Assembly would not pass 
the bills he wanted,  it would not pass any. 
To justify his  frequent  use of the veto,  Blease 
offered a number of explanations.    His  favorite was to re- 
fer to the size of the majority which had  elected him and 
whose interests he was serving.     Using campaign promises 
8 Burnside,   "The Governship  of C.  L.   Blease,"   56. 
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as reasons,  Blease vetoed every general appropriation bill 
sent to his  office.    Although  rarely used in the state's 
history,   the Governor of South Carolina  has the power to 
veto items  from annual appropriations bills.    As he had 
stated on the stump,   the financial  issue was  the chief 
problem of the state.     Deeming 26  items  of the 1911  appro- 
priations bill as  "useless or  excessive expenditures," 
Blease returned the bill to the General Assembly in the 
final hours  of its session.    In 1912 the governor urged 
the General Assembly to limit  its  expenditure: ,   eradicate 
the state debt, and  "abolish useless state  offices"  such 
as  "Bank Kxaminer, Bureau of Agriculture,   State Geologist, 
Game Warden,  Government Printing, and Insurance Commis- 
sioner,"    According to the governor the  "state institu- 
tions  of higher learning are receiving  entirely too much 
money," as were public  utilities and the Catawba Indians. 
All  of these retrenchments were necessary since it was 
"possible to run the government on less money,  which would 
relieve our people from their heavy tax burden."        When 
the General Assembly refused to comply with his wishes 
concerning what he called  "ending extravagances," Blease 
9Senate Journal.   1911.   846 j   Richmond Times-Pi snatch. 
February 22,   1911. 
955-959. 
10Senate Journal.   1912.   65   veto message  in ibid.. 
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again vetoed the annual appropriations bill of 1912 which 
was again passed over his veto. 
Another Blease tactic was the sending of a large 
number of messages to the legislature on particular sub- 
jects, and placing the responsibility of his actions in 
the General Assembly's hands. An outstanding example of 
this method was the governor's war on the state peniten- 
tiary.  Following a tour of the state prison shortly after 
he assumed office, Blease threatened to pardon every con- 
vict in the penitentiary unless the legislature completely 
reformed the state penal system. According to the 
Governor, the state prison had become a tuberculosis fac- 
tory in which prisoners were forced to work long hours in 
a privately owned hosiery mill within the prison. The 
mill was a certain deathtrap, with inadequate sanitation, 
lighting and ventilation.  The prison itself was no better, 
but the abolition of the hosiery mill became an obsession 
with the governor.  Throughout his administration Blease 
crusaded for the abolition of the mill, the last vestige 
of the convict lease system in the state. Not only was 
the mill a health hazard to the inmates of prison, but 
according to the Governor it was also detrimental to the 
state as a whole.  John Graham, the owner of the mill, was 
making a fortune by the cheap labor and was simultaneously 
spreading potential tuberculosis carriers over the entire 
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state with every visitor to the penitentiary.     In the 
melodrama   that followed,   the rich aristocrat was the 
villain and Dlease the champion  of the underdogs,   demanding 
that  the legislature "abolish this infernal  deathtrap, 
this  earthly hell,"        Again and again Blease warned, 
threatened,  and harangued the General Assembly concerning 
prison reforms and the abolition of the hosiery mill. 
Initially the hostile legislature refused to acknowledge 
the need  for reforms and  obstinately stood its ground 
12 during Blease's  first administration. 
Although Blease's charge  of inhumane  conditions  in 
the state prison were justified,   his policies regarding 
prison reform were not.     When the legislature denied that 
pens.1 reform was necessary and refused to take action, 
Blease reprimanded the legislature by saying:     "My advice 
to you is  to do something.     If you do not,   then don't blame 
me for what I  do." He had,  however,   done a great deal 
previous to his warning.    By the  end of his first year as 
nSenate Journal.   1911.   729. 
12Jane Zimmerman,   "The Penal Reform Movement in 
the South  During the Progressive Era,   1890-1917,"  Journal 
of  Southern History..   XVII   (195D.   **62-'*92.     Blease  is  here 
specifically mentioned as a penal reformer in  the South. 
Blease appealed to the General Assembly to tear down the 
prison and build a new one.     One of his best arguments is 
found in the Sennte Journal,  1212.   90-95. 
13Senate Journal.   19_lj>,   93. 
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governor,   he had pardoned,   paroled,   or   commuted the 
sentences  of 317 prisoners.     In 1911 when he began his 
crusade,   he appeared to be sincere in his motives for using 
executive  clemency.    Most of the prisoners he freed were 
either suffering from  severe illness,  serving sentences 
for crimes they did not commit,   or were serving  longer 
terms than their sentences had prescribed.    In these cases, 
Blease drew attention to be injustices of the institution. 
Unfortunately,  Blease seemed to have formed a habit 
of exercising  the pardoning power.     It became a habit he 
could not break while serving as Governor,    Even after the 
legislature had enacted certain penal reforms including 
the abolition  of the hosiery mill,   the high number of par- 
dons  continued to flow from the governor's office.    Alto- 
gether he pardoned over 1700 convicts and very nearly 
emptied the prison at  the end  of his second odrainistration. 
While he never forgave political enemies,  he grew quite 
fond  of his aboolute power to pardon the criminal enemies 
of the state.     Concerning pardons he said,   "Nothing has 
given me more genuine pleasure than the privilege of 
14 exercising the power of forgiveness."        Aside from his 
sheer  enjoyment and humanitarian justification of the 
pardoning power,   Blease reiterated that he was only 
1^Senate  Journal.   1912.   565. 
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exercising the will of the people as their duly elected 
representative. He received many petitions for pardons 
and was only honoring their requests.  In his own words, 
"When the best people, the white people of the community 
sign a petition for a criminal, I took the position that 
I was a servant of the people and turned him out.  * 
Although he was accused of accepting bribes in ex- 
change for pardons, no evidence was ever found to sub- 
stantiate the charge. Graft was possibly involved in the 
many pardons made by Governor Blease, but it is unknown 
whether he ever received any money for his acts of clemency, 
Blease himself had been a criminal lawyer and so were many 
of his friends. He had often stated publicly that he was 
partial to his friends» so if a convict or an outside con- 
tact could purchase the expensive services of one of the 
governor's lawyer-friends, a pardon was sure to follow. 
More often, inmates who had an outside spokesman, influ- 
ential with Blease could depend on a pardon.   In the 
final analysis there really seemed to be no one reason for 
Blease's abuse of executive clemency other than merely 
^House Journal. 1.913. 60. For examples of the men 
Blease pardoned and his pardon philosophy, seei  New York 
Timer;. January 17t 1915* 
l6C. L. Blease to John D. Bivens, June ^, 1912, 
John D. Bivens MSS, Duke University Manuscript Division. 
In his letter Blease promised his friend Bivens that he 
would "see what can be done for your negro" in the way of 
a pardon. 
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using at his discretion the power made available to him. 
Some newspapers, notably the State, attempted to 
imply that Blease's wholesale emptying of the prison fostered 
crime in the state.  Similarly, it was intimated that cor- 
ruption in the state government was stemming from the 
Governor's office.  In short the opposition was making an 
effort to show that Bleaseism led to lawlessness.  Other 
actions of the Governor also seemed to reinforce this 
thesis, especially regarding the liquor problem and lynching. 
Liquor and its evil influence on the state had been 
one of the main issues of the campaign. Not only was there 
corruption within the few remaining county dispensaries, 
but also wide-spread traffic in illegal liquor over the 
state.  "Blind Tigers," as the illegal barrooms were 
called, were abundant in many South Carolina towns, even 
within sight of the capitol, Blease made some effort to 
enforce the liquor laws, although ha never recommended any 
changes in the laws. He publicly ordered local officers 
to enforce laws under the threat of removing them from 
office. Meanwhile, he appointed a large number of con- 
stables all over the state to stop the illicit trade in 
liquor.  Despite these measures the sale of illegal liquor 
continued and Blease was blamed for failing to halt it. 
His constables did little to enforce the laws and the fact 
that they were paid by the counties was a source of local 
resentment. 
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Blease was accused not only of being lax in en- 
forcing the law,  but  of undermining it as well.    He was 
no temperance leader himself and professed that he enjoyed 
a drink occasionally.    According to some reports he was 
seen in Blind Tigers and "under the influence" at the 
state house.    Furthermore,  he pardoned many liquor law 
violators because they were personal  friends.     Other 
charges  of the governor's involvement with liquor corrup- 
tion would be used in the election of 1912.     In the main 
it appeared as though Blease's attitude concerning liquor 
17 was not conducive to respect for the law.   ' 
By the same token some argued that Blease's racial 
attitudes  tended to encourage lawlessness.    Although few 
men in public  office in South Carolina would dare disagree 
with Blease's ideas of white supr<-.iacy,  his views on 
lynching brought  consternation to the state and national 
press.     Blease had borrowed his philosophy on lynching 
from Ben Tillman as he had other ideas.     For Blease,   only 
one crime  justified lynching«     the rape of a wnite woman 
by a Negro.     Then and only then would the Governor condone 
the action of lynch mob.     In fact he claimed he would lead 
such a mob himself if the opportunity arose.    Blease was 
7For a  complete account  of the liquor problem 
during Blease's administration,   see:     R.   D.  Burnside,   "The 
Governorship  of  C.   L.  Blease,"   1C4-135. 
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only reciting what  Tillman had popularized,   but the idea 
well suited the prejudices  of many South Carolinians who 
believed  that the sanctity of white womanhood,  racism,  and 
the fear of miscegination were sufficient  justification for 
lynching.     Blease understood these prejudices sufficiently 
18 to exploit  them. 
Blease's stand  on white supremacy was essentially 
a  reformulation of an old pro-slavery argument.    The  Negro 
race was simply inferior to the  "pure-breed Caucasians." 
Nature eliminated  "social  equality," and any attempt  to 
change the inscrutable laws  of nature and God would be the 
highest of all  sins.    Blease often professed himself an 
advocate of the popular adage of "keeping the Negro in his 
place."    The "place" was of course definitely subordinate 
to that of  the white.     To insure this status,   the Negro 
must be frequently reminded of his position in society and 
any attempt to approach  equality must be severely punished. 
Blease believed as did Tillman,   the  "foulest  social 
disaster" which  could possibly occur was the  "mongrelization" 
of the white and black races.    Rape was  the method by which 
Negroes sought racial equality in shattering the color line. 
For Tillman's  racial views see:    P.  B.  Simkins, 
Pitchfork Bon Tillman.   393-^07.    Blease's views may be found 
in R,   D. Burnside,   "Racism in the Governship  of Cole 
Blease," The South Carolina Historical Association,   Pro.- 
cecdin."-:-;.   196^,   ^3-57. 
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Such a heinous violation of Southern womanhood could not 
be tolerated.     Both Tillman and Blease  justified  lynching 
for rape.    As was  often the case with Blease,   he merely 
copied the idea  from Tillman,  but offered his views  on 
the subject.     In fact it was  one of Blease's favorite 
themes.    Soon after he was  elected,  Governor Blease 
announced that he would never order the state militia to 
protect, a Negro rapist  from a lynch mob.    He believed that 
by refusing to call out  the militia,  Negroes would consider 
the consequences before attacking a white woman.     Since rape 
represented an attempt at racial equality through miscegen- 
ation,  Blease contended that lynching was indeed  justifiable 
punishment  for a  Negro rapist. 
Senator Tillman had presented his views on race 
and lynching to the nation during several speaking tours 
throughout  the  country.     In 1912 Blease attracted the atten- 
tion of the national press  on the same subject at  the 
Richmond Governor's Conference.    Whe asked by one  of the 
governor:- if his advocacy of  lynching was in violation of 
the federal and state constitutions,  Blease echoed 
Tillman's words by saying: 
Whenever the constitution of my state steps between 
me and the defense of the virtue of the white woman, 
I will resign my commission,  tear it up,  and throw it 
to the breezes and march to the defense of her honor 
and virtue.     If the constitution causes my state to 
60 
blush and allows her women to be forsaken, then I 
say to hell with the constitution!x9 
That the perfervid response of the Governor was 
genuine is mere than suggested by actual incidents in 
which the governor was called upon to order troops out to 
stop a lynch mob. Blease did just as he had promised— 
nothing. After "Citizen Josh" Ashley had led a successful 
lynch mob in October, 19H» Blease assured his old friend 
that he had done the right thing and had nothing to worry 
about.  On other occasions Blease flatly stated that he 
would pardon anyone convicted on charges of lynching for 
rape, but doubted that a white jury existed in the state 
that would make such a conviction. At least eighteen 
lynchings occurred during the four years of Blease's go- 
vernorship, and not once did he attempt to use his power 
**  20 to stop them. 
9A.  J.  McDelway,   "The Governor's Conference," 
The Survey.   XXIX   (December 21,   1912),   3^7-3^8.     The  exact 
wording of Blease's  emotional outburst is disputed!  during 
the controversy that followed the statement,  Blease went 
so far as to issue a  copy of his speech to the General 
Assembly in a special message.    Blease maintained that he 
was misquoted or misrepresented concerning his beliefs on 
lynching.     His  enemies  only stated that he was in favor of 
lynching without  telling why.     For more information on the 
Governor's  Conference see:     "31ease Among the Governors," 
Literarv Digest,   XLV   (December,   1912),   1164-1165|   "From 
Calhoun" to Blease,"  The  Independent.   LXXIII   (July-December, 
1912),   1383-1384.     Tillman had also  used the term  "to hell 
with the constitution"  on the same issue.     See«     F.  B. 
Simkins,   Pitchfork Ben T.i llman.   396. 
20C.  L.  Blease to Josh W. Ashley,  October 16,  1911. 
Governor C.  L.   Blease MSS,   South  Carolina  Department  of 
Archives and History;  New York Times.   November 13.   19111 
ibid..  January 17,  1915. 
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During his first administration Blease had done 
everything in his power as Governor to live up to his cam- 
paign pledges to reward his friends and political supporters, 
and to chastise his enemies. And his enemies reacted 
accordingly, declaring that Blease was the worst governor 
of the 3tate since the scalawag, Franklin J. Moses.  James 
C. Hemphill, former editor of the Charleston News and 
Courier, expressed the common attitude of the state's con- 
servatives in a letter to Dr. Samuel Mitchell, president of 
the University of South Carolina:  "What an ass he /flense? 
is to be sure and how fortunate the other states in the 
21 
Union are not to have a blackguard like this as governor," 
In 1912 the conservatives had little understanding of the 
"queer things Blease has said and the queer things he has 
22 done."   While they believed him "utterly unfit for the 
office which he disgraces," Coley was more popular than ever 
with the poor whites.  In their opinion he had fought 
bravely against the aristocrats, "nigger:.-, and nigger lovers." 
In doing so Blease had proven that "'e ain't scared o' 
2T nothin'."   Although liquor may have been the deciding 
issue in the 1910 election, in 1912, as it would be for 
many years, the issue was Cole L, Blease. 
21J. C. Hemphill to Samuel C. Mitchell, January ^, 
1911, J. C. Hemphill MSS, Duke University Manuscript Division. 
22„s 
23 
'Richmond   Times-Dispatch,  March   16,   1911. 
Ibid.,   July 8,   1911. 
CJIAPTER V 
THh ELECTION OF 1912 
The campaign of 1912 followed the same pattern as 
that of 1910.     Rather than offer a  constructive reform 
program as an alternative to Blease,   the conserv   tive 
machine tried to meet him on his own ground by continuing 
the tactics   used against Blease   in the previous  election. 
The newspapers and his opponent attacked almost everything 
Blease  had   said or done,   but Blease proved  himself   once 
again a  professional at ridiculing the accusations  of his 
enemies and defending his actions. 
But  there was   one   error which  the conservatives 
would not repeat.     This time they would unite behind a 
single  candidate to defeat Blease in the primary.    Before 
the close  of 1911.   conservative forces already had a candi- 
date to rally behind.     While many anti-Blease men,  most  of 
them old Tillmanites,  were talking about running,  Ira B. 
Jones,   Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court,  emerged 
as 31ease's  opponent.     Strongly opposed to Blease after 
the appointment squabble,   Jones sent his resignation as 
Chief Justice to Blease  on September 11,   1911.   to be effec- 
tive January 2,   1912.     On  September 12,   he announced his 
intention  to run against Blease  in the  primary and   "put 
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an end  forever  to politicians of this type." 
Jone's political  career was  in some ways remark- 
ably  similar to Blease's.     Both were born  in Newberry, 
both were   college-educated  lawyers and  excellent debaters, 
and both had entered politics as Tillmanites in 1890. 
Jones,   however,   was   seventeen years   older than Blease end, 
like Tillman,  had grovn conservative with age.    Years on 
the bench  had removed him from active participation in state 
politics and some felt that he would not be a match  for 
Blease  on  the  stump.     Nonetheless,   the  conservative machine 
2 
decided to back Jones. 
In language and appearance Jones was soon easily 
identified with the conservatives.     He also alienated the 
masses  of voters with his "burning desire to redeem South 
Carolina   from Bleaseism."     The  conservatives  seemed to 
believe that all Bleaseites were liars,   thieves, and 
scoundrels,   the same attitude that the aristocrats had held 
in regard  to Tillmanites.    As   one Jones   supporter put  it, 
"A  large majority of the most intelligent and decent citi- 
zens  of the state will,   if they vote at all,  vote for 
Jones,   still as  you well   know a majority  of the voters are 
Richmond Timer:-Dispatch,   September 20,   1911. 
2Clarence N.   Stone,   "Bleaseism and the 1912 Elec- 
tion  in South Carolina,"   North Carolina   Historical  Review, 
XL (January,   1963).   57. 
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not intelligent and have little or no regard for decency, 
and the latter class almost to the man will vote for 
Blease."      This refusal  of the conservatives to recognize 
and  to react to the political and social realities set the 
tone of the campaign.     It was to he the rich, wise,  and the 
well-bred against the poor.     Rather than allow the masses 
of poor whites to participate in state politics and ser- 
vice their interests,  the conservatives sought to eliminate 
them altogether by tightening the primary qualifications. 
The effort t<   purge the Democratic  club rolls fizzled, 
fortunately for Blease and his supporters.    Senator Tillman, 
still  somewhat influenti: 1,   could not bring himselj   to 
endorse such a reactionary measure.    Many also feared  that 
such tactics might give  the general  elections more meaning 
and raise once more  the spectre of Negro participation in 
state politics. 
Jones* anti-Blease campaign was based on the slogan* 
"Bleaseism  leads to anarchy."    Hi:   platform was centered 
around  "law and order"  to gain the support of the middle 
and upper classes.     He  emphasized the point that Blease 
had interfered with  the court system,  granted huge numbers 
of pardons and paroles,  and vetoed almost every act  of the 
General Assembly.     Jones further argued that Blease fostered 
^Richmond  T3.mes-Disnatch.   March  13i   1912. 
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lawlessness  since the governor had publicly advocated the 
lynching of Negroes.     If elected,  Jone~ would bring about 
"law and  order,   good government,   good roads,   and good 
schools." 
Jones   implored the people to "vote as you pray" 
for  "decency,   home,   sobriety,   salvation of youth,   law and 
order,  and respect for women."    He further implied that 
all Blease men were crooks or ex-convicts.       Meanwhile 
Blease still  claimed to be the working man's  friend,  who 
was not backed by any corporation.    Pro-Blease advertise- 
ments and handbills scoffed at  "wise-looking old fossils 
or diplomasized molly-coddles," and praised the "uncounted 
common folk to whom  life's daily burden is hard and heavy." 
One advertisement,  allegedly paid for by workers,   declared: 
"There are so many people who have the idea  that we cotton 
men people and poor farmers are fools and are an underclass 
7 
of people,  but we know Jones is against the poor men." 
Crowds grew larger and  larger as the candidates  stumped 
Charleston Newr; and Courier. March  7,   1912. 
'Taken from a Jones political advertisement which 
appeared in the state newspapers a  few days before the  elec- 
tion.     Greenwood  Index. August  24,   1912,   in Tillman Scrap- 
books,  B.   H.  Tillman MSS,   Clemson University. 
"Pro-Blease handbill  in Tillman Scrapbooks. 
n 
Charleston News and Courier.  August   25,   1912. 
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the state.  Though there were three entrants, Blease and 
Jones drew all the attention. 
Blease had no difficulty branding Jones as an 
"aristocrat," a representative of the monied interests and 
an opponent of the interests of the people, Jones re- 
peated often that he was not an aristocrat, but he seemed 
to convince very few voters. As the stump campaign opened 
in June, it appeared that Blease would make a fool of Jones 
with little effort.  Blease was at his absolute best on the 
stump campaign as he kept Jones on the defensive by issuing 
diatribes against all that the ex-Chief Justice had done 
R in the past and ridiculing everything that Jones said. 
"Corporation Jones" as Blease called him, was also 
accused of favoring "social equality." Because Jones had 
not voted for a bill to segregate railway passenger cars 
when he was in the General Assembly, Blease labeled him a 
"nigger lover." Jones futilely tried to deny the charge, 
but the stigma of one who believed in crossing the color 
line was on him. At Bamberg, Blease confronted the audi- 
ence with these statements:  "You people who want social 
equality vote for Jones.  You men who have nigger children 
vote for Jones. You who have a nigger wife in the back 
yard vote for Jones."  In many Bleaseites' minds anyone 
Wallace, History of South Carolina. Ill, &31, 
Wallace flatly stated that, "Jones on the stump was a failure." 
9Newberry Herald and News. July 16, 1912. 
, 
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associated with Ira B.  Jones was a "nigger lover." 
On several  occasions  Jones ventured  into racist 
demogoguery against Blease by accusing  him of being a man 
"who loves  the nigger pretty well."    Jones pointed out 
that most  of the prisoners Blease  had  pardoned were Negroes, 
and therefore he had shown his love for them,  and in 
addition,  Blease had allegedly made some flattering state- 
ments about the state-supported college for Negroes.     Blease 
answered the first  charge by applying his philosophy of 
Negro inferiority to his pardoning records     "We cannot 
apply the same rules  to this inferior race that we do the 
superior.    Negroes are a  class by themselves,   .   .   .  their 
morals are not as high as white." Negroes were  like 
little children who did not know right  from wrong,  and 
should be forgiven for their mistakes by a responsible 
white person.     Their low morality caused Blease to doubt 
that rape could be committed against the Negroi  consequently, 
this assumption influenced his liberal   use of  executive 
clemency.    In regard  to the state college at  Orangeburg, 
Blease replied  that  upon taking office  he had removed  the 
president of the college,  vetoed appropriations to the 
school,  and now wanted the institution  for "baboons" 
closed. 11 
10 House Journal. 1912. 73. 
11C. N. Stone, "Bleaseism and the 1912 Election," 
60» Newberrv Herald and News, July 19. 1912. 
60 
If indeed there were any real  issues  in the cam- 
paign,  race was  the most  important.    Tillman had said that 
"he /Jones7 is absolutely a  child in Blease's hands,"12 
referring to this  stump campaign,   for at that time Blease 
was unequalled in the state as a- demogogue.     Before the 
third stop on the tour,  however,  it appeared  that Blease, 
not Jones,  was on the defensive,    Jones'apparent failure 
had called forth   other methods  for  defeating Blease, 
The liquor question,  which had been the main issue 
in 1910,  was  used again in 1912,  but in a different way. 
The State Dispensary System,   though legally dead since 
1907,   played a prominent role in the campaign.    Governor 
Ansel  had appointed a  special  commission to close out the 
business of the Dispensary and  this  commission was still 
operating when Blease became governor in 1911.    During its 
existence it had recovered large amounts  of money lost by 
the state through  the dispensary system.    Many lawsuits 
were  launched and an Atlanta  law firm,  Anderson,   Felder, 
Roundtree,  and Wilson,  was  employed by the state to handle 
some of the cases.    Many of Blease's friends were faced 
with court action when he assumed office in late January, 
1911.     Blease  called  on the legislature to appoint a com- 
mittee to investigate the commission and claimed he be- 
lieved  that the state was  being swindled by  the commission 
12Simkins,   Pitchfork B.J2 Tillman.   ^95. 
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more   than it   had   been by  the dispensary.     Thomas 15.   Felder, 
one   of the Atlanta attorneys,   was  singled   out by Blease 
as actually being an agent   for  the  liquor companies.13 
Felder gave the anti-Blease forces real inspira- 
tion for the coming campaign with his profane remarks about 
Governor Blease.     After  the General Assembly appointed a 
committee to investigate the dispensary and the eloaeout 
commission,  Blease refused  to authorize the committee and 
appointed his  own team  of investigators.    It was soon 
apparent that  the governor's committee was  out tc get 
Felder.    A  former member of the State Dispensary Board and 
one  of Blease's  friend-  testified that Felder had tried  to 
bribe him  in behalf of the  liquor companies.     Felder sent 
open  letters  to tl 6 state newspapers  denying the charges 
and most of all attacking Blease's  character.    He referred 
to Blease as a  "plunderbund," a  "mental and mor~1 pervert,"   i 
and a   "miserable miscreant   .   .   .   not  even fit to be governor 
of a  nigger colony."  ^    Felder had no facts  to offer that 
would  prove corruption on the Governor's part,   but overtly 
implied that a man of such moral  character wa3  certai:   to 
be involved. 
^For  full  details   of the   liquor controversy,   see, 
R,  D.  Burnside,   "The Governorship  of Z,  L. Blease,"  IOU-135, 
ill 
Newberry Herald and News.   March 2^,   1911. 




Meanwhile,   the Governor's committee ended the state 
contract with Felder's law firm and demanded that he supply 
documented evidence for his charge of corruption of Blease. 
Pelder refused,   stating that the  committee had no legal 
power and that he would at the proper time give proof of 
his allegations.     The committee was indeed powerless and 
was dissolved in March,   1912, 
By this time the General Assembly had begun its 
1912 session and had  overridden the governor's veto for 
the legislative commission that the executive had orginslly 
demanded.     The legislative commission appeared to be less 
interested  in investigating the old dispensary than it was 
in proving that Blease had been involved in corruption. 
Many of the witnesses before the commission took  the oppor- 
tunity to slander Blease as much as possible,  but could 
offer no proof of his guilt.    As the  campaign drew closer, 
the anti-Blease forces became desperate to uncover evidence 
that the Governor was  corrupt.    In June the commission 
moved to Charleston to hear Mayor John P. Grace,   former 
Bleaseite,   testify that the corruption in his county dis- 
pensary system could be traced back to the Governor's 
mansion.    Again,   however,  no proof of the charge was forth- 
coming. 16 
1 Grace later got into  trouble during the  campaign 
by telling a  "Negro story"  on Blease.    Grace claimed that 




By now the campaign was well  under way and the 
only course of action left to the anti-Bleaseites  lay with 
Felder.     Blease had sought to have Felder   extradited for 
libel,  but had failed.     The Atlanta attorney claimed he 
was afraid  to enter South Carolina since Blease had offered 
a two-thousand-dollar reward to anyone who would  "get Tom 
Felder two feet  this side of the Savannah River." 
According to Felder, Blease would then have him killed and 
17 would pardon the murderer. ' In order to hear Felder, 
therefore, the commission decided to move to Augusta. 
The Governor aired his opinion on the affair by sayingt 
This guttersnipe, stinking, filthy commission 
which has been trying to find something on me are 
going to crawl on their bellies to Augusta to take 
the testimony of a scoundrel who is afraid to come 
to South Carolina.18 
Felder appeared before the committee and promised, 
"I will show by records that Cole L. Blease is not fit to 
sit in a convention of buzzards and the absolute testimony 
will be presented to prove it. .,19 Felder again renewed 
Spartanburg a group of infuriated Bleaseites mobbed him 
when he tried to tell the story.  Strange as it may seem, 
Grace would later become a Bleaseite once again. His manu- 
script collection at Duke University appears to have been 
purged of any important political letters. 
17"A Governor Accused," Xhe Outlook. CI, (July 27, 
1912), 650-651. 
18Colunhia State. July 12, 1912. 
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19C. N. Stone, "Bleaseism and the 1912 Election," 
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his chargers  of Blease's involvement in dispensary graft, 
and  created a  na  ional sensation when he   declared that he 
had conclusive  evidence that the Governor had sold pardons. 
William Burns,  a  detective hired by Felder,   had obtained 
a  "dictograph recording"  from a  lawyer who had bought a 
pardon for a  "safe blo\.er" from Blease.    The lawyer later 
claimed to be drunk at  the time of the recording and would 
not substantiate the charge,  nor could any other witnesses. 
Even if there had been actual proof t) 9 commission had no 
power  to act on it.     Its purpose had been to investigate 
the dispensary and in no way could it definitely implicate 
Blease. 
The Governor dismissed the proceeding as a  "damnable 
conspiracy" and resented "the manner in which  this cowardly 
character,   thief, and debaucher and pimp has attempted to 
injure the chief magistrate of the state with the assist- 
ance  of this   .ornmittee."        On the stump he produced affi- 
davits  testifying to his innocence of the charges,   demon- 
strated the lack of evidence,  and  easily proved that many 
of the charges were clearly false.    Again the  conservatives 
had  failed   to  discredit Blease. 
Also on the stump Blease  continued to refer to him- 
self as a Tillmanite and claimed  to be the political heir 
20 New York  Timer;.   July  21,   1912. 
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of Pitchfork Ben.     During Blease's first administration, 
however,   Senator Tillman had disapproved  of many of the 
governor'3 actions.     In turn,  Blease had shown little in- 
clination to pay heed to Tillman's advice and wishes.    As 
Tillman*s biographer wrote: 
Blease knew he had a  constituency among whom the 
name of Benjamin was not always magic.    He dared 
to be independent,   even ignoring the  senator's re- 
quest for the formation of a new county,  scolding 
him  for holding  two offices at the same time,  and 
openly declaring that Tillman's  support was not 
essenti: 1 for his re-election.21 
By the time Jones had announced his candidacy, 
Tillman had decided thi t Blease should not be re-elected. 
He had come to believe that Blease was morally unfit to 
be Governor,    His advice to Blease to stop drinking,   to 
stop talking so much and  to clear  up the charges  of corrup- 
tion went unheeded.     Tillman also heard stories about 
Blease's  gambling and chasing after women.    After making 
this  decision,  Tillman did not publicly condemn Blease, 
for the Senator was also  up for re-election in 1912.    Al- 
though he expressed his concern over Blease's  unworthiness 
in many private letters,  r   public  statement against the 
Governor would alienate many old Tillmanites.    Many of 
Blease's   enemies were his  own and he did not want to side 
21SimfcinS|   Pitchfork Ben Tillman.   493.     For a more 
detailed account  of the formal break between Tillman and 
Blease. ibid..   493*500. 
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with themj so rather than risk his own defeat, Tillman 
planned to remain neutral in the gubernatorial contest and 
hoped that Blease would lose the election. 
Before the campaign was well under way, Tillman saw 
the futility of the conservative tactics used against 
Blease. He disapproved of their slanderous methods, and 
even admired Blease on the stump. He grew to realize that 
Jones would be defeated by his lackluster performance 
alone.  Simultaneously, Tillman was being pressed by both 
sides to endorse one of the candidates. In his letters he 
had spoken for and against both men.  Now both sides had 
obtained letters that contained some remarks complimentary 
to their candidate.  The Jones supporters insisted that 
Tillman had endorsed the ex-Chief Justice and the Bleaseites 
maintained the opposite. Tillman was forced to take a 
stand.22 
Three days before the primary election, Tillman 
made public the full text of one of the letters concerning 
Blease.  In it he denounced Blease as a man who had betrayed 
his state and abused the power of his office. He con- 
cluded, "I hope for the credit of the State, he will be 
beaten." J    Blease had been pitchforked. 
22Some of the letters and telegrams may be found 
in the Tillman Scrapbooks. 
23Charler,ton News and Courier. August 24, 1912. 
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Blease was quick  to label  the pronouncement as an 
"infamous   eleventh hour stab" and alleged that he had been 
betrayed by Tillman because of the Senator's  "Insane 
jealousy."    Blease dismissed the matter as having no effect 
on the  coming  election and attributed it to the fact that 
the old Senator's feeble mind "has become more diseased of 
late than it was when I  had my last talk with his confi- 
24 dential physician," 
In the final  days before the election,   Tillman 
issued more statements  on the encumbent governori     "The 
people two years ago elected a man governo" who   'ran amuck' 
and displayed so little realization of his high opportunities 
that it makes me sad and angry to be told as I  have been 
2$ 
more ti   n  once that Tillmanism leads to Bieaseism," 
Tillman continued by contrasting Tillmanism as a  "genuine 
democracy,  and the rule of the people," with Bieaseism as 
factionalism,  partisanship,   and the self-aggrandizement  of 
Cole L.  Blease. Privately,  Tillman feared  that his  oppo 
sition to Blease would prevent his re-election to the Senate, 
On the other hand Blease seemed confident of 
2/4Tb_id.., August 23,   1912. 





victory throughout  the campaign.    He had kept his promise 
to make "that Jones gang sweat blood."    Before the  elec- 
tion Blease  expressed his optimism  in a  letter to one of 
his friendsi 
Everything is moving along nicely:    good news 
coming in from all  sidesf   keep  up your good work and 
tell all  the boys  to be at the polls on the 2?th 
and stay there and see that vre get a  free ballot 
and fair countj  that is all we want,   for we got the 
Jones gang beat and are going to keep them beat.27 
The  election results proved Blease's prediction to 
be true,  but the  "Jon: s gang"  decide, that they were not yet 
beaten,    A  record number of votes were cast in the primary, 
causing many Jones  supporters  to believe that there were 
too many votes cast.     They lost no time submitting an of- 
ficial protest to the State Democratic Executive Committee. 
The committee declared  the results  of the election invalid 
until a recount and an  investigation were held.     The pro- 
cess was  to be slow and arduous, and for over a month after 
the election  the South  Carolina Democratic Party had no 
nominee for Governor. 28 
Both   sides  accused   each   other of  fraud.     The 
Jonesites accused  the Bleaseites of stuffing the ballot 
27Cole L.   Blease to John D,   Bivens,  August 10,   1912, 
John D.   Bivens MSS,   Manuscript Division,   Duke University. 
28Because of the disputed returns,  varied counts 
of the vote  exist.     It seems safe to say that Blease re- 
ceived  over  72,000 votes,   Jones   over 66,000 and  John T. 
Duncan  over  2,000. 
, 
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boxes and other irregularities at the polls. In turn, 
during the investigation the Bleaseites accused the 
Jonesites of attempting to juggle the votes after they had 
been cast.  Such division within the party became dangerous 
as the days wore on. Tillman warned John Gary Evans, 
Chairman of the State Democratic Committee, of the danger 
involved if the situation continued: 
, . . while it will be a bitter dose to have Blease 
as governor . . , , I see no earthly power that can 
prevent Blease from running independently in November 
and sweeping this state, for a great many Jones men 
do not stomach cheating or such high handed pro- 
ceedings as are going on.  The dawling and fooling 
of your sub-committee place the entire state demo- 
cratic party in jeopardy.29 
Finally the investigating sub-committee filed its 
report on October 1 and Blease was still the official 
nominee. Although m ny cases of irregularities were cited 
in the report, no evidence of fraud was established. The 
unusually high number of votes was attributed to the strong 
interest in the race.  The conservative effort to defeat 
Blease had failed. 
In November Blease was officially elected  Lth no 
opposition in the general election.  The mill workers had 
again rallied to their champion, and the state prepared for 
two more years of Bleaseism, 
29B. R. Tillman to J. G. Evans, September 12, 1912, 
J. D. 3ivens MSS, Manuscript Division, Duke University. 
CHAPTER  VI 
THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION,   1913-1914 
Governor Blease began his second  terra with an air 
of optimism.     He was  pleased with his first administration, 
with his second statewide political victory, and, most of 
all,  with himself.     In his 1913 inaugural address he spoke 
of the "wonderful prosperity"  the state had attained during 
his first two years as  governor.     Despite the warnings that 
"if Blease was /sis7 elected,   the state would be financially 
ruined,"  investments  in  cotton mills and agricultui -.1 pro- 
duction had increased tremendously; more northern capital 
had come into the state  than ever before.     Blease was also 
happy to report that there was no corruption in any state 
office and the state's budget was balanced. 
Although South  Carolina appeared to be in better 
condition than  ever by  the Governor's account,   he recom- 
mended a number of improvements  that were necessary if pro- 
gress were to continue  in the state.    Blease began by 
calling attention to the  educational system  of South 
Carolina.     The state colleges were still  spending too much 
money.    More funds should be appropriated for the common 
schools.     Since the legislature refused to  cut the allot- 
ments  to state institutions of higher learning,   the governor 
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proposed a  special  one-mill property tax for the public 
schools.     The  state  colleges were worthy institutions ac- 
cording to the Governor,  but  if the legislature would not 
improve the public  schools none of the  "country children" 
would  ever be able to attend them.     Naturally Governor 
Blease reiterated his belief that white taxes were for 
white schools  only,  and such would be the case with  the 
new tax. 
Blease not  only criticized the state appropriations 
for higher learning,  but also recommended that the entire 
system  of state institutions for higher learning be 
changed.    Each state  college should specialize in certain 
areas,  rather than "all the state colleges  teaching all 
these things."     For example,  Clemson College should be the 
only state  college with an agricultural department and all 
funds  for agricultural development and  education would go 
to that school and no other.     This would avoid  "extrava- 
gances" by errdicating duplicate programs in separate state 
schools. 
The Governor specifically demanded that the legis- 
lature place Clemson College under complete state control 
and change its name to Calhoun College.     This in itself was 
nothing new or unusual,   for earlier efforts  had been made 
to name the school after John C.  Calhoun,  who had ori- 
ginally owned the land  on which it was built.     Thoma.3 G. 
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Clemson, Calhoun's son-in-law, had willed the property to 
the state along with an endowment to build an agricultural 
college.  One of the terms of the will allowed the majority 
of the board of trustees to be independent from the state 
government.  Tillman, who had been active in stimulating 
Clemson to leave his estate for the school, was one of 
these independent trustees. Blease had often scolded him 
for "dual office-holding" and perhaps he hoped to receive 
credit for the institution that Tillman had been in: tru- 
mental in founding. Whatever Blease's reasons, the legis- 
lature would ignore his demands concerning Clemson College 
and the departmentalizing of the state colleges. 
Continuing his tirade against the "big" evils in 
the state, Blease again stated that he was opposed to any 
cotton mill mergers.  If his support of the improvement of 
the common schools, at the expense of the "rich man's" 
colleges appealed to the lower classes, the claim to stop 
the financial interests in their high-level plans also 
gave the workers and cotton farmers inspiration.  In regard 
to the mergers the Governor flatly stated that they were 
only "an effort to absolutely control the price of cotton 
and to control the price of labor in all cotton mills and 
control the vote of the cotton mill people." Blease also 
asserted that "men were dismissed from their jobs for not 
voting as their bosses," but offered no proof for his 
statement. 
81 
Of  course,   the greatest evil in the governor's 
mind remained in the form of the state prison hosiery mill. 
Blease again urged the  legislature to abolish that "tuber- 
culosis  incubator."    If no action were taken he implied 
that he would continue to utilize his power of executive 
clemency to force the legislature to action.     In short, 
the governor was repeating his threat to pardon all the 
prisoners who worked in the mills and farm the rest out to 
county chain gangs  if the legislature refused to act. 
Rarely missing an opportunity to raise the race 
question,  Blease offered several recommendations to keep 
the Negroes  in their place.     The education of Negroes Was 
naturall;.   a  serious  threat to white society,  but  the grave 
"menace which can be averted" was the acquisition of land 
by Negroes.     Whites  should refrain from  selling land to 
the Vlacks,   or  else the day would come with the Negro being 
on an equal  economic plane with the whites.    Bleaso's  logic 
in this  case seems to have been that if Negroes cannot 
always be deprived  of life and liberty,   at least something 
should be done  to prevent them from acquiring property. 
Another protential danger to white supremacy was 
the organization of secret Negro lodges.     The governor 
urged  the General Assembly to enact legislation to disband 
these lodges immediately.    Such measures could avert a 
future conflict between  the races. 
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In   conclusion Bleane boasted  of the  state's pro- 
gress in all areas during the past year.    Cotton prices 
were high,   a bumper crop  of corn had been harvested,  new 
textile mills had opened,  and there had been a  "magnificent 
increase in manufacturing activities."    Rather than ruin 
the state financially,  Blease boast.d that he had stimulated 
the  "wonderful prosperity"  of the state,   "In every phase 
of South Carolina's  economic  life,  the year 1912 will rank 
as the best year  of all  that  have gone before,"  exulted 
the governor. 
Throughout Blease's second administration,   he con- 
tinued to gain notoriety with his  controversial statements 
and programs.    He wasted  little time in advising the General 
Assembly by means   of his   special message: ,     Several were 
waiting for the legisl? ture the day after the governor had 
taken office.     Continuing to press for a  severe libel law, 
a  series  of messages dealt with Blense's statements at the 
Governor's  Conference of the previous year.    He sent the 
legislators  transcripts   of his remarks made at Richmond in 
order to correct the many misquotations and  "infamous and 
foul  editorials."    Blease argued that he had advocated 
lynching only in the event of a  criminal assault by a 
Negro  on a  white woman.      In regard to this matter he 
commented t 
1Senate Journ- 1,   1913.   29-52. 
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There will be no need for a  trial,  and there 
ought not be any need of it in any civilized com- 
munity.     If we can't protect our white women from 
a black fiend what can we do for our country's 
civilization and for man's  uplift?  ...   I assure 
you that whenever a  black brute lays his hands 
upon a white woman,   the sooner his dead body is 
placed six  feet  underground the better for the 
virtue and womanhood of the Southern States and of 
South   Carolina.2 
As for the "infamous and foul editorials" Blease 
replied,   "I  care nothing for the criticisms  of Cubans, 
mixed breeds,   negroes   or negro  lovers.     However,   I want 
the decent  element of South Carolina to see what  I said,  and 
to let them pass   judgment on it themselves."•* 
The Cuban mentioned by Blease was probably W,  E. 
Gonzales,   editor   of the  Columbia   State and bitter opponent 
to Blease.     Other messages were also concerned with Gonzales. 
One implied th   t  if no libel law were passed,   there was the 
strong possibility of the death of a certain newspaperman. 
Blease's particular hatred for the  editor of one of the 
state's  leading  newspapermen also caused him to oppose 
Woodrow Wilson.     During the campaign Wilson had visited 
South  Carolina  and had stayed with Gonzales rather than 
with  the governor.     It had  only been necessary for Gonzales 
to endorse Wilson for Blease to oppose him.     When  the  Demo- 
cratic candidate for the Presidency chose to ignore the 
Ibid...   58-73»  61-72. 
■'ibid.,   59;   Now York Times.   June  16,   1913. 
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encumbent  Democratic  candidate for Governor and allied him- 
self with  the  opposition,   that added insult  to injury. 
As a  result,  Blease rarely had anything good to 
say abouJ   Wilson's administration.    He even refused to 
allow the South Carolina militia to march in Wilson's 
inaugural  parade since there was a  chance that Negro 
soldiers would precede the state's militia  in the proces- 
sion.    He was  severely critical  of Wilson's  policy during 
the Mexican intervention.     In Blease's opinion the United 
States should have annexed Mexico,  and would have if 
Wilson were not a coward.     The Governor's hostility toward 
the President  continued throughout his administration. 
This attitude would lator cost Blease dearly in his poli- 
tical career,  but he never altered his opinion of Wilson. 
The  judgment that  "Wilson is a good school  teache  ,  but a 
poor president,"5 characterized Blease's feelings for the 
President. 
Blease  openly stated that he  expected no  favor:: 
from Wilson's administration,    but he also killed two 
federal projects in the state by his  own spite.     In one 
4G.   B.   Tindall,   The Emergence  of the  New  South, 
1913-19'tl;   Vol.   IV,  A   History of. ihe South,   ed.   £.. Merton 
Coulter and W.   H.   Stephenson  (Baton Rouge,   Louisiana  State 
University Press,   19^7),  9. 
5Uuoted in Burnride,   "The Governorship of Coleman 
Livingston Blease,"   273. 
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case JosephU8 Daniels,  Secretary of the Navy,  toured  the 
Naval facilities at Port Royal and remarked to William 
Gonza.Tes that federal   funds  could be available  to renovate 
and to enlarge the port on the condition that the area's 
illicit Whiskey trade be ended.    Blease interpreted 
Daniel's stipulation as an attempt to slander his adminis- 
tration and reacted accordingly.    He described Daniels as 
"a very small man" who was  completely incompetent for a 
cabinet post.    As  for the federal funds,   Daniels could 
keep them  "or stick it in his ears,  as may ber-t  suit." 
Needless to say.  South Carolina  received no federal funds 
for port, improvements. 
Another i   lident embroiled the Governor with  the 
Secretary of War,  Lindley Garrison.    Early in 1913 Garrison 
ordered that  certain low-country units of South  Carolina 
militia be deactivated since they were not  up to standard. 
Blease violently countered that  to do so was impossible be- 
cause the militia was needed to protect the white population, 
In the low-country,  whites were a minority and the white 
militia was  considered to be the only deterrent  to a black 
insurrection.    After a  short wrangle Blease agreed that 
the militia  units in question would be mustered  out on the 
condition that new ones would be organized without delay 
to replace them.    Garrison was assured that his  problems 
6Ibid..  27^. 
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with South  Carolina's Governor were over, but he was wrong. 
In 191^ Garrison was searching for a site for a 
summer training camp to serve four southeastern states 
including  South  Carolina.    After consulting the members of 
Congress from South Carolina and the state adjutant 
general,  Garrison announced that the Isle of Palms,   (which 
had housed military installations  since the Revolutionary 
War),   had been selected by the War Department.    Blease was 
enraged.     No one had consulted him and his approval was 
necessary  for the site.    In his mind an effort had been 
made to by-pass  his authority,  and unless an apology w?is 
forthcoming,  Blease would not approve the site.    Garrison 
replied that if the Governor delayed the matter further 
the site would be moved to another state.    It was.    Blease 
then announced that no troops would be allowed to travel 
through South Carolina  to the new site in Georgia and 
cPlled Garrison a  "pug-nosed Yankee."7    Another victory 
for the champion of states'  rights?    Some in South Carolina 
thought so. 
Other issues  during Blease's second administration 
could be considered in a similar light.    According to one's 
point  of view,   either he succeeded marvelously or made a 
7Ncw York limes,   January 19,   19151  gflUmblfl  BaftBEA* 
April   22,   191^. 
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fool  of himself.    In  the field  of education Bleaseites 
later would show several major accomplishments  under 
Blease's administration.     The two great achievements wore 
the passage of the special school tax and the establishment 
of the State Medical  College el Charleston.    Both were 
measures recommended by Blease and were used in later cam- 
paigns to illustrate the great  educational progress  under 
Blease. 
The Governor's proposed state-wide one-mill property 
tax was a major issue in the 1913 session of the General 
Assembly.    After a  lengthy and heated debate a compromise 
bill was passed v/hich diverged widely from the measure the 
Governor had proposed.    Blease had wanted the tax revenue 
place! in a general  fund to be distributed 1 y the State 
Board   of Education.     In  this way the poorer counties  could 
receive more money than was possible through local  levies. 
Instead,  the tax bill  enacted by the General Assembly pro- 
vided that the counties retain one-half of the income from 
the tax and the  other half would be dispersed by the State 
Board   of Education not   just among the poorer rural  schools, 
but also among high schools,   libraries,  and graded schools. 
Blease was  furious.     In his veto message he called  the bill 
an "abortion" and  objected to the fact that the rural 
schools would not receive the funds they needed.     The le- 
gislature overrode his veto and  enacted the bill.     It was 
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the first direct tax exclusively  for public schools in the 
history of the  state. 
Blease  continued to fight for the one-mill tax for 
rural schools,  but  the General Assembly had little desire 
to pass more property taxes.    In 191^ the one-mill tax for 
schools was not renewed,  but the legislature did make 
direct appropriations from the general tax fund for public 
education.     This was a new measure since educational funds 
had previously come from  the dispensary fund.     Without 
following Blease's specific recommendations,   the legisla- 
ture had given more assistance to the public schools.    Al- 
though the governor had vetoed the tax bill   of 1913,   he 
Q 
later v/ould  claim credit  for the.  one-mill tax. 
Similarly Blease vetoed other measures pertaining 
to education,   yet apparently was able,   in his mind,   to 
make political  capital from his actions.    Appealing to the 
strong sense of individualism in the lower classes,   the 
Governor vetoed a compulsory education bill in 1913. 
o 
Calling the bill  "a humbug snare,  a farce,"      Blease 
argued that it was  the parents'  responsibility and not the 
state's  to decide whether or not their children received 
8Burnside,   "The Governorship of Coleman Livingston 
Blease,"   201-204. 
9House Journal.   1913.   1^30.     Senator Tillman also 
opposed the compulsory attendance bill,  but on the grounds 
that it would increase the danger of social equality by 
educating the Negro, 
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an education. 
In 1912 Dlease had vetoed a medical  inspection 
bill for school children  on the same grounds.     During his 
second administration,   the executive vetoed  two more medi- 
cal inspection bills.     The veto messages denounced the 
bills as invitations to immorality.    Governor Blease pro- 
mised that if the bill were passed  over his veto,  he would 
pardon any father who killed a doctor for violating his 
daughter's modesty.    A medical examination was also an 
individual's  prerogative  that could not be forced on any 
person or his  children.     Again, Blease appeared to many 
10 as a hero of individual rights. 
The Governor also clouded over important issues  in 
education with racial prejudice.    The danger of social 
equality in schools was brought before white society. 
Blease condemned the use of white teachers in Negro schools 
and repeatedly urged the  legislature to  enact a  law for- 
bidding such  practices.     In 1913 a Bleaseite assemblyman 
introduced auch a bill  in the legislature,  and a heated 
debate followed.     The Bleaseites and their leader accused 
; nyone opposed to be bill  of being in favor of social 
equality. 11 
10House Journal.   1211.   1089-1092;  Senate Journal, 
191^.   1022-231  See also,  Burnside,   "The Governorship  of 
Coleman   Livingstone Blease,"   216-217. 
11The bill was introduced by C.   D.  Fortner of Spar- 
ta nburg. 
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Another favorite target,  of the governor was  the 
University of South Carolina and  its president Samuel C. 
Mitchell.     Possibly Blease  had never forgotten the  incident 
of his college days.    A  feverish battle developed  over 
Blease's accusation that Mitchell   diverted Peabody  funds 
from Winthrop College to South Carolina State College.     Thus 
Mitchell was   just another "nigger lover."    Eventually 
Mitchell  resigned   under fire from  the governor to become 
president  of the Medical  College   of Virginia.     The Bleaseites 
rejoiced while  others   in the state were  shaken at  the  loss 
12 of a fine educator. 
Also  in  1913 Blease  recommended that the str te ac- 
quire the Medical  College  of Charleston and place it under 
the control  of  the  University of  South  Carolina.     This was 
a   favorable  proposition to   the legislature,   which  soon 
acted to secure the  school.     As a   result  the Medical  Col- 
lege of South   Carolina   came   in1o  existence.     In the area   of 
higher learning it was Blease's  only praiseworthy and non- 
13 partisan proposal during his four years as governor. 
The General Assembly had  begun to co-operate with 
the executive in other areas as well by 1913.    Although a 
Daniel  W.   Hollia,   University of South  Carolina. 
Vol.   II,   (Columbia:     University  of   South  Carolina Press, 
1951-1956),   249-262. 
1 Wallace,   History  of South  C^roUrn,   IV,   965. 
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majority  of   the   legislators were anti-Bleaseites,   they 
enacted several  of the Governor's recommendations concern- 
ing prison reforms.    A   191'+ law,   enabling counties and 
judges   to sentence more prisoners  to road work  crews  and 
county  prison farms,   made  it   unnecessary for Blease   to 
commute many prisoners'   sentences from the state prison to 
the road gangs.       At  the time the measure was a  practical 
one.    Earlier,  acting  upon another suggestion from the 
Governor,   the  legislature  enacted that   electrocution re- 
place hanging for capital  crimes.    Finally in 1913 the  le- 
gislature abolished  the prison hosiery mill as a   health 
hazard  to inmates.    Apparently this was a great victory 
for the Governor since he had advocated  such a measure  from 
1*» 
the beginning of his administration. 
Superficially   it would appear  that  the  conservative 
General Assembly had reconciled itself to Blease.    In all 
little   danger that  Blease would be so  foolish as  to attempt 
an unprecedented third term as governor.    It was  fairly 
certain,   however,   that  he would  remain active  in politics, 
and   that at   least  there would be a   Bleaseite candi, ate   for 
governor.     Furthermore.  Blease  did  have a   considerable  con- 
stituency.     So the  old conservative  faction had  to cope 
1*+ Ibid. 
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with  him   in  some way.     Twice it  had attempted to defeat 
him by employing his   own tactics and  had failed.     Now at 
last they had  come  to realize that  "Biease,   the personality, 
represents Bleaseism,   a   condition."l*     The   only way  to g   t 
rid   of Biease was  to  eradicate  some  of the  discontent   on 
which he  thrived.     Thus,  by enacting the least offensive 
and the most beneficial measures that Biease had proposed, 
the conservatives sought  to lessen social unrest of the 
lower classes with at  least  token measures  of moderate re- 
form.    Meanwhile the assault  on Biease,   the personality, 
did  not  cease. 
In some ways  the strategy worked.    By enacting pri- 
son reforms the legislature removed 31ease's  justification 
for his  use of  executive clemency.     If he continued his 
policy of   excessive  pardons,   vote's might wonder why. 
Biease would demonstrate how he could discredit himself by 
the use of the pardon. 
One  example which  strained  the   credibility  of the 
governor's  use  of the pardon occurred in March,   1913. 
Harrison Neeley,   Cole's  Negro chauffeur,  was  f:ned $3.75 
for driving thirty miles an hour on the main street in 
Columbia,   a   twelve mile  per hour zone.     The Governor re- 
sponded by pardoning the chauffeur.     Columbia  Police Chief 
15James  C.  Derieux,   "Crawling Toward  the Promised 
Land,"  The  Survey.   XLVIII   (September,   1922J,   178. 
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Clint Cathc t stated to the pi :ss that he did not think 
Cole had the power to pardon in a city Recorder's Court. 
This infuriated Blease, who claimed that the Columbia police 
were his political enemies.  If they continued to persecute 
Neeley, the Governor would have no choice except to take 
over the police, and place the city under martial law. A 
few days later, the matter still unsettled, Neeley was 
fined again for a speeding violation.  Naturally Cole par- 
doned Neeley again.  Chief Cathcart asked that both the 
fines be paid and repeated his belief that the Governor had 
no power to pardon *n city court. 
Cole's first reaction was to threaten to pardon 
everyone who asked him for pardon in city court. In the end, 
however, Blease settled on what he considered to be a better 
punishment for the city.  He merely appointed throe extra 
liquor constable:, to the city. The city and the county had 
to pay their salaries and Blease promised to add another 
every time his chauffer received a traffic ticket. 
This incident, in addition to Blease's continued 
pardoning of convicts in large numbers after reforms had 
been passed by the General Assembly, detracted from his 
professed concern for prison conditions. Any sincere de- 
sire of the Governor to improve prison conditions was al- 
most totally overshadowed by the excessive use of pardoning 
l6New York Times. March 9. 12, 1913* See also, 
Columbia State. ?«larch 8-12, 1913. 
94 
power to satisfy his  own personal desires.     It was a mis- 
take that would contribute to several  future political de- 
feats. 
If the occasion demanded  it,  the General Assembly 
co-operated to a degree with the Governor as in the "cotton 
panic"   of 191^.     The  outbreak  of World  War I  had severely 
limited the  int  mational  cotton market.    With the major 
European purchasers at war,  the price for a bumper crop of 
cotton dropp sd fro:   12 cents a  pound in July to 5  cents a 
pound in August.     In South Carolina as well as other 
Southern states,   agitation began in many quarters  to at- 
tempt some method of price stabilization.    Many requests 
for a special session of the General Assembly were received 
by the Governor,  but Blease was hesitant to comply.    In 
his mind there was a good reason. 
Cole  had already lost to li.  D.   Smith in the primary 
of the Senatorial race,  but the Bleaseite candid- te,  John 
G. Richards,   in the gubernatorial race  had been able to 
make the second primary.    The day before the election 
Blease announced that  he would consider the vote in the 
second primary as a referendum  for a special session of the 
legislature.     If Richards won,   then there would be a  special 
session.     Richards  lost,  but Blease decided to call the 
.     17 
legislature   into session anyway to meet  the crisis. 
17Co3.umbia   State.   September 3"5»   191^. 
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True to his  style,   the Governor welcomed  the  legis- 
lators with a   lengthy harangue.     In great   detail  he be- 
moaned his  recent  defeat,   complained of the "abus.   and 
vituperation"   he had received as Governor and   candidate, 
and promised to continue as the champion of the common man. 
Finally he made specific recommendations to meet the 
emergency:     prohibit the sale   of all  property  und<      lien 
or mortgage;   extend time limits  of tax paymentsj  reduce 
the interest rate  to six percent?  restrict all  cotton 
l P acreage;   initiate a   state warehouse  system  for  cotton. 
As  radical  as the:,e proposals were  for conservative, 
individualistic  South Carolina,   nome  legislators were pre- 
pared  to take  even more  drastic measures.     Debate  over 
restriction  of acreage ranged from demands for no restric- 
tions at all   to the popular idea   of  the total  elimination 
of the   191U  cotton   crop.     Finally the General Assembly 
acted   to restrict  acreage to  one third  of the  191^ crop 
and established a   state warehouse system,     Blease signed 
bo^h the bills readily,  but still complained about his re- 
lations  with   the   legislature.     Nonetheless  they had  worked 
together to attempt  to solve the problem,  and neither wor- 
ried  if  the   solution was  popular or  constitutional.     At  the 
Houne Journal.   191^ r-xtra   Session,   12-117;   most 
of the  laws  passed  by the r-xtra   Session were  repealed by 
next year when prices became  stable.     Wallace,   History of 
South   C^roUrrL.   H.   ^36. 
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time  they  seemed necessary.     Blease had provided   leader- 
ship and  direction  in a   time when it was required.     As   D. 
D.   Wallace stated,   "This was   cool and statesmanship  conduct 
19 while thousands  of  conservative men had lost their heads." 
Such was  the governorship of Cole L.   Blease.     He 
was not as bad a governor as his opponents declared him to 
be,  nor was he as good as he and his  supporters said he 
was.     His accomplishments,   however,   were shrouded by  his 
mistakes.     Excessive  use   of executive clemency veiled   his 
true  concern  for prison  reform.    Vetoing appropriation and 
education bills and opposing the state colleges tainted the 
establishment   of the Medical  College and his  fight  for  the 
improvement of rural schools.    Notoriety,  personal vendettas, 
favoritism,  and antagonism toward the Wilson administration 
were also mistakes;  not to mention the fact that Blease 
offered  little as  Governor to the people who had   elected 
him.     During both  his  terms Blease acted as though  he was 
still campaigning on the stump.    To him the process  of  ob- 
taining political  office seemed more  important than ful- 
filling the functions  of the position.    The administrations 
of Blease were  only secondary to his gaining election  in 
his next   campaign.     The mistakes he made  in office,   however, 
would  cost  him  dearly  in   future  campaigns. 
19Wallace,   History of  South   Carolina,   II,   "36. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DEFEAT AND MORE DEFEAT, 191^-1922 
Often Cole declared that it had been his ambition 
as a boy to become governor of South Carolina, and that he 
aspired to no higher office.    But Blease had a propensity 
for saying  one thing and doing another.    Even in his first 
administration the Governor admitted that he would be 
pleased to represent his  state in the Senate with Ben 
Tillman.    During his  second administration he visited the 
Senate Chamber in Washington and picked out a  seat for 
himself.    It was almost a foregone conclusion that Cole 
Blease would be in the race for the Senate in 191^. 
"The campaign of 191^ exhibited a repetition of 
2 
the coarse personalities  of 1912."      So said D,  D.  Wallace, 
and such in fact was the case.     No real issues were in- 
volved,   only a  conflict  of personalities on the stamp and 
behind the political scenes.     Blease's opposition was 
formidablei     "Cotton Ed"  Smith,  Langston D.  Jenning,  and 
William F.  Pollock.    All  four were accomplished demogogues, 
Columbia   State.   January 28,   191^. 
2Wallace,   History pjf South Carolina.   II,  ^. 
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but possibly the deciding element in the  election was the 
political maneuvering of Pitchfork Ben Tillman.     In 191^ 
Tillman did not hesitate to work for Blease's defeat, 
thanks to the increased hatred between the two men.-* 
The issue which most antagonized Tillman was  the 
forced resignation of James W.  Babcock as superintendent 
of the state insane asylum.    The episode began when Blease 
accused Dr.  Eleonora Sanders,   one of the first women doc- 
tors in the state,  of insubordination and conduct unbe- 
coming a lady.     Dr.  Sanders had been working in the asylum 
laboratory at night in the company of a Dr.  Cooper,  who 
had been dismissed from the asylum.    Although the doctors 
worked together in the presence of nurses,  Blease charged 
that the two were secretly U3ing the laboratory for immoral 
purposes.    When Blease demanded that Dr.  Babcock dismiss 
Dr.  Sanders,  he refused,  and upheld Dr.  Sanders as a de- 
dicated worker.    More than that,  Babcock submitted his  own 
resignation effective if and when she were dismissed. 
Blease then turned his wrath on Babcock.    This  enraged 
Tillman,  who was a good friend of Babcock.    When the con- 
troversy continued, both the doctors resigned.     Later the 
The split between the  former  friends   had reached 
a new low in 1913.     Tillman stated that   "Cataline among the 
Romans and Aaron Burr among the Americans are  the  only 
other two men I  have ever read of who were equal  to Blease 
in bamboozling the people."    New York Times,  January 22, 
1913. 
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name of each was cleared,  but Tillman was now prepared to 
prevent Blease from becoming his  junior colleague in the 
Senate with every resource at his disposal. 
At the same time Tillman had no great love for 
hllison D.  Smith,   the incumbent.    Smith was believed to 
have been a Haskellite  in 1890 and had won his Senate seat 
without Tillman's  endorsement.    As an alternative,  the old 
Senator attempted to persuade several of his faithful 
lieutenants to run against Blease.    John L,  McLaurin, 
A. F. Lever, and John Gary Evans politely declined the in- 
vitation.     Eventually Tillman reconciled himself to Smith's 
candidacy since  "it would be unspeakable disgrace and dis- 
aster to the state to send  him ^Bleas<|7 to the Senate." 
Another weapon advocated by Tillman to be used 
against Blease was  that  of tightening primary voting re- 
quirements.    Some of the state's Democrats wanted to apply 
the same strict regulations  that deprived the Negro of the 
franchise in the general elections.    Such a measure would 
have been disastrous for Blease.    A  large number of his 
white supporters would have  easily been disqualified by 
Burnside,   "The Governorship  of  C.  L.   Blease,"   267- 
271 j  Simkins,  Pitchfork Ben Tillman.   501. 
5B.   R.   Tillman  to J.   L.   Sims,  August  20,   191^. 
3. R.  Tillman MSS.,   Robert Muldrow Cooper Library,   Clemson 
University. 
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the property requirements or the literacy test.    But the 
Democratic Party was not prepared to cast the poor white 
aside.     Some  changes were made in regard to enrollment and 
residency.     One had to enroll on the party rolls with his 
own hand and was required to have lived in South Carolina 
for two years,   six months in the county and sixty days in 
the precinct.    When the Bleaseites protested that they 
were being disfranchised,   the party added rules forbidding 
property or  educational requirements.     No definition of 
party membership was given in the law passed the next year. 
This allowed the Democratic Party,  as a private club, 
freedom  to exclude the Negro.    Nonetheless these were im- 
portant measures which would insure against double voting 
and other fraudulent methods at the polls.    It was also 
hoped that many Bleaseites would be ignorant of the fact 
that it was necessary to  enroll their names as voters. 
Tillman and the other anti-Bleaseites were pleased with the 
new rules. 
Another effective tactic used by Tillman was re- 
peated reminders to the White House and to the voters that 
Blease was hostile to Wilson's administration.     The remarks 
made by the Governor in regard to Wilson had done nothing 
to increase his popularity.    The President was well-liked 
6Wallace,  History. o£ South Caroling.,   II,  ^33. 
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in South Carolina  for he had  lived in the state for a 
while as a boy.    A  group of Columbia  citizens had purchased 
his boyhood  home there and offered it to Wilson to use 
whenever he desired.    On several  occasions  Tillman advised 
the White House of Blease's  corruption and general immoral- 
ity.     He confided to Wilson that  if Blease were in the 
Senate he  "would be a very big thorn in his  side and far 
more painful than I  ever was to Roosevelt,   for Blease would 
be more unscrupulous  than I  ever was."    The voters  should 
also realize that such a  Senator would  "have absolutely 
7 
no influence with the administration." 
Because  of his ill health,  Tillman could not con- 
front Blease on the stump,  but he did send many letters to 
individuals and to newspapers.    In comparing the records 
of Tillmanism and Bleaseism,   the Senator enumerated the 
achievements  of his Reform Party.     Tillman said one need 
only look at Blease's  outstanding record«     "his blind- 
tiger record,   his race-track gambling record,   his whore- 
house record."8    Repeatedly,  Tillman railed at Blease's 
immorality and called for his defeat. 
As Tillman manipulated political strings in the 
background,   the candidates prepared for the stump campaign. 
^Quoted  in Simkins,   P^ tchf ork B_en. Tillman,   502. 
8Quoted in ibid..   501. 
I 
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Jennings and Pollack had been persuaded by Tillman to 
attack Blease on the stump and let Smith  stay out  of the 
fray as much as possible.    Of course "Cotton Ed" Smith was 
a  demogogue of no mean ability himself.    Blease harangued 
Smith,   Negroes,  and the rest  of his  "enemies," while 
Jackson and Pollack  castigated Blease.     "Cotton Ed" at- 
tempted to remain aloof from  such goings-on by defending 
his record in the Senate and giving stump audiences his 
own unique repertoire, 
Ellison Durant Smith  had his own special appeal to 
South Carolina voters.     Purely and simply,   it was  cotton. 
Smith came to a  stump meeting riding on a  wagon piled high 
with cotton bales and pulled by mules,  garlanded with 
cotton.    As his brass band blared  "Dixie," a procession of 
farmers accompanied him to the meeting place.    Placards 
announced the arrival of  "The Farmer's Friend."    Upon his 
turn to speak,  Smith arose and took a  cotton boll from his 
lapel.    Holding the boll skyward for all to see,  he praised 
the virtues  of the fiberi     "My sweetheart,  my sweetheart, 
others may forget you,  but you will always be ray sweetheart! 
So Cotton Ed would carry on at great length dwelling on the 
glory of cotton and all the marvelous success he had in 
...9 
9Quoted in Allan A. Michie and Frank Ryhlick, 
Dixie Demogogues  (New Yorki    Vanguard Press,  1939J.   265. 
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working to raise its price. 
Blease was quick to point  out the folly of elect- 
ing a man who had only one notion.     "His name is Ellison 
Durant Smith,  and he sho'  do rant,   cotton,  cotton!"10 
quipped the Governor.    Expressing open contempt for Smith's 
Senatorial record,  Blease claimed that the Junior Senator 
was  just an agent for cotton mill  executives and aristo- 
crats.     Furthermore,  Blease hinted that Smith was dealing 
in cotton futures.     The most serious charge made by Blease 
was that Smith was derelict in his racism.    Only after he 
had learned that Blease would run against him had Smith 
introduced bills to repeal the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
amendments.     Neither had Smith done anything about Negro 
employees working for the federal government.    All this, 
according to Blease,  was because Smith had been a 
Haskellite.     If Blease were elected to the Senate,  he pro- 
mised to insure the repeal of both amendments,  the passage 
of a Jim  Crow railroad passenger car bill, and rid the 
civil service  of all Negro employees. 
Blease's stump speeches also repeated many themes 
on which he had earlier spoken.    Lynching as  the punishment 
10Burnside,   "The Governorship of C. L.  Blease," 288. 
11Unmarked clipping in Tillman Scrapbooks,  B.  R. 
Tillman, MSS.,   Clemson University. 
10U 
of rape,   the threat  of racial  equality,   his political 
enemies,   the abuse he received from the press,  and the 
other usual Bleaseismsj all received much attention from 
the Governor. 
Smith never wilted under Blease's charges as 
Jones had in 1912.     On the stump Smith did not always make 
an effort  to refute  the accusations,  but when he did the 
incumbent  calmly dismissed the condemnations as absurdities. 
Anyone who knew him  should know better.    In short.   Smith 
chose to ignore Blease's rantings.     Instead Smith  told the 
audiences   of all the wonderful work he had done to raise 
the price  of cotton.     When the cotton panic came in the 
middle of the campaign,  the Senator left immediately for 
Washington.    Upon his return to the stump tour,  he announced 
his efforts to obtain federal loans  for the farmers,  as 
proof  of his value or a representative of the agrarian 
12 voters. 
Smith could also entertain on the stump as well as 
Blease by recounting stories of his poor childhood on the 
farm|  or by telling  of his mother who,   even in poverty, 
had sought  to rear him as a good Christian man.    On several 
occasions   "Cotton Ed" aroused the laughter of the audiences 
against Blease.    When the Bleaseites  exuberantly carried 
12 Burnside,   "The Governorship of C.  L.  Blease,"  299. 
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their champion from the  speaker's platform,  Ed  exclaimed, 
I  have attended many a  funeral in my life,  but this 
is the first at which I  have ever seen the pall- 
bearers a-whooping and a-hollering.    And this is 
truly a .political funeral,  for I am going to bury 
Cole Blease so damned deep that when he does dig 
out,  he'll scratch out in Hell face foremost.13 
One of Smith's  favorite promises during the campaign was 
to take "the ease out of Blease,"    Once Cole spoke about 
his early boyhood days when he worked in his father's 
livery stable,  and Smith  interrupted him by saying that he 
was going to send Blease back to the stable where he be- 
longed. 
The Senator was able to perform his  own act  un- 
hampered by Blease  since  the other two  candidates showed 
little interest  in being  elected.     They only wanted to in- 
sure the defeat  of Cole L.  Blease.    William P.  Pollack and 
Langston D.  Jennings had made no real pretense of winning 
the election.     They had only entered the campaign a  few 
weeks before the stump tour.    They did not want  Smith's 
election nearly as much as they wanted Blease's defeat. 
Their sole strategy was to discredit Blease in every way 
they could,  and by combining their attacks on the Governor, 
the two became known as  "Mutt and Jeff."    The prospective 
130.  L.  Warr,   "Mr.  Blease of South Carolina," XhS. 
American Mercury.  XVI  (1929),   30. 
14 Ibid. 
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voters were reminded  of every notorious act that Blease 
ever committed.     The most frequently repeated charge 
leveled at Blease by the two was his  excessive use  of exe- 
cutive clemency.     Cases were cited in which the Governor 
had pardoned dangerous  criminals.    Many lawyers had be- 
come prosperous by obtaining pardons for their clients. 
The real peril of  the pardon policy,   however, was the large 
number of Negroes  released by the governor.    Blease had 
blamed Smith for allowing Negroes to work for the United 
States Postal Service in South Carolina.    Jennings replied, 
"Which do you prefer,  a few mail clerks on trains,   or 
more than 900 negro robbers,  rapists,  and murderers  turned 
loose in the community?"  5    They branded Blease as a man 
who had released  crooks from prison and implied that he 
might be in league with them as well.    Not only this,  but 
if Blease were no friend to the Negro,  why were most of 
his pardons given to Negroes? 
Likewise,   Jennings and Pollack emphasized Blease*s 
association with the criminal  elements of South  Carolinai 
race-track gamblers,   illegal liquor sellers,  crooked law- 
yers, and the like.     Certainly Governor Blease stood by his 
friends,   but who were his friends?    Could anyone doubt that 
the convicts who had been pardoned would vote for Blease? 
,16 
15Burnside,   "The Governorship of C. L.  Blease,"  300. 
l6Greer Citizen.  August 28,   191*.     Jn Tillman Scrap- 
books.    B.  R.   Tillman KISS.,  Clemson University. 
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Finally the recriminations ended and the voting 
for the primary was held.17    The outcome proved a simple 
fact about the South Carolina  of 19l4t    There were more 
farmers than cotton mill workers.    Smith totaled over 
72,000 votes while Blease polled over 55,000.    None of the 
other Bleaseite candidates had won either.    John G, 
Richards,  Blease's  candidate for governor,   did manage to 
enter a run-off primary against Richard I, Manning,  but 
lost by a wide margin.    The national press rejoiced over 
Blease's defeat as a rebuke to  "the most pernicious fomenter 
of sectional and racial antagonism for political profit 
lfi now in the public  eye,"        Some said the election had, 
"driven the last nail in Blease's coffin."19 
Blease had  lost the  election, but he was still 
Governor for more than four months after the election. 
There was  still time to make news.    After his admirable 
leadership during the Cotton Panic,  the governor's name was 
7A few weeks before the election,  a doctor,  whose 
letter allegedly had asked for a pardon for a sick convict, 
claimed the letter was a forgery.    The night before the in- 
vestigation was to be held,   the doctor was  shot    by an un- 
known assailant who shouted,   "Coley won't be bothered with 
you tomorrow,"    Blease and his supporters came to be 
associated more and more with lawlessness after the inci- 
dent.    Wallace,   Short History.  663. 
18Literarv Digest.   XLIX  (September 12,  191*0.  ^8. 
19Unmarked  clipping in Tillman Scrapbooks, B.  R. 
Tillman MSS.,   Clemson University. 
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not seen in the headlines until the final days of his ad- 
ministration.     In keeping with his style,   Blease left  office 
with as much controversy as when he entered it. 
After the Extra  Session of the General Assembly, 
31ease was quiet for a  few months, but made up for lost 
publicity during the  last days of his administration.     In 
the first week  of January,   1915,  the Governor went  on a 
pardoning spree.    Before his term had ended he issued full 
pardons to all prisoners who had been parolled or whose 
sentences had been commuted.    Then in another gesture of 
defiance of the powers  that be,  Blease disbanded the state 
militia and ended his  feud with Secretary of War Garrison.20 
His annual address remained to be given to the General 
Assembly.     Blease took the opportunity to blame the legis- 
lature for the strife and partisanship that had plagued 
his administration 
If you had paid attention to what  I said in my 
1911-191^ special messages,  you would have found 
therein many matters which are of vital importance 
to our people,  and which if they had been enacted 
into law,  would have given much relief,  and in con- 
sequence the people  of South  Carolina   today would 
not have been facing the very serious and in some 
cases disastrous  situation which now confront them. 
•   •   .  Blinded by political prejudice,   instead of 
working for the best interests of the people,   the 
majority refused to see anything good in any recom- 
mendation I might make.21 
20New York  Times.  January 10,   19151  January 12,   1915. 
21Autographed  copy of Blease's Annual Message £o 
he General Assembly p_f_ 1M State of South  Carolina, 
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Possibly this revealed how little qualified Blease 
actually was  to be Governor,    His special messages pro- 
posed virtually no reforms at allj  nor would the recom- 
mendations he had made alleviate many of the state's 
pressing problems.     The real irony of the situation,   how- 
ever, was that Blease might have thought his proposals 
would improve matters.    No one will  ever know. 
After showing the General Assembly the error of 
their ways, Blease recounted the accomplishments of his 
administrations, such as the passage of the special tax 
for schools, the establishment of the State Medical College, 
and most of all, the abolition of the prison hosiery mill, 
"Blease and Blease's fight that wiped out this infernal 
death-trap,"  the governor proudly stated. 
Then the Governor launched on "a  course not taken 
by any other governor."    In order to correct the "calumny 
and abuse,   the misrepresentation and the willful and foul 
slanders  that  have been heaped  upon me and my family,   it 
is necessary that I  do this."     "This" meant a lengthy auto- 
biography beginning with an account of his grandfather and 
continuing to the autobiographer.    Even though he professed 
to care nothing about the criticisms of others,  Blease 
wanted to leave an accurate record for the "fair historian 
January 12,   1915,   3.     In Tillman Scrapbooks,  B.   R.  Tillman 
MSS.,   Clemson  University. 
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of the future." He closed by stating that, "I have never 
done one single act that I am ashamed of, ... I have 
never bowed my knees to any man or set of men," Again 
there was the strong possibility that Blease was speaking 
22 the truth. 
Two days after his speech Blease sent his final 
message to the General Assembly!  "I hereby resign as 
Governor of South Carolina, ..23 This was the entire text. 
No explanation was given for the resignation.     Charles A. 
Smith,   lieutenant governor,   became Governor for the 
shortest term in the history of the state:    five days. 
If Blease had resigned for the publicity,  he was 
certainly rewarded.     The national press rejoiced over his 
exit.     On the Sunday after his resignation the New YorJi 
Times ran a  special  full page spread on "Fiery Coley 
Blease,"     "He has been Governor," said the Times,   "There 
can be no doubt about that,  and he has been such a Governor 
as no other state in the Union ever knew before,"        The 
article  continued with an account of his governorship and 
attempted to analyze his rise to power.    Several magazine 
articles about Blease gave similar accounts.    All reports 
22 Tb^d... 3-^2. 
23House Journal. 12LS. 30. 
2**New York Times. January 17. 1915. 
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came to about the same conclusion!    Blease was nothing 
more than a political  opportunist who used prejudice and 
ignorance to assuage his  lust for personal power.    He 
talked to the poor man,  but did nothing for him when he 
was in office.     For this reason Blease was a demogogue of 
the lowest sort.    He was the type of man who could only do 
harm to his state and the nation.     It was hoped that now 
Blease's political career would be over.    The hopes  were 
destined to be disappointed.   * 
Coley retained his loyal mill-worker supporters 
even in defeat.    Although the more progressive Manning 
initiated more legislation favorable to the masses  of South 
Carolina,  he was   ,  because of his high-born origins,   not 
popular with the lower classes.    Five members of his  family 
had been in the Governor's seat before he.    As D. D.   Wallace 
stated.  Manning's  upper class manner made  "his ideas   .   .   . 
more popular than himself."        His program was good,   but 
his personality lacked color,  and if nothing else,  Blease 
had color. 
Once more, as  so often in the past,  there were no 
25See,   "The Resignation of Governor Blease,"  TJia 
Outlook.   CIX  (January 27,   1915).  156-157* and W. K.   Tate, 
"After Bleaset    A  New Program for South Carolina,    Xof 
Survey.  XXXIII  (March,   1915).   575-577. 
26 Wallace,  History of. South Carolina. II, ^37. 
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real issues in the election of 1916.    Five candidates were 
in the primary race for governor.    Manning was up for re- 
election,  Blease was  trying for a third term,  while Robert 
A.  Cooper ran as a compromise candidate.    Two minor 
aspirants,  John T.  Duncan and J. M,  Duchamps,  were never 
really in the contest from the start.    Cooper chose to sit 
hack and  let the Blease and Manning forces  fight it out, 
eonfident that the two would discredit  each other.     Then 
the voters would become disgusted with Manning and Blease 
and,  hopefully,  vote for Cooper.    Otherwise his platform 
was  little more than a promise to improve the public 
27 school system. 
Manning ran on the record of his first administra- 
tion and his  Bourbon virtue»  his campaign slogan was« 
2fl "Manning has made good." On the stump tour he usually 
made his speech first, since he was the encumbent. Then he 
departed, if at all possible. Manning was ill-equiped to 
face Blease on the stump, but rather left the mud-slinging 
to his supporters who were not so much pro-Manning as they 
were anti-Blease. As in the past, most of the state news- 
papers, led by the Columbia SS&i£. attacked Blease without 
mercy.    Although  Tillman had gone so far as to declare that 
27Columbia State. August 13.  1916. 
28Ibld.. August 28,   1916. 
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Manning was  "the worst politician South Carolina had ever 
produced who became Governor," 9 the old Senator hated 
Blease more and did what he could to insure his  ex-friend's 
defeat. 
On the stump,  however,  none of the other candidates 
were a match for Blease,    His target was Manning and his 
Bourbon background.     Taking his cue from Tillman,  Blease 
shouted that  "Dick Manning was the worst governor in the 
history of the state."    Nine white men had been killed by 
Negroes  during Manning's two years as governor.     No Negro 
had dared do such a thing when tie. was in office,  boasted 
Blease,  because they knew what would happen to them.     It 
was Cole's  opinion that Manning was too weak to enforce 
the law.     He also reminded the voters,   time and time again, 
that Manning was an aristocrat.    The social welfare bills 
passed during Manning's administration did not really 
benefit the people,  but  only resulted in higher taxes and 
more extravagance from the state government.    Except  for 
Cole's shouting that Manning was a  liar and a coward,   the 
stump tour was somewhat dull and uneventful. 
The newspapers,  however,  gave Blease the full 
treatment.     The Columbia  State claimed that Manning's good 
29Quoted in Simkins,  Pitchfork Bgn. TJJJfflfiH,   503. 
3°Columbia State. August 27,  1916. 
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name was abused because of Blease's lack of "sense of fair 
play."    The State's  editorials  on the other hand were 
sometimes abusive to Blease.    A  third term "would cause 
the first two to look as a  tallow dip looks to an arc 
light."    Criminals from the entire country would flock to 
the state.    A  Blease victory would be an  endorsement of 
"to hell with the constitution."    If Blease were elected 
"the majority don't want a governor,  but a king—an 
absolute ruler of South Carolina."    The State felt confi- 
dent that Blease would be rejected and predicted long 
31 before the election that Manning would be the victor. 
The campaign ended,  and  unlike the previous  elec- 
tion,   it was peaceful  "except for an old negro preacher 
who had slipped  up on the amount of cider he could handle. 
Duchamps and Duncan received only a few hundred votes each. 
Cooper fared much better,   polling over 25,000 votes.    Over 
41,000 Democrats  cast their ballots for Manning,  but 
Blease led all the candidates with over 63,000 votes. 
Blease did not,  however,  have the required majority, and a 
run-off primary was  scheduled between him and Manning. 
Despite the fact that Blease had the highest number 
of votes,   the State was still confident that Manning would 
.,32 
31Ibid.. August 25,   19l6i August 15,  1916. 
32Ibid.. August 29,   1916. 
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be elected.     The  editorial  opinion was that Blease had 
gained nothing since 191^ and had merely held his  own from 
that election.     The quiet election,  then,   began to become 
33 noisy.   ' 
A  few days after the  first primary Cooper gave his 
endorsement to Manning.     Bolstered by his  new ally,   the 
Governor proclaimed,   "I  started this morning to win the 
fight in the Second Primary and I am going to win it. 
Manning was not much of a fighter himself,  but his supporters 
were. 
The state press  lamblasted Blease during the two 
weeks before the election.    No one was as  enthusiastic 
about Manning as he was  opposed to Blease.     "No yeggmen 
have been freed by Manning,  no foul mouth speeches,   no 
pardons given,"  cried the editors.    The State proclaimed 
that "There was never more involved in an election then 
this one."    Which did the people preferi    Manning for a 
second term or Blease for a  third? 
Tillman publicly announced that the "liquor ring 
and barrooms are trying  to buy the election.    They want a 
man in the governor's office they can control,   that they 
^Editorial,   Columbia  State. August 30,   1916. 
3**Ibid.. August   31t   1916. 
35Ibid..   September 5.   1916. 
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might run the government."    According to Pitchfork Ben, 
Manning would be reelected if Wilson were, as  long as 
there was an  "honest vote and a fair count."    A vote for 
Blease was a  vote  for lawlessness.    Tillman penned  several 
articles about cases in which Blease had pardoned Negro 
rapists and a murderer who had  killed "an old man defending 
his daughter's virtue."36 
William Watts Ball,  former conservative editor of 
the Charleston News and  Courier,  saw the election as a 
choice between "government and misgovernment."     "If I had 
a son in the pen,"   he added,   "I  have no doubt I would be a 
..37 Bleaseite. "■" 
Election day came.    Blease picked up only a  few 
thousand votes  from  the  first primary while Manning received 
almost 30,000 more votes  than he had previously drawn. 
Still a  change of  only 2,3^3 votes would have given Blease 
the election.     The  obvious fact was that nearly five thou- 
sand more votes were cast in the second primary.    The 
Bleaseites  cried fraud,  but Cole remained quiet.    Manning 
made things worse by proclaiming a victory for law and 
order and announcing that  "South Carolina  is redeemed. 
..38 
36Ibid. 
37Quoted in Lander, A History ol South.  Carolina, 
1865-1960.   55. 
38Wallace,   History of South  Carolina,   II,  kk-2. 
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Tillman further alienated the Bleaseites by saying,   "All 
the tin-horn gamblers,  all the blind tigers,  all the red 
light habitues,  all the criminals and near criminals— 
those who have been pardoned and those not yet caught and 
convicted—were for Blease.    y 
A   series  of fourteen articles  entitled  "Bleaseism" 
appeared in the Greenville Piedmont before and after the 
second primary.     The author attempted to analyze South 
Carolina politics with particular reference to Cole L, 
Blease.    He described the condition of the mill workers 
who supported Blease,   "not with any thought of  establish- 
ing a reign of  lawlessness,  but in a sincere hope of 
bettering their  condition by law."    In the author's opinion 
this was really what Bleaseism was.    Because of Manning's 
social legislation he was  "a better exponent of Bleaseism 
than Blease himself."    Yet no amount of legislation could 
win the mill workers over to Manning because of the role 
of emotion,  sentiment,  and personalities rather than sense 
and principles.    Manning's genteel birth and his claim 
that  "Bleaseites want to trample on the Constitution and 
wipe their feet  on law and order,"  estranged him from the 
workers.     Blease could take  "a demogogic advantage of that 
class  separation."    Most Bleaseites were "simple-hearted, 
honest,   earnest  citizens" who resented being labeled as 
39 Ibid. 
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kO criminals,      whether directly or by association. 
Each  faction no longer trusted the  other.    The con- 
servatives branded the Bleaseites as criminals while  the 
Bleaseites believed that they had been cheated and falsely 
slandered as mslfactors.     Rumors began that Blease might 
run as an independent  in  the November General Election. 
William P.   Beard,   who  had been Blease's  bodyguard 
and was now editor of the Abbeville Scimitar,  proposed that 
ballots be printed with Blease's name rather than Manning's 
for the general election.     Beard's reasoning was  that the 
41 ex-governor had really won the primary. 
Blease himself enraged many of the  state's Demo- 
crats with a  speech made a  few weeks after  the second pri- 
mary.    In a surprise move,  Blease accepted an invitation 
to speak at Allen University, a Negro college in Columbia. 
Introduced as  the  "strongest white man in the state of 
South Carolina,"  the racist demogogue delivered a flattering 
^°George M.   Koester,   "Bleaseism," Greenville 
Piedmont,   September 7-October 6,   19161  in Tillman Scrap- 
books,   B.   R.   Tillman MSS.,   Clemson  University.     Some   of the 
articles  can be found in the scrapbooks of W. W.  Ball, 
W.   W.  Ball MSS.,  Manuscript Department,  Duke University. 
^Abbeville Scimitar.   September 15-November I,   1916. 
Beard printed   "Our Ticket"   on the  front page of  the  Scimitar, 
October 1,  1916.    All candidates were the same with the ex- 
ception  that Blease's  name was   up for governor.     The  news- 
paper's  epithet was  "All Coon's  look alike  to me.      aea**a 
was  later imprisoned for sedition during the First World 
War. 
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M speech,   "generously seasoned with superlatives,"  " to the 
students.    He began by protesting that he had been mis- 
understood by the Negroes.     "They say I am against the 
Negro.     Nay,   I am a  friend of the Negro,"  seemed to be the 
thesis  of his address.    He declared that he had never in- 
sulted  or wronged a   "colored girl."    He had always advo- 
cated black taxes for black schools,  but the white school 
boards had cheated the Negro schools out of funds that 
were rightfully theirs.    As a member of the democratic Ex- 
excutive Committee,   he had voted to seat a  Negro rather 
than a white man in a disputed Congressional election.    If 
the all-white Executive Committee was as honest as he had 
been,  Blease would have been elected in the last primary. 
His stump remarks had been made merely "to tickle the  ears" 
of the white voters.    Alluding to his pardoning of many 
Negroes,  Blease wished that some day all prisons and courts 
might be abolished.     He closed his address with the en- 
couraging statementt     "You're coming to higher things. 
They can't hold you back despite what I  or any other man 
might  say." 
Democrats were appalled by the speech.     The Columbia 
^Columbia  State.  October 5.  1916. 
43Most  of the daily newspapers carried Blease's 
speech  the day after he delivered it.    Excerpts maybe 
found in Wallace,  History o£ South Carolina,  II,  W3. 
i 
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State accused Blease of conspiring to bolt the party and 
grab the Negro vote  in the general election.    The cardinal 
sin in South  Carolina politics was to "turn against the 
white's  party." In effect Democrats believed that Blesse 
had condemned the white man's party and had appealed to the 
black vote.     The Greenville Piedmont  called Blease "a  hide 
skinner  on the crude and vulgar stage of South Carolina 
politics." The  loss  of faith was now complete, 
Blease denied that he contemplated any attempt to 
bolt the party,  but  still claimed that he had been cheated 
out of his election.     In late October the  "Reform Party," 
as the Bleaseites called themselves,   held a state conven- 
tion.    Blease announced that he was a victim of  "whiskey, 
money,  intimidation and fraud," but remained loyal to the 
regular Democratic Party.    He was contemptuous of the 
Columbia   State for accusing him of defection from the 
party.     It had been the State which had supported the 
Haskellite bolters in 1890 and appealed to the Negro,  not 
Cole L.  Blease.     Rejecting all charges that he threatened 
to bolt.   Cole avowedi     "I am not a candidate for any 
office now.     I do not expect to be a  candidate for any 
44 Columbia State. October 13. 1916. 
^Greenville Piedmont (undated), in Tillman scrap- 
books, B. R. Tillman MSS., Clemson University. 
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office now.     I  do not expect to be a  candidate for any 
office in the near or distant future." 
By November W.  P. Beard had proclaimed Blease as 
an independent candidate.    Only a few ballots were printed 
with Blease's name and he continued to deny that he had 
anything to do with the movement.    In the election Manning 
received over 60,000 votes while Blease polled only slightly 
more than 1,000.    It is not known whether or not Blease 
was foolish  enough to think he could win. 
Manning's second administration was not nearly as 
successful as his first.    By 1917 the era  of  "Progressive 
Conservatism"  in South Carolina, as  in the rest of the na- 
tion,  had  come to an end.    Domestic issues were over- 
shadowed by the  entry of the United States into the first 
World War.    A sizable minority of South Carolinians of 
German descent had naturally sided with Germany early in 
the conflictj  some had protested when the United States de- 
clared war on Germany in April  of 1917.    All  of the mem- 
bers  of the South Carolina Congressional delegation had 
voted for the war except one.     The dissenter was Represen- 
tative Fred Dominick, Blease's  law partner. 
In May of 1917 a group  of Bleaseites met in 
46 
1260. 56. 
Columbia State. October 25. 1916. 
4?McPherson, History o£ South Carolina, 1&6_S- 
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Columbia and  condemned Governor Manning for discriminating 
against them in the appointment of draft hoard members. 
John P.  Grace,   editor of the Charleston American,   condemned 
Congress for declaring the war.    Blease reportedly agreed 
with Grace and began his  own war.  ° 
At Pomaria,  a  small town with large population  of 
German descendents,   Blease made his first anti-war speech 
in July,   1917.     He declared that the forthcoming."political 
war of 1918" was as important as the World War.     "Dick 
Manning is the worst Governor the State ever had," he 
charged,   "worse than Scott,  Moses,  or Chamberlain because 
they only stole money,  but he is trying to steal the souls 
and bodies of your boys.     They talk about a free America. 
I  don't care what kind of America it is when I am dead and 
gone.    Neither does your boy."    He continued by declaring 
that the war was  "an unwarranted sacrifice.in the sight  of 
Almighty God,   of fresh young American manhood."    Using 
pacifist rhetoric,  Blease preached that the war was totally 
un-Christian.'*9  "When Christ was  on this  earth,  He  taught, 
•Blessed are the peacemakers.'     Can any man show me where 
48Wallace,  History. a£ SsiUh. CRrolina,  II,  ^5. 
Grace's  Charleston American was banned  from  the mails be- 
cause of its anti-war editorials. 
^Columbia  State.   July 28,  1917.    Excerpts  from 
the Pomaria and Filbert anti-war speeches may be found in 
Wallace,  History o£ South Carqlina.  "1  *•/• 
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Christ ever said,   'Blessed are the war makers?'   ...  I 
would rather be an outcast  of Woodrow Wilson and a follower 
of Jesus Christ than be a  follower of Wilson and an out- 
cast  of Christ.     I was opposed to this war."    In a  final 
gesture of opposition to the war Blease proposed that if 
the German army ever invaded the state,   South Carolina   could 
whip it single-handedly.    To soften his remarks somewhat, 
he added somewhat ambiguously,   "Do not misunderstand me. 
We are in this war and it must be pushed to a successful 
conclusion." 
These were  strong words  for a politician in South 
Carolina during the war.    The speech placed Blease on the 
defensive  for several years and ruined his chances for 
election in two campaigns.    After being severely criticized 
by the state press  for his Pomaria speech,  Blease,  a week 
later,  made a  similar but more cautious anti-war speech  in 
Filbert,  another small town with many citizens of German 
blood.    Much  of the address was given over to a defense  of 
his earlier speech.     Cole complained that his anti-war 
statements had been taken out of context. 
Those who for a malicious purpose took a  part of this 
report and condemned me for it,   lied and know they 
lied.     I said  that I believed that President Wilson 
and the members  of Congress,  who voted for the war, 
would be responsible for every American life that 
50 Columbia State. July 28, 1917. 
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was  lost in it  ,   .   . any man who says I  have ever in 
word or deed showed  treason and am not as good an 
American as  they are,  they are liars and puppies. 
Those who don't like it,  darn  'em,   let'em lump it!5 
The whole controversy according to Blease was merely a ruse 
on the part of those who had stolen the  election from him 
in 1916,   to discredit him.    His  enemies were only trying 
to camouflage the real political issues  of the state by 
"wrapping an American flag around themselves," and accusing 
52 Blease of treason. 
The mistakes  had been made.     In 1916 Blease's re- 
cord had been used against him and would be used again to 
help defeat him in 1918.    The alleged bolt by the Bleaseites 
in 1916 and the anti-war statements were sufficient evidence 
to indict Blease in the 1918 campaign for the Senate. 
In early 1918 the prospects for the Senatorial race 
were not at all clear.     Blease was  certainly going to run, 
but who would be his opponent for Tillman's seat in the 
Senate.     Pitchfork Ben had announced that because of his 
age (?1  years) and poor health,  he would not be a  candidate 
even in the face of popular demand.    Tillman,  his  family, 
his friends,  and his political allies felt that the aging, 
crippled man was no match for Blease.    The choice of the 
anti-Blease  forces was  Congressman Asbury F.  Lever,  a good 
51Ibid..   August   3.1917. 
52Columbia  Record. March  3°,  1918, 
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stump speaker with  ten years  experience in Congress.    He 
had rendered much legislative service to farmers and was 
chairman  of the House Agriculture Committee.    Lever ap- 
peared to be the leading challenger against Blease,  but 
Tillman changed the situation when he changed his mind 
about running. 
Tillman came, to the conclusion that Lever could not 
defeat Blease.    The old Senator had also received many 
letters  urging him  to run for re-election.    He was then 
chairman of the naval  committee and believed he could 
serve the  country and his  state in wartime better than any 
new Senator could.     Tillman had made his decision,   so he 
began to work to force Lever to withdraw.     First he had to 
convince many people that his health was good enough to 
enable him to  continue his service in the Senate.     He ap- 
peared before the state party convention and attacked 
Blease with the shout,   "To hell with German sympathizers 
and thank God  for Woodrow Wilson."    Then he explained that 
he would not canvass the state because he was needed in 
Washington because  of the war.    Tillman went to great 
lengths to show that his age and health were not the reasons 
53 he would avoid the stump campaign. 
Tillman realized  that the key to winning the 
53Simkins,   Pitchfork Ben Tillman,   536-537. 
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wartime  election was  to gain the endorsement of President 
Wilson.    After some confusion and delay in Washington, 
Tillman first received a promise from the White House that 
the administration would be neutral in the election.    He 
then penned a public  letter damning Lever as an agent of 
Manning and  the ring politicians.     In a surprise move, 
never fully  explained,  Wilson publicly asked Lever to with- 
draw from the Senate race and return to the House where 
he could not be spared.    Lever complied,  and Tillman re- 
joiced.    He quickly asked  the state press to suppress his 
letter against Manning and Lever.    All the papers did so, 
except the pro-Blease Charleston American.* 
Again it seemed as  though there would be no real 
issues involved  in the election.    Tillman had announced 
that he would not make the stump tour and later Blease dis- 
closed that he would make  only a partial tour.    Nathaniel 
B.  Dial, a  successful businessman and Wilsonite, was also 
a  candidate,   but the real  contest seemed to be between 
Tillman and Blease. 
As an early and persistent tactic,  Tillman opened 
fire on Blease's war position.    Blease's pro-Germanism, 
wrote Tillman,   "ought to be sufficient to damn him in the 
eyes of all  sensible and patriotic men." 
^Wallace,  History  o£ South. Carolina.,   II,  ^50. 
55Quoted  in Simkins,  Pitchfork Ben Tillman.   5^5. 
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Convinced that  the Pomaria and Filbert speeches had al- 
ready lost the  election  for his opponent,   the  old Senator 
gave it as his  opinion that  "Blease realizes now that he 
cannot wipe out those fatal,   damning,  disloyal ravings 
when he thought they would appeal powerfully to prejudice 
and ignorance."    He further warned that Blease would at- 
tempt to squirm  out  of his own trap through the "shrewd 
manipulation of words." 
In several  open  letters Tillman gave Blease no 
hope  of winning.     "All you have to do is throw his official 
record back at him."    In addition to his allegedly trai- 
torous  oratory,   it was  evident that Blease could not over- 
come Tillman.     "Blease wants  to get in the Senate and he 
knows he can never be elected if he has to fight a deter- 
mined and agressive  opponent who can be neither bull-dozed 
nor bamboozled by Blease's cheap,   feather-legged bluster 
and his clap-trap methods  of stump speaking."57    Tillman 
naturally believed that he was such an opponent,  despite 
his advanced years. 
The Columbia State was really in a quandary after 
SAiken Standard   (undated)i   in Tillman Scrapbooks, 
Lman MSS.,   Clemson University. B.   R.   Tillma  
57Unmarked clipping in Tillman Scrapbooks.    B.  R. 
Tillman MSS.,   Clemson University. 
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Lever withdrew.     The contest was between Ben and Cole, 
both of whom the State had traditionally opposed.    After 
some hesitation and  fear that Blease,   being younger,   might 
be able to win,   the State endorsed Tillman and rationalized! 
"It /the State7 does not love Tillman morej but it loves 
Blease lessi  it doesn't want  either,  but is 100 times more 
CO 
for Tillman though." 
Blease softened his words on the war when it be- 
came apparent  to him that he had misjudged public opinion. 
He bought Liberty Bonds,   donated a forty-acre tract  of land 
for a military rifle range, and offered to raise a regi- 
ment of Bleaseites  for the war  effort.    He complained that 
he had been misquoted and misunderstood.    All he had meant 
was that,   "No man wants the United States to back down or 
curl its tail and run, but if we can have an honorable 
peace without slaughtering our young manhood,  who can ob- 
ject?"59 
The Bleaseite Charleston American contended that 
Tillman was so old and in such  "pitiable condition"  that 
he  should quietly retire,   whereas it  felt  that Blease was 
"alert,  active,   highly intelligent,   in the full vigor of 
58 IbM. 
59Columbia  Record. March 3.   1918, 
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his manhood."    The State's  endorsement of Tillman was re- 
presented as a good example of the Senator's betrayal of 
the people who had  elected him.     "Our plebeian farmer has 
become an aristocrat and none but aristocrats find  favor 
in his eyes.   .   .   .  Z~He_7 has deserted and widely departed 
from the principles  upon which he was  elected and of which 
he was supposed to be the most earnest and able advocate." 
Meanwhile  "Nat" B.   Dial was confident that neither 
Tillman nor Blease would win.     In his  estimation Tillman 
was  "too old and  feeble"  to make the  campaign much less 
serve another Senate term,  while Blease's attitude toward 
Wilson and the war had already eliminated him.    As for 
Blease's  talk  of raising a regiment,  Dial discounted the 
proposal as   "mere twaddle."61    With only Dial and an even 
more  obscure  candidate,  J.  F.  Rice,  on the stump tour, 
"Nat" predicted that it would be hard for him to lose. 
Nobody seems  to have paid much attention to him at the time. 
The Senate race looked as though nothing eventful 
was going to  occur.    Lever had withdrawn early in the year, 
Tillman was not  even going to appear on the stump,  Blease 
was  only going to speak at a  few of the stump stops, and 
few voters seemed to care what Dial did.     Cole had snorted 
60Charleston American.  April  22,   1918. 
6lCj2lumbia_ StajfciU April  25.   1918. 
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"There's no use to have an election if we're going to 
have it stolen from us  in 1916."    Taking a  cue from his 
pronouncement,   some newspapers thought the whole  election 
should be called off if nobody were going to campaign. 
So it appeared  to be a  dull Senate campaign even before it 
started.62 
Tillman's  unexpected death on July 3 changed  the 
entire election outlook.    The leading opponent to Blease 
was gone.     Now only Dial could challenge Blease for the 
Senate seat.    Blease was confident he could win against the 
unknown Dial.     With Tillman out of the campaign,   he pre- 
dicted his  own victory since he was the only "representa- 
tive of the masses  of the poeple."    A Bleaseite  editorial 
pictured the opposition in terrible disarray after Tillman's 
death.     "The Columbia State is in such woeful straits  that 
it is about to be forced to support Mr.  Dial,  the former 
nemesis of the  editor."63   Anyway a favorite Bleaseism had 
always been to vote as  one wanted,  not as the newspapers 
said. 
When Blease did make one of his rare appearances 
on the  stump tour,   he continued to talk about the war. 
Usually his  claim was that he was for winning the war.  but 
62Newberry_ Herald aM News.,  June I*,  1918. 
63Columbia   Record.  June 28,   1918. 
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that the war should not cloud the state political  issues, 
the most important  of which was that Manning was  "taxing 
the people to death."    He would debate the war with anyone 
from Washington,  yet Blease was not disloyal and would 
fight any man who called him a traitor.        To play down 
his remarks about Wilson, Blease declared,   "When I am 
elected to the United States Senate,  I am going to President 
Wilson and tell  him  here is an American Senator,  and what- 
ever is necessary to win the war,   I am with him to the 
finish." Several  times,  Blease renewed his offer to 
raise a  regiment,   showed receipts for purchase of Liberty 
Bonds,  and reminded voters of his donation of a rifle 
range.     Going even further,     he promised to support and to 
campaign for a  third term for Wilson if this were necessary 
to winning the war.     Finally upon election,  if Wilson so 
desired,   Blease would resign from the Senate seat and lead 
his own regiment into battle.66    The wiley Coley knew he 
had  erred in the voters'  eyes in regard to Wilson and the 
war,  but with Tillman gone,  he hoped the electorate had a 
short memory. 
If the voters did have a  short memory,  the anti- 
Bleaseites would not permit them  to forget one vulnerable 
6dewberry Herald g_n_d_ News.,  June  7,   1918. 
65Wallace,  History p£ South Caroling,   II,  **9. 
66 'Ibid. 
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word or deed by the former governor.    Ex-Senator John L. 
McLaurin,  a popular Tillmanite,  campaigned and wrote pub- 
lic letters against Blease because he, 
,   .   ,  desired to strip the mask from Cole L,  Blease, 
expose him before the people as a self-seeking derao- 
gogue without scruple or honor,  and  disbar him from 
the councils  of a  free,   clean,  and intelligent 
Democracy.   ...  He could have been a great leader 
and done great good.    But he chose to prostitute 
his ability to gain an hour's applause and gratify 
an insatiable ambition for power.°7 
McLaurin illustrated to what depths the character of Blease 
had descended.    Many times Blease had pledged that he stood 
by his  friendst  he had even broken that vow.    W, P.  Beard, 
Blease1s old bodyguard,  had written McLaurin from prison 
where Beard was  serving time for his anti-war activities. 
No one had  ever been more loyal to Blease than Beard.    As 
editor  of the Scimitar.  Beard had been encouraged by Blease 
to propcse the independent ticket in the general election 
of 1916.    In Beard's words,   "Then he ^Blease7 got cold feet 
and left me in the lurch.     Now he has deserted me." 
Beard's family had received no assistance from Blease,  nor 
had Beard himself for that matter.    According to McLaurin 
Blease abandoned his  former friend because he was  "no 
longer useful to him." 
Blease replied  to McLaurin's charges the day after 





they had been madei     "Every friend I have in South 
Carolina knows that I discouraged any effort at a bolt 
in 1916."    He also quoted many newspaper editorials which 
cited the allegiance of the Bleaseites and Blease to the 
party.    As for Beard,  he had printed the tickets against 
Blease's advice and had asked to be reimbursed.     Blease 
merely refused.    Often Blease had warned Beard about his 
seditious articles,  but he would not listen, *    The reply 
seemed to be insufficient.    The question of Blease's 
loyalty to the party remained an issue, and doubt was 
raised over what happened to Beard. 
The renewal  of the bolt accusation breathed new 
spirit into Dial,  who soon echoed the McLaurin charges. 
On the stump at Florence,  Blease had dared anyone to call 
him a traitor.     Dial told him to his face that he was 
"disloyal from the crown of his head to the soles of his 
feet."7°    Blease did nothing.    The war,  the bolt,  and later 
the Allen University speech,  were all haunting Blease be- 
fore the election.    He was truly on the defensive.    Hand- 
bills appeared,  with the taunt,   "Vote for Blease and the 
Kaiser will smile."    When the Columbia Record, quoted 
Blease's Allen University speech as an example of his 
hypocrisy,  the harassed candidate could only retort,   "The 
69Columbia  State.  July 1,   1918. 
70IbJii.,  July 17.   1913. 
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biggest  liar in the world is the  Columbia  State." 
The knockout punch was set up  unintentionally by 
the Bleaseite Charleston American.    The American had asked 
Wilson if it were true that Blease was an acceptable to 
him as Dial.     The President's answer was published two 
weeks before the electiom     "Let me say that I  have perfect 
confidence that the people of South Carolina will   judge 
rightly in the senatorial contest, and I  have not  the least 
fear that they will believe Mr,  Blease is o£ can b_g a friend 
of the administration.    The record of his opinion is al- 
72 
ready written and it is a little late to expunge it." 
For all practical purposes Blease had no chance to 
win after the Wilson letter was printed.    The Charleston 
American tried to belittle the Wilson indictment by in- 
forming its readers that it really did not make any differ- 
ence if a Senator did not get along with the national ad- 
ministration.    Neither Tillman nor John C.  Calhoun had 
any sympathy with their respective presidents while serving 
in the Senate.    Why should Blease?    Such a reationalization 
was futile,   however,   during the First World War in 
Wilsonian South Carolina. 73 
71, 2D. American.  July **,   1918. 
72 Wilson's letter 
appeared 
Columbia  State.  August  20,   1918.     ilson's  1 
in most of the daily newspapers in the state. 
"^Charleston American.  August  22,   1918. 
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As one  commentator phrased it,   "Mr, Blease vastly 
mistook the temper of the people,  and reaped the  natural 
reward of attacking the President and the war when such 
conduct could only hinder his success."        As a  result of 
his grievous  error,  Cole suffered the worst defeat he had 
yet received in his political career.     The colorless  Dial 
received over 65,000 ballots,  while Blease commanded  only 
about 40,000,  a number much lower than he had received in 
the two previous  elections.    The Blease vote probably 
represented his  faithful  following of mill workers,  rather 
than any pacifist feelings toward the war. 
The next year Blease considered running for the 
House of Representatives,  but in the face of his   unpopularity 
over the war,   he decided not to be a  candidate.     Only after 
the world conflict was  over and the  "return to normalcy" 
had arrived,  did Goley think it wise to be a candidate 
again.     Intolerance and prejudice had replaced progressive 
reform,    A  contemporary description of Cole L, Blease  il- 
lustrated the fact that  he was still in the national news, 
in the prime of life,  and ready to campaign! 
He was,  with a  touch of consciousness, almost 
staginess,   the typical leader of the democracy of the 
New South:     ostentatiously large wool hat, dark 
rather fierce eyes,   heavy black mustache, gaudy in- 
signia on a  heavy watch chain,  a man who radiated  or 
wanted to radiate a  constant ferocity against  the 
7^ Wallace,  History fif South Carolina.  II,   ^52, 
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irreligious,   the impure,   'nigger lovers,'   'aristo- 
crats,'   'pap-suckers,'  Yankees, and intellectuals— 
a  son of the soil and of the mob with a  chip on his 
shoulder,'5 
The year 1922 gave Blease another opportunity for 
a return to public life.    His  sixth campaign for governor 
was typical of its  five predecessors.     The Blease platform 
had hardly changed in the past ten years,  nor did the man 
himself when he offered it  on the stump tour.    Reduce 
taxes,  abolish  "useless"  offices,  and  "extravagance" by the 
state government,   provide better rural  schools,  increase 
pensions to Confederate war veterans, and prohibit the 
sale of harmful drugs:    all these had been used by the 
candidate before,  and they were  just as meaningless now 
as they had always been.     The  only new promises were a 
"merit basis"  for  use of executive clemency,  a home for 
orphans and another home for  "women who have erred," and 
finally the "strict enforcement  of prohibition," 
In addition to the Eighteenth Amendment, another 
new amendment to the Constitution was given attention by 
Cole and the candidates.  In regard to the Nineteenth 
Amendment,  Blease  conceded:   "While I have always opposed 
woman suffrage,  we now have it and as law abiding citizens 
75Ludwig Lewisohn,   "South Carolina:    A Lingering 
Fragrance,"   The Nation.   CXV   (1922),   38. 
76 Charleston American.   June 20,   1922. 
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77 we must support it.     '     In order to conform with the 
state's peculiar election system, Blease urged the women 
to enroll  on the Democratic  Club Rolls. 
Usually he read the same speech at most  of the   . 
stump meetings,  but  occasionally he took time to castigate 
what he believed to be the worst evil in the state:     the 
tax commission.    Headed by Ben Sawyer,  whom Blease des- 
cribed as  "a  one horse bookkeeper," the Commission was com- 
posed of "Sawyer's Boston bookkeepers and Sears-Roebuck 
cigarette suckers and  liquor drinkers" who "bamboozled the 
state out  of $16,000" by "smelling rat holes around the 
7R state house," Except for his harangues  on the tax com- 
mission,   the papers reported that Blease was  "not in his 
usual fine fettle." It should be noted that Blease said 
very little on the dangers posed by the Negro.    Perhaps he 
was afraid that the Allen University speech would be 
brought up by his opponents.    Whatever his reason,  racism 
seemed to be oddly missing from his speeches. 
Early in the campaign Cole called all  the other 
candidates  "young colts on the track"80 while he was a 
78 
79 
'ibid.. June 21, 1922. 
'ibid.. June 27, 1922. 
'ibjji., June 28, 1922. 
80Ibid.. June 29, 1922. 
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proven thoroughbred who would win easily.     There were 
five "young  colts" who sought to "displease Bleaset" 
Thomas G. McLeod,   John T.  Duncan,  George K.  Laney,  J.  J, 
Cantry and William  Coleman.    Most were younger than Blease 
and not nearly so well  known as he,    McLeod appeared to 
be the strongest  challenger to Blease,  while the others 
sought to discredit the old campaigner as much as possible, 
McLeod  conducted a safe and lackluster campaign. 
He spoke in favor  of the Nineteenth Amendment,   saying he 
was a  "ladies'  man for twenty years under the control of a 
Rl 
Dillon county woman.    Some of you men know what I mean." 
Laney appealed to the veterans and assumed none of them 
would vote for Blease.     When accused of being a Bleaseite, 
Laney vehemently denied it and attributed the accusation 
to a rumor begun by a  "cowardly cur. John Duncan was 
outstanding  in his  opposition to Blease,    He admitted, 
however,   that Blease was not the only villain in state 
politics}   there were "damned rascals on both sides." 
Duncan thought Blease was the worst though,  and  "had done 
enough to damn him to purgatory."  3    He was so low that 
"even negroes wouldn't vote for him"  during the bolt  of 
8lColumbia  State.  July 27,  1922. 
82Gharleston American.  June 28,   1922. 
83Columbia  State.   July 27,   1922. 
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1918.     Duncan called Blease the worst enemy left in the 
8^ United States after the war. Not  only was Blease a 
traitor to his  country,   he had also betrayed the Demo- 
cratic Party.     He had attempted to appeal to Negroes in 
the bolt of 1918,   he had  consistently opposed President 
Wilson,   he had had curiously strange political dealings 
with Joe Tolbert,   the Republican patronage boss  of South 
Carolina, and he had reportedly rejoiced at the  election 
of Harding over Cox.     Duncan harassed Blease so much that 
"a man of gut would knock Duncan off  the platform if it 
were not true," but Cole  did nothing.     The Bleaseites in 
Darlington,   however,   booed,  hissed, and howled at Duncan, 
whereupon he shouted for  "a bale of hay to feed these 
jackasses."    At Manning they left  the meeting,  but in 
Edgefield Duncan called all Bleaseites  "liars or liquor 
sellers," and then "an Edgefield  citizen was seen to ap- 
proach the platform with  his knife down,  announcing his 
intention to cut the throat of Duncan."    After a brief 
scuffle,   the assailant was arrested and order was restored 
to the meeting.8' 
The Columbia  State, as in previous elections, 
spearheaded the  editorial  opposition to Blease.     It re- 
printed Blease's anti-Wilson and anti-war speeches as well as 
87 Charleston American. June Zh,   1922. 
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letters tying Cole to Boas  Joe Tolbert.     One open letter 
stated that three murderers who had been pardoned by 
Blease had all  committed murder again.    Handbills asked, 
"Do you believe in trials by jury?    Does Governor Blease?" 
The big issue of the day for the voters was the treachery 
of Blease to the Democratic Party.     If he rejoiced at the 
election of Harding,   the State pondered,   how could he have 
voted for Cox?88 
The election day came.    As was  expected with six 
candidates  for governor,  none had received the required 
majority.    Blease led all candidates with almost 72,000 
votes,  McLeod received almost 62,000,  and Laney polled 
over 20,000.     The second primary would be between McLeod 
and Blease. 
Laney and Duncan pledged to vote for McLeod,    Ad- 
vertisements asked,   "Shall South Carolina Endorse Harding? 
The Columbia State predicted that the second primary would 
be the same as  in 1916.    Blease would gain a few votes, 
but McLeod would rally to win.     Baxter McLendon,  a popular 
..89 
88Columbia State. August  22-25,   1922.    In response 
to charges that he was disloyal  to the party,  Blease com- 
mented:     "I am an American first,  last and all the time, 
and I want in all offices from President on down,  whether 
they be Democrat or Republican or what,  men who are first 
of all for America."     Columbia State, August 22,   1922. 
89 Ibid..   September 2,  1922. 
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evangelist in the state, endorsed Blease, Yet religion 
could not neutralize the political stigma of disloyalty 
attached to Blease. The State quoted the Pro-Blease 
Yprkville Knauirer as saying no matter what the outcome 
of the second primary, "The General Election remains to 
be seen." 
Cole had  tried too much of the same old Bleaseism 
and could not remove the doubt that he had created by his 
words and deeds.     Some said he had committed "political 
suicide" years  earlier.    Blease was  denied a third term 
as governor when McLeod defeated him by over 15,000 votes. 
No bolt materialized in the general  election.    If Blease 
were going to win another election,  he would have to try 
a new tactic.    His  standard methods had failed in four 
state-wide  elections. 
9°Ibld..   September 8,   1922. 
CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  SbNATE YEARS,   1924-1931 
In 1924 Cole L.  Blease began his  third campaign for 
the United States Senate.    Because he had not won an elec- 
tion since 1912,  he  decided to change his  image.    This  time 
he chose to be the ringmaster of the summer political  cir- 
cus known as  the stump campaign.    The other candidates 
could resort  to name calling if they chose,  but Coley was 
going  to stay out of the fracas.     In his own words,   "I am 
not running against anybody.     I am in to make a clean cut 
campaign on  issues." 
His platform was  calculated to appeal  to moderate 
Democrats.     The main planks werei     economy in the federal 
government 1  strict enforcement of the federal Volstead 
^Prohibition? Actj  a guarantee of state's rights and an 
end to the  "mad orgy of  centralization of government in 
Washingtont"2  federal aid to education,  provided Congress 
does not stipulate  "who shall and who shall not attend 
schools in South Carolinai" the pledge of a good  education 
for every white child 1 and,  finally,  the most important 
1Columbla State.   June 11,   1924. 
2Ibid..   July 14,   1924. 
1^3 
plank according  to Blease» a  "return to family prayer."3 
Gone were the old rantings,   the accusations,  the 
harangues,   the personal attacks.    His campaign was con- 
ducted  on such a  high plane of moderation and dignity that 
many people spoke of  "a new Blease."^   Early in the campaign 
one up-country newspaper oberved that there was  "nary drop 
of  liquor"  on the stump tour,  which made the campaign unique. 
Not only was  there no drinking,  but also "a non-pyrotechnic 
Cole Blease.    Long the storm center of politics,  Blease is 
now noted for his  lack of use of vituperation,   concen- 
trating his  energies  on the main issues of the campaign."^ 
As  the  "new Blease"  exhorted  crowds to,   "Get down 
that family Bible!"  the other candidates fought  (at times 
quite literally)   in traditional South Carolina style.     In 
addition to Blease,   Nat Dial was running for reelection to 
his  Senate seat,  and Congressman James F.  Byrnes and J.  J. 
McMahon also wanted the office.    Dial had not been out- 
standing in the Senate during his  term and had in fact 
antagonized some voters.    He had voted against liberal pen- 
sions for veterans and later injured himself further poli- 
tically by accusing the national Democratic Party of court- 
ing  socialism and Bolshevism.    Certainly his remark that 
Coolidge was a better Democrat than many in the party did 
3Greenville News. August 8,   192^1 August 20,   192^. 
^Wallace,   History of. South Carolina.  II.,  ^63. 
5Greenville News.  July 13.   192*». 
him little good either. 
Byrnes took it upon himself to criticize Dial in 
every speech he made.    Dial had created some controversy 
when he declared  that he favored open immigration laws. 
The prejudice against immigrant labor of many low income 
workers in the state was    easily turned against Dial.    The 
quarrel between Byrnes and Dial was so fierce that on 
several  occasions  they almost came to blows.    At Florence 
one took a poke at the other and a fist-fight seemed ready 
to erupt.    Who should intervene,  but  the grand peacemakeri 
Cole L. Blease!     When the two called  each other liars, 
none other than Blease settled their dispute.    McMahan was 
almost as intemperate as Byrnes when it came to deriding 
Dial.    A McMahan-inspired quarrel resulted in both McMahon's 
and Dial's arrest in Gaffney for disorderly conduct. 
Earlier,  Blease had also stopped a  fight between McMahon 
7 
and Dial in Greenwood. 
Occasionally,   one of the candidates would remind 
the stump audiences of one or more of Blease's earlier 
disreputable speeches or conduct.     Coley always remained calm 
and usually ignored any charges against him.    His  composure 
was in sharp contrast to that of the other contestants who 
6Ibid.. August 20,   1924;  Wallace,  H^stpry oX Sojrth 
Carolina.   II,   462. 
Columbia  State.   June 29,   1924, August 24,   1924, 
Greenville  News.  August  10,   1924. 
1^5 
were constantly abusing each other in violent fashion. As 
for his past record, one newspaper speculated that it had 
either been "forgiven or forgotten." The notoriety of the 
past was given little publicity or justified to some extent. 
For example the Greenville News predicted that Blease's 
once infamous opinions on the war would have no effect on 
the election.  "It should not, every day they (the electorate) 
Q 
realize more and more that he was right."      Although the 
News was located in a  textile city,   it did not have a  repu- 
tation as a pro-Blease paper.    Such was the case in many 
counties where the "New Blease" made many converts by ex- 
pounding "Americanism,   the fatherhood of God,   the brother- 
hood of man,   the religion of Jesus Christ,  decency,   good 
citizenship and anything that will build the best in South 
Carolina."9 
Such lofty and meaningless  rhetoric gave Blease a 
commanding lead in the primary election,  but not a majority. 
His vote and that of the runner-up James F. Byrnes accounted 
for only half of the ballot cast.    The Columbia State con- 
ceded that Blease had stayed aloof from disputes  on the 
stump and had conducted a moderate campaign,  but immediately 
after the first primary the State endorsed Byrnes in the 
8Greenvllle News.  August 11,   192^ 
9Columbia State.  June 1^,   192^. 
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run-off  election.     The example of the  State was followed in 
the editorials  of the other leading daily newspapers.    Most 
believed that he would lose in the second primary despite 
his change.    It would be a repetition  of many previous 
elections in which Blease led in the first primary only to 
be soundly defeated in the second.    Advertisements by the 
"Democrats of  •76'.'  reminded voters of Blease*s more recent 
betrayals  of the partyi    his Allen University speech,   his 
anti-Wilson statements,   his attempted bolt in 1917*  and his 
friendship with Joe Tolbert,   the Republican patronage boss. 
Other advertisements and articles sought to discredit Blease 
with his past political record rather  than his present 
10 
political conduct. 
On the other hand Blease contended that he was not 
running in the past,  but the present.     "During the campaign 
I have made no attacks  upon any of my  opponents.     South 
Carolinians believe in a  clean campaign and that is the 
campaign I have made."11    Others agreed with him.    One 
editor thought that  "Blease's big lead surprized everyone. 
He had no camp-followers,  no booster trips,  no bag of booty 
to be distributed among his henchmen and seemed to take no 
10l£i4..  August 27,  1924,  September 3.  1924»   Sep- 
tember 9.  192C. 
11Ibid..   September 8,   1924. 
Ik? 
special interest in the campaign.    His methods were entirely 
different from  those of his  earlier days and they evidently 
12 bore him fine fruit. When Benjamin R.  Tillman,  Jr., 
endorsed Blease  for the Senate, A,  F,  Lever,   James Byrnes' 
campaign manager,  reminded voters that  the Senior Tillman 
had been strongly anti-Blease.    Afterwards handbills ap- 
peared endorsing Blease,  and signed by ministers,  were  cir- 
culated and Lever claimed:     "It was a negro preacher who 
endorsed Blease."    Blease merely replied,   "Preachers do 
not have to print circulars to prove my religion." 
Other papers showed their amazement over the "New 
31ease."     "He was a  lamb where he had been a lion,  and  one 
with a big roar at that," said the Charleston News and 
Courier.    Not only had he been "a peace maker between the 
other candidates," but he also was "much more dignified 
than any other of the candidates."    Still many of the adu- 
latory comments were qualified with doubt that Blease  could 
•     14 win. 
The day before  the election a  circular of mysterious 
origin was  distributed in the state.    The handbill  offered 
12Greenville News.   September 5.   1924. 
1 Columbia State.  September 7,   8,  1924. 
^Unmarked clipping in James F.  Byrnes Scrapbooks, 
J.  F.  Byrnes MSS.,   Clemson University. 
1^8 
positive proof that Byrnes had attended a  Catholic school 
during his boyhood.    The document defintely appealed to 
religious prejudices and was passed out by Bleaseites. 
Whether or not Blease personally had anything to do with 
it was  unknown.     Byrnes believed that that leaflet alone 
accounted for his  defeat by Blease the next day.   5 
The vote was heavy,  but close between the two can- 
didates,    Blease won by a mere two thousand votes out of 
almost two hundred  thousand cast.    A great number of South 
Carolinians were astonished at Blease's victory. 
Much  editorial ink was spilt attempting to explain 
how the impossible had occurred.    Many expressed the opinion 
that the failure  of a large number of Dial  supporters to 
vote had given Blease the victory,  but the large number of 
votes cast is  enough to show the faulty logic for such an 
explanation.    Other arguments along the same line contended 
that it was apathy  that elected Blease.    He had lost so 
often in the past  that the prevalent thought was,   "We can 
17 always beat Blease and my vote is not needed."'      Again the 
15J.   F.   Byrnes,   A_H in One. Lifetime (New Yorkt 
Harper Brothers,   195°),   53. 
l6Columbia  State.   September 10,  1924,  New Yoxk. Times, 
September 10-12,   192^.    Byrnes asked for a recount in Spar- 
tanburg and Richland counties where he had lived.    A  change 
of a few thousand votes would have given him the election, 
but a  few days later he withdrew his request and conceded 
victory to Blease. 
17Greenville News.   September 12,   1924. 
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large total vote discounts that theory.  The obvious reason- 
ing was that few hard core Dial supporters would have voted 
for Byrnes, considering his exteme hostility towards Dial 
on the stump.  If they had not voted, it would have helped 
Byrnes more than if they had. 
An explanation closer the truth was that Cole L. 
Blease had run the most appealing campaign of all the can- 
didates, including Byrnes.  Coley had avoided controversy 
by relying upon safe, moderate electioneering. He had 
abandoned his old demogoguery and appeals to passion and 
prejudice, with the possible exception of the indicting 
"Catholic circular." All in all, the shock of his election 
was not overwhelming. One editorial grunted that he had 
been a failure as governor, but, "What else may be said, 
18 
he has always kept his political promises."   Considering 
that Cole had not made very many promises during the cam- 
paign, perhaps it would not be difficult for him to ful- 
fill them in the Senate. 
Of the very few bills that Senator Blease intro- 
duced in Congress, the first were in fact designed to keep 
his promises. Several times he drafted bills to repeal the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and to provide for 
complete segregation of interstate railroad passenger cars. 
None of the bills ever even went past the committee level, 
18 Ibid. 
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but Coley could  say he tried. 
Blease really did not believe,   however,   that legis- 
lation was  the key to his success in the Senate.     Neither 
did the Congress  or President Coolidge,    As  one author 
saidi     "The one aim of both the executive and legislative 
19 branches  of the government seemed to do nothing."        So 
Cole was right at home in Washington in 1925.    Because there 
was no work to do,  he could talk and talk. 
Of all  the new Senators  elected,  the New York Times 
pronounced Cole L,  Blease as "the most picturesque,  a master 
of invective,  an orator of the fiery type,   ... a danger- 
20 ous  enemy when he wants  to be."        Blease categorically 
announced that he was  completely opposed to the League of 
Nations and the World Court.    He also promised!     "I  shall 
work in harmony with my Democratic colleagues,  but will 
not be bound by the code of any man who calls himself a 
Democrat.     I know no boss  or bosses.    I will vote for what 
21 
I think is best for the country and my state."''      Actually 
Cole's vote was never as  effective a weapon as his mouth. 
He usually voted against the caucus if only to prove his 
19Ernest F. Bates,  Thjg. Storv of. Congress, U31-1221* 
(New Yorkt     Harper and Brothers,   1936),  ^02. 
20, 
21 
3New Yprk Times. March 1,   1925. 
Ibid. 
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individualism.    He found the Senate tradition of fili- 
bustering to his  liking and made it his favorite pastime 
in Congress.     Since the League of Nations had already been 
defeated.   Cole could  (and did) filibuster for hours on the 
World Court. 
In the 1926  debate on the World Court,   Cole held the 
floor for many hours,   spouting opinions  on the race pro- 
blem,  his political  career,   evolution,   Confederate heroes, 
Prohibition,  Woodrow Wilson and a variety of Bleaseisms. 
Rarely did Coley read a  speech.    His remarks were usually 
extemporaneous.     Twice cloture was voted on Blease on the 
World Court debate alone. He bitterly resented cloture 
in both instances.     In order to punish his fellow Senators 
for what he believed to be an abridgement of his freedom 
of speech,   Cole offered another filibusteri 
I  know this  is not pleasant to some Senators.     It 
was not pleasant for me  on the World Court matter when 
they put cloture on me,  but I  said  then I would make 
some people pay for it and I am doing it and I am 
going to keep it up.23 
If he could have his way, all  the debate would 
cease.    The whole thing could be settled in a day if the 
World Court was defeated.    According to Blease such action 
22Franklin L.   Burdette,   Filibustering in JJe 
Senate.   (Princeton:     Princeton University Press,   I9WJ1 
146-168, 




would  "save a lot of waste of time, money,  and gas,"2 
His main reason for opposing the World Court was his  fear 
that the American  judge might have to sit next to a   "nigger" 
judge.     Often Blease would read a list of  judges on the 
court and comment,   "To this list add a nigger from Haiti, 
Liberia,  and Santa  Domingo,  along with the Cuban,  the Jap, 
and the Chinese,  and ask yourself how you would like to be 
tried by these mixed breeds."  *    The worst  that could hap- 
pen would be that "the destinies  of Southern women and 
Southern men would be thrown into the lap of a black 
man."26 
It  is difficult to assess how influential Blease's 
stand against the World Court was,  but he certainly tried 
his best to prevent the  court's acceptance by the Senate. 
His best,   however,  was little more than filibustering, 
knew little  else to do,  but talk. 
He 
I would to God I  had the power to stand here 
without  eating a bite or taking a drink or sleeping 
a wink  until  twelve o'clock  of the fourth day of 
March,   1931,   if it would keep this iniquitous,  in-      2? 
fernal machine from being put on the American people. 
Certainly Cole L.  Blease rejoiced at the ultimate defeat 
^Blease's Weekly.   December 10,   1925. 
2%bid..   September 9t  1926. 
26New York Times.   January 28,  1926. 
27Ibid..  July 2k,   1926. 
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of the Court. 
Cole was rarely bound by the Democratic caucus on 
any vote in the Senate, but as for filibustering, if any- 
body asked him, he was only too happy to oblige. One ob- 
server of the Junior Senator from South Carolina stated: 
When a senatorial  filibusterer is in need of as- 
sistance,   he  has   only  to wink at the Hon.   Coleman 
Livingston Blease,  LL.B,  his eminent colleague from 
the  sovereign State  of South  Carolina.     Immediately 
he is afforded an opportunity to shift his weight 
from  his  legs to his haunches,  and to suck loudly 
a cough drop  or swig surreptitiously from his flask, 
while the Senator from South Carolina horns in.     The 
purpose of the filibuster or the personnel  of its 
conductors makes no difference to Coley.    He leaps 
to the assistance of a  hoarse and wobbling  enemy as 
quickly as he aids an  exhausted  friend.28 
If the World Court was Cole's favorite topic in 
foreign affairs,   then Prohibition was his pet subject in 
domestic affairs.     Blease professed strong support of Pro- 
hibition as long as  it was strictly  enforcedi   "but if a 
friend of mine tonight should ask me up to his house for 
a drink tonight,   I'd be delighted."29    The trouble with 
Prohibition was that the Volstead Act was by-passed by the 
rich,  but not  the poor.     "Prohibition?" queried Blease, 
"Why any man who thinks this country has Prohibition is an 
ignorant fool!     The only man in this  country that has pro- 
hibition is the poor devil who has not the money to buy 
280.  L. Warr,   "Mr.  Blease of South Carolina," Ajaex- 
ican Mercury.   XVI  (1929).   25. 
29New York Times. April  5.   1929. 
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liquor and  everyone knows it."'      Several times Blease 
exhorted the Senate to pass a dry law that would provide 
for  equal punishment for rich and poor.    Once Cole dared 
the Senate to enact such a  law because he knew,   "Senators 
can get any brand liquor any time they want it." 
What irked Senator Blease most was the foreign 
diplomats'   immunity from the Volstead Act,     "These foreigners 
get drunk and debauch our women."    An American woman with a 
foreign diplomat could be arrested for possession of il- 
legal alcohol,  while the diplomat would be escorted back 
to his embassy.     If such were the case,  Blease asked,   "Why 
hasn't the cotton mill boy who works from daylight to dark 
six days a week to bring prosperity to the South—yes and 
the Northern mill-owner—the same  privilege to have a  little 
flask in his pocket as some little half nigger from a 
foreign country."32    Instead the poor boys had to pay high 
prices  for bad liquor from bootleggers who were protected 
by corrupt law officers. 
If Prohibition were not going to be repealed,   it 
should be impartially enforced.    If neither could be accom- 
plished,   then Blease proposed a  compromise.     "I would change 
3°Blease's Weekly.  January 28,  1926. 
31Ib_iii.,   January 16,   1926. 
32Ibid..   January 16,   1926. 
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the Volstead Act  so that we could have a pure beer.    If 
Coca  Cola  is allowed to be sold and to be poured into the 
stomachs  of the little children of this country,   I do not 
see how anyone would be opposed to good pure beer." 
Again all that Blease did in regard to Prohibition 
was talk about it.    As the New York Times phrased it,   "Mr. 
Blease, an anti-prohibition prohibitionist,   is mainly 
valued for his qualities as an entertainer."-' 
A good way,   thought Senator Blease,   to tell the 
folks back in South Carolina what he was saying,   if not 
doing,  was to have his own newspaper.    Especially since 
"favorable comment from all  over the nation regarding 
Senator Blease" was never "published in the anti-Blease 
press  of South Carolina."    Actually Blease's Weekly,  as the 
paper was named,   printed very little "favorable comment 
from all over the nation."    It contained mostly articles 
written by Blease,  new and old Blease speeches,  opinions by 
the Bleaseite    editors,  and a  few adulatory letters from 
Bleaseites.     Blease made a number of proposals of what he 
would do,   "if I  controlled Congress," but he only wrote 
bills  for a  few of the ideas. 
Some of the plans that Blease talked of were 
33Blease's Weekly.   December 10,   1925. 
3^New York Times.  February 1,   1927. 
i 
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reduction of  taxes,   strict  enforcement of Prohibition,   in- 
crease of  tariff,  restriction of immigration,   consolidation 
of federal government departments,  increased veteran's 
benefits,   regulation of railroad rates,  and a variety of 
measures  to insure white supremacy.JJ    On the latter,   Cole 
took ample action in the Senate.     In addition to his bills 
to segregate railroad passenger cars and to repeal the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,  he offered bills for- 
bidding interracial marriage.    "We should declare in favor 
of preserving our white races and stop idiots,  fools,  and 
morons from marrying Negroes."36    In fact Blease believed 
that a  Constitutional Amendment should provide« 
The marriage of a white person with a negro or mulatto 
shall be  unlawful and void.     Congress shall provide 
by law for the punishment of parties attempting to 
contract  such marriage,  and for the punishment of the 
officer of  the law or minister or other person 
qualified to perform the marriage ceremony, who shall 
attempt to  or perform such ceremony.37 
Several  of Blease's  remarks  concerning Negroes were 
so offensive  that they were omitted from the Congressional 
Record.     One deleted speech was about Mr. Hoover enter- 
taining  the wife of a prominent Negro.    Blease penned a 
^lease's Weekly.   December 10,   1925. 
36Ibid..  May 27,   1926. 
37Yorkville hnouirer. January 13» 1928. 
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poem   called,   "Niggers   in  the White House,"  which was so 
obnoxious   to his  fellow Senators  that no  trace other than 
the title is  to be found published anywhere.'      Possibly 
Blease's  racist bills and pronouncements  on the Senate floor 
and in his newspaper  endeared him to many of his white con- 
stituents,   but many national publications lamented him as 
a disgrace  to the Senate and the country. 
Blease's Weekly collapsed in a  year's   time despite 
it's  own prediction that it was "destined to grow into an 
important state weekly newspaper,"-'"    Its  circulation was 
always small,  and in order to increase subscriptions the 
publisher sponsored a   contest.     Over $13,000.00 worth of 
prizes was  offered for the sale of subscriptions.    The state 
was divided into ten districts and an automobile was to be 
given to the person who sold the most subscriptions in his 
district.     Lesser prizes were also offered.    Perhaps the 
expense of the prizes bankrupted the paper.    Although the 
journal was a   "sheet of fire,"  the New York. Times believed 
it to be doomed to failure,   "for how could Blease's Weekly 
compete with Blease's  Daily,  Blease's Hourly,   and Blease's 
Minutely? ..^0 
38New Yoxk. Times.   June  18,   1929.     Blease was^quoted 
as saying the poem was  not published because it may    give 
offense to niggers." 
39Blease's Weekly.   December 10,   1925. 
1+0New York Times.  August 16,   1926. 
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In  1928   the nomination of Alfred E.   Smith   for the 
presidency by the Democratic Party caused some consternation 
in the  South.     Anti-Catholic  prejudice was  strong  in South 
Carolina,  and so was  feeling to retain Prohibition.    Equally 
powerful was the  fear of crossing party lines.    Blease said 
that he believed the nomination of Smith had been a mistake, 
not because Al was Catholic,   but he was the  "product of a 
corrupt organization" and expected Negroes  to vote for him. 
Cole further thought  that William E.  Borah would have been 
a  better nominee   for  the Democratic Party.     In 1927 when 
President Coolidge's announcement that he would not run for 
re-election,   Blease  drew from the  comment  that it was 
"the slickest political move  ever made on the national chess 
board."4l     When Herbert Hoover was nominated,   however,   Cole 
quickly decided to endorse Smith.    According to the Junior 
Senator from South Carolina,   Hoover was more of a  threat to 
white supremacy than was Smith.     Blease had hated Hoover 
from the time he desegregated the Department of Commerce. 
Therefore,   "Hoover has no chance to carry any Southern 
State."     Upon his announcement,   one South Carolina news- 
paper reporter talked to Colei 
Most of the  interview was devoted to talk about niggers 
and he held  up niggers of all  colors and  kinds.    Senator 
Blease has been dominating this state for "long by 
virtue  of picturesque oratory  that he is  justified in 
41Ibid..  August 4,  1927. 
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believing that when he shouts niggers to South 
Carolinians and   orders them to vote  for Smith,   South 
Carolina  will  obey.    As a matter of fact,   it prob- 
ably will do so.^2 
Blease's   endorsement really had very little to do 
with South Carolina's vote for Smith.    Like Smith or not, 
the state's Democrats had no choice but  to vote for him, 
Blease was   correct,   though hardly clairvoyant,   in his  cal- 
culations  that South   Carolina  would go for Smith,     The iron- 
clad  loyalty  oath  of  the  Democratic Party required that the 
voters pledge to support national,   state,  and local party 
nominees.    Rather than divide the white man's party,  many 
South Carolina  Democrats refrained from voting altogether. 
Nobody  dared vote Republican,   so why vote if Smith was a 
Catholic?    The one-party system  caused by a fear of the 
Negro race still shackled South Carolina  in the 1920's. 
The Republican Party had little or no chance to make any 
headway in the state. 
Cole Blease  spoke the truth when he said«     "There 
has been some talk of breaking up the solid South,  which 
has always stood for white supremacy.    Those who have been 
dreaming a happy thought  of a respectable Republican Party 
in the  South might as  well wake   up. ,.*3 The Senate even 
^2Yorkville Enquirer. July 10, 1928. 
**3New York Times. April 11, 1928. 
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laughed at  some   of Blease's   statements   on the Southern 
Republicans.     It was amused,   for example,  by his comment 
that   "I   think Mr.   Coolidge received 1100 votes  in my state. 
I do not know where he got them!     I was astonished  to know 
they were cast and shocked to know they were counted.    I 
actually was,   because  I   cannot imagine 1100 Republicans  in 
my state.    I  do not believe it yet."    The reason for his 
disbelief,   Cole bragged   to his  fellow Senators,   was  that, 
"We keep the colored men from voting in South Carolina  by 
our constitution.     We do not allow him to vote in the Demo- 
cratic white primaries and we never expect to let him vote 
44 in them,   no matter what may be done here." 
Despite  his  rantings   over the Republican Party in 
the South,   Blease  defended Joe Tolbert,   the Republican 
state party boss   of  South  Carolina,   against  charges  that 
Tolbert  had  sold postmasterships.    Karlier Cole had made 
statements to the effect that every postmaster in the state 
45 had bought his   job  from Tolbert. Although Blease voted 
for a  bill enlarging the civil service,   he said. 
I  do not believe in any civil service and never have. 
The  civil  service is  the most damnable and iniquitous 
system for the appointment of government employees 
that has  ever been perpetrated on a free people.    I 
believe   'that to the victor belongs the spoils.' 
44 Congressional   Record.   69 Congress,   2 Session,   5362, 
^Wallace,   History  of South Carolina.   II,  463-464. 
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That is my doctrine and all  of you feel that way, 
but you don't have the nerve to stand up and say so. 
Blease had never believed in giving anyone a political office 
if the person had not voted for him,  yet he had contradicted 
himself by voting for  civil service bill. 
When Blease was not voting against the majority or 
his party  just to show his individualism,  he did note sen- 
sibly in the minds of some South Carolinians.    He voted 
against reduction of federal income tax despite his own 
promises to do the opposite, against the Muscle Shoals  dam 
project as a  "long step toward socialism," against the 
McNary-Haugen Agricultural bill,  because he believed it was 
an attempt  to force federal price fixing.    He did vote for 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 
Because of his lack of seniority,  Blease's work in 
Senate committees was  unspectacular.    Naturally he did not 
think much  of seniority in the Senate.     "Brains are worth 
more than seniority,"**7 testified the  junior first-term 
Senator,   ignoring that fact that many Americans believed 
that he had neither. 
The  only real accomplishments Blease could boast of 
during his  term in the Senate were three in number.    One 
was the passage of a bill for the  establishment of King's 
46 
47 
'New York Times. May 25,   1929. 
Ibid.. August 11,  1926. 
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Mountain National  Park.     The second was the establishment 
of a new federal   judicial  district in South Carolina.  This 
was  secured when Blease  threatened to   filibuster eternally 
if New York received additional   judges and South Carolina 
received none.     Senator Bruce of Maryland commented that 
the Senate would be wise  to give the  judgeship to Blease 
since South Carolina  had more bootleggers than any other 
state. Third was a speech during a  filibuster,    bntitled 
"Destruction of Property  in Columbia,   South Carolina by 
Sherman's Army,"   the   essay went  to great lengths to prove 
once and for all that Sherman's men had first set fire to 
the city.     Blease was so proud of his work as a historian 
that he had many copies  of the verbose monograph distributed 
to the  folks back home.     Blease did not distinguish himself 
during his  six years  in the Senate,   unless  one considers his 
49 verbosity.   7
The truly outstanding  feature  of his Senatorial 
term was his vanity.    Only a  few Senators had longer auto- 
biographical  chapters   in   the Congressional   Directory, where 
Coley wrote of himself: 
48- Ibid..  January  31.   1929. 
**The three  "accomplishments" are neatly listed in 
Blease's biographical   sketch in Wallace,  ttUfcUSLjL jggjl 
Carolina.   IV,   963-964.     One autographed  copy of his  Sherman 
speech may~be  found  in the James F.   Byrnes  Scrapbooks,   J. 
F. Byrnes MSS.,   Clemson  University. 
163 
The  only governor  or former governor  elected by 
the people of South Carolina for his first term in 
the United States Senate.    Only South Carolinian who 
has   ever been mayor  of his  city,   senator from his 
county,   speaker of the house,  president of the Senate, 
governor of the state,  and United States Senator, 
elected by the people and served in more offices than 
any other citizen of his State up to the present date. 
Only one who has represented three  of the State fra- 
ternal bodies in national grand bodies.50 
Another example  of Blease's self-esteem is found in his 
words:     "Wire anybody in the world and ask who is the 
Senator from South Carolina and I will set you up if the 
answer doesn't come back  Cole L.   Blease!" Not many 
Senators had their own newspapers,  named for themselves. 
But Blease was a minority in his opinion of himself in the 
nation and perhaps  in the state.    Some thought Blease was 
unhappy in  the Senate because he thought he was "a big toad 
in a  small  puddle."^2    Several times while in Washington 
Blease was quoted as saying,   "I would rather be in good old 
South Carolina."^    Rumors  in 1928 began that Cole was con- 
sidering resigning in order to run for governor again.    When 
questioned  Blease  replied   that he had not thought of it, 
but,   "I will  frankly state that I would rather be governor 
^Congressional Directory.   71st  Congress,   2nd Ses- 
sion,   (Washingtoni     U.   S.   Government Printing Office,   19Z9/, 
^1New York Times.   August  11,   1926. 
52YorkvUle hnauirer.  March   30,   1928. 
^Blease's Weekly.   June 3.   1926. 
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of South Carolina  than to hold any other office in the 
world."5      He added that he had no intention at all  of ever 
running for governor in the future.    Rather than "big toad 
in a  small puddle,"  the New York Times'   editorial staff 
thought of Blease as a man too small for his job.    The rea- 
son he did not have the ability to become a good Senator 
was  that he represented only too well "a new social stratum 
.   .   .  only coming into its own and still raw in the making. 
This  "new social stratum" in layman's terms was simply 
"hillbillies," and Blease was nothing more than a well- 
dressed hillbilly. 
For six years Cole L. Blease grew older in the 
Senate,  but no wiser.    His record there was less contro- 
versial  than his  conduct as governor,  but then he did 
nothing notorious other than talk a great deal.    Besides 
sponsoring a new federal  judgeship and a national park, 
Blease did  little to serve his state in the Senate.    During 
the Great Crash  of 1929 and  the Depression that followed, 
almost nothing was said concerning the economic situation 
by Senator Blease.     He seems to have ignored the problem 
altogether,  possibly because he had little knowledge or 
understanding  of the forces involved.    If Blease's years as 
..55 
5\orkville Enquirer. April 3.  1928. 
55^ York Times.,   November 13.   1928,  See also 
,  HistorTof South Carolina.. II.  W for a discussi Wallace 
of the subject. 
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governor had brought him  fame throughout the nation,   there 
was  little to remember him by as Senator. 
■ 
CHAPTER  IX 
OLD MAN BLEASh,   1930-19^2 
Despite   the  fact that Blease had  done nearly nothing 
in the United States   Senate,   he was prepared to run for 
re-election  on the basis  of his record.     Confident as 
usual  of victory,   Blease was now sixty-two years   old and 
clearly past his prime.    All of his  opponents were younger 
and  could   conduct a much more vigorous campaign.     Five 
candidates   challenged him  for his  seat,   the  two most seri- 
ous  contenders being Leon W. Harris and James F.  Byrnes. 
Harris castigated Blease at almost every stump stop,  while 
Byrnes,   learning  from   his defeat  in 192'+,   chose to conduct 
a moderate campaign. 
Harris  charged   that Blease was an agent for cotton 
mill   executives.    A  later magazine article had quoted a 
mill boss as  saying,   "All he ever does is get the hands 
excited about  liquor and niggers.    Well,  we'll drink the 
liquor and take care of the niggers.    Coley will  keep the 
hands quiet."1    According to Harris,  Blease's talk of 
1 "Jimmy Byrnes,"  Lif_e_,  XIV (January k,  19^3).   65. 
Surprisingly,   virtually no mention of the^Depression or the 
New Deal  was made  in  South Carolina political campaign   in 
the 1930's,     Issues were purely local.    Olin D.  Johnston 
did,   however,   attempt,   to run on  Roosevelt  S coattails   lor 
the United   States  Senate  in  1938,   but  lost  to hd Smith. 
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establishing  "local   unions"   for cotton mill workers was 
nothing more  than meaningless  rhetoric.     Blease had   "be- 
trayed  the workers" whom he claimed to represent.    Asso- 
ciating Blease with Joe Tolbert,   Harris  called  them   "the 
2 
gold-dust twins." 
Coley ignored Harris's strictures and asked audi- 
ences  "Who  else has  ever done more for South Carolina  in 
one  term  in  the Senate?"-'     The reason,   Cole   explained,   that 
so few of his bills were passed and that he resorted  to 
filibustering  so much was  that the South was  now dominated 
politically by the  North and the Republican Party.    The 
national political  situation for Southerners was  so bad 
that "we will never have a President from the South  unless 
we stick in a  Vice President and trust God to do the rest." 
The filibuster was  the best weapon that the South had for 
blocking any legislation undesirable to Dixie,   especially 
legislation that might endanger white supremacy.    Who could 
defend   the   South  orally better  than Cole L.   Blease?    hvery- 
one should  know by now that  "negroes pray for Blease»s 
defeat."5    It was  for this reason alone that he ran for the 
2Columbia   State.   August 22,   1930. 
3Ibid.. August 20,   1930. 
4Ibid.. August 21,   1930. 
Circular,   Byrnes   Scrapbooks,   James F.  Byrnes MSS., 
Clemson   University. 
168 
Senate.     As   he said,   "I   have no personal ambition,   but a 
desire  to help the people."      iiveryone understood,   of course, 
that Cole meant  the white people.     He made a  habit  of 
boasting at  the  end of each of his  speeches  that he would 
win the nomination by at least 25,000 votes. 
Byrnes made no charges against anyone.     He  only pro- 
mised to serve his state,   the nation and the Democratic 
Party.     Byrnes avoided controversy and name-calling as much 
as  he had   used  them   in   1924.     He  told voters  that  the elec- 
tion was  in  their hands.    Byrnes  trusted them to make the 
right decision and vote for the best man.    Many newspapers, 
including  the Columbia   State,   endorsed Byrnes as   the best 
man for the  office.     The Greenville News reminded Democrats 
that religious prejudice and possibly fraud had deprived 
Byrnes  of victory over Blease in the close election of 
1924.7 
Election day came and once again none of the candi- 
dates won a   clear majority   of the votes.     A   run-off was  de- 
clared between Byrnes and Blease.     Harris quickly  endorsed 
Byrnes and   things  looked bad  for Blease.8     Worried by 
Byrnes'   strong showing,   31ease expressed fear that his 
6Columbia   State.   September 2,   193°. 
7Greenville News.   September 6,   1930. 
8"Palmetto's   Her,"   Outlook.   LVII   (September 10, 
1930),   157. 
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opponent would buy votes  or attempt some other underhanded 
manipulation  in order to cheat Blease.     Voting in the run- 
off primary was heavy.    Blease was  defeated by over 5,000 
votes.    The Columbia   State rejoiced over the fact that 
Q 
"Senator Blease  has been retired."       The Charleston News 
and  Courier  offered  the opinion that Blease had been de- 
feated because he had   "made the state look ridiculous" by 
his offensive  utterances. 
As Blease had  grown older,   so had his supporters. 
The ranks   of  the state Democratic Party had swollen with 
younger men and women  to whom  the  name  Cole L,   Blease held 
no magic.     Once he had been able to acquaint himself per- 
sonally with  his  supporters.    By 1930 there were too many 
to know individually,   but Cole still did command a large 
following. 
Spitefully Blease nailed a note to his   Senate office 
door on February 17,   193L    The message was to forward his 
mail  to his home in Columbia for he would no longer be in 
Washington.11    Already,   however,  he was making plans to 
return to  the Senate.     "Cotton Ed"  Smith would be running 
for reelection in  1932 and Blease intended to challenge 
him  for the   office. 
9Columbin   State,   September  10,   193°. 
10Charleston News and Courier.   September 9,   1930. 
11Colurnbia   State.   February  18,   1931 • 
170 
Smith was  firmly entrenched in the Senate.    He had 
been there for twenty-four consecutive years and would be 
a hard man to beat.    Blease was  joined by two other candi- 
dates:     Leon W,  Harris and Ashton H.  Williams,  who were out 
to defeat the incumbent.    The three combined to attack 
Smith with charges of nepotism,   extravagance,  and holding 
the same political  office for too many years.    Harris and 
Williams made a great  issue of repealing Prohibition.    On 
this subject  Cole disagreed with them.    Harris and Williams 
contended that Prohibition fostered gangsters,  bootleggers, 
and crime in general.     "I have yet to hear of abolishing 
12 
the Ten Commandments because some one violated them," 
replied 31ease.    The people,  not the politicians,  should 
decide if a  vote were needed for repeal.    When asked if he 
were not being hypocritical  on Prohibition since he was 
known to drink,   law or no law,  Blease answered,   "I'm a 
drinking man,  but doctors haven't let me have a  drink for 
months."13    He also added that everyone should pray for 
the deliverance of drunkards,  but after the statement some 
people wondered about his health. 
Smith ran his  usual  campaign,     celebrating the 
virtues   of cotton and  his valiant   efforts   on its behalf. 
Much attention was given to Smith's  use of the radio in the 
12I_bid.,   June  16,  1932. 
13,1 Jimmy Byrnes,"   Lil£.   65« 
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campaign.     In 1932 the Senate election was  the only state- 
wide primary held and crowds were smaller on the stump tour. 
Smith made a number of radio broadcasts from WBT in Charlotte. 
In each  he reminded voters  of his  seniority  in the Senate 
and promised to continue serving the people as he had  for 
two decades.    He was always  confident of victory and pre- 
dicted that Blease would run second. 
Blease refused to make any radio broadcasts.    Larlier 
he had  explained,   "I never listened to a radio but one 
time,  and it was  in such bad shape that I got disgusted and 
quit.     I   like   to see a man when  he is   talking to me.     I 
have never wanted to make a speech over the radio because 
I do not like it."1'4'    While in the Senate,  Blease had  once 
commented on the radio industry by saying the whole busi- 
ness should be  "gassed  out."    Possibly the Smith message 
reached more homes through his  use of the radio. 
Smith's prediction came true.    He led all  candidates 
with over a  100,000 votes and Blease was second with 81,000. 
Almost all  the state newspapers  endorsed Smith for the run- 
off election.     On election day Smith made another radio 
address  over WBT,  predicting his victory.     The second pri- 
mary was  held   in September with Blease polling  over 112,000 
15 
l4New York Times.  March  3.   1929. 
^Columbia  State.  August 31.   1932. 
I 
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votes.    He had not quite held the votes he had amassed two 
years   earlier.     "Cotton lid" had overwhelmed Blease by a 
margin  of almost  35,000 votes.     Cole had never been beaten 
so badly in his  entire career.    It was  the last Senate race 
Cole L.  Blease  ever entered. 
Yet less  than a year later Cole announced that he 
would run again for governor in 193^.    He had always said 
that he would rather be governor of South Carolina  than 
17 hold any other office in the world.        He insisted that the 
people of the  state had petitioned him to run,  and,   he 
1 ft added,   "I   love my people." Out of the seven  other  candi- 
dates  in the primary,  another man sought the support of 
"Coley's people."     Olin D.  Johnston was known as  the "mill 
boy-lawyer."     He had worked in the mills of Spartanburg since 
the age of eleven and managed to obtain a  college degree 
and a  law degree while actively participating in state 
politics.    As  something of a hero among mill workers, 
Johnston had  lost an election for governor in 1930,  but had 
gained valuable political  experience and public  exposure. 
When the campaign opened, most  of the state's political ob- 
servers believed the contest would be between the old hero 
of the  textile workers and the new hero of the textile workers. 
l6Ibid..   September 13,   l*i  1932. 
17New York Times. April 16,   1933. 
18Columbia   State.   June  20,   193^. 
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Cole  conducted a mild campaign centering around the 
promise  of honest  government.     "When I  was  governor,   no man 
or  clique dictated   to me and never will,"  vowed Blease. 
"hlect the man who not only can help you,  but will help you,    9 
implored the man who had never done much of anything for the 
state.     He also promised to reduce  taxes,   eliminate crime, 
cooperate with  the federal government,   and   "carefully in- 
vestigate pardons,"    If ho were governor again,  no barrooms 
would be found in South Carolina  during his administration. 
Furthermore,   "Drunken drivers should be put in prison." 
Many times  Cole emphasized,   "I will again be governor of 
the state,   I have not had and never will have any political 
boss. ,.20 
One candidate, H. Kemper Cooke, a state senator and 
lawyer, chose to harass Blease.  Cooke recalled how Blease 
had abused his power of executive clemency during office 
and had never done anything for the people of the state. 
"Blease has done one thing for you. He has fooled you 
fools," declared Cooke.  "Neither Washington, Tillman, nor 
Hampton sought a third term."  Cooke also badgered Johnston, 
calling him "King Olin the Dry," and "Little Olin the Fence 
Straddler. ..21 
19IMd..   June  21»   193^' 
20Ibid..  September 5»   193'+. 
21Ibid.,  August 11,   193^. 
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to choose between two men neither  of whom  they had approved 
in the first primary.     Kather than endorse either,   the 
r.nl umbia   State  lamented over the choice between Johnston 
who was   too young and a   "radical," and Blease who was  too 
old and a  "reactionary."    Johnston rejoined that he was a 
"reformer,  not a radical."    Campaigning almost without 
pause between  the primaries,  Johnston pushed his image of 
being the  "worker's friend."    "I am a  laboring man myself 
and I  feel  I  know the heartbeat of the working people." 
Although he might be young,  Johnston asked "God for guid- 
ance to make me a great governor." 
When questioned about his advancing years,  Blease 
replied that his father  "never had any sense till he was 
past sixty."    As for being a  "reactionary,"  Cole answered, 
"When I was governor,  you were happy and had plenty to eat. 
Today we are bankrupt.   ...    I  have abused no person.     In 
everything  I   have said and  done  I  have at all  times  the 
best interests  of the people at heart.    With the help of 
God,   South Carolina  can be made a happy state."  5 
H.   Kemper Cooke,   who had placed  third  in the  first 
primary and had  damned  Johnston and Blease.   publicly announced 
that Johnston  was  the lesser of  two  evils.     "Cotton Ed" 
Smith,   however,   disclosed  that he was going to vote   for 
^Columbia   State,   September  5.   12,   193**. 
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Blease.     Both men had influential supporters  then and both 
asked God for assistances both men had made strong appeals 
for worker's  votes»   but  Johnston waged a more vigorous   cam- 
26 
paign and soundly defeated the aging Blease. 
Coley had lost three statewide elections  in four 
years,  but he had made the run-off  election each time.    En- 
couraged by drawing over 100,000 votes in each defeat, 
Blease decided to run for governor again in 1938.    Again 
Cole was  the oldest candidate,   this  time in a  field of 
eight canpaigners.     With his white suit,   string tie,  white 
hair and silvery mustache,   Blease was  "a perfect imitation 
of a  Civil War colonel."27    In his  eighth race for governor 
Cole was remarkably dignified and restrained.    Early in 
the campaign he predicted his victory.     "They are all 
going to vote for Cousin Coley."    Quietly he spoke of his 
concern over the rising state debt.     Out of respect for 
his age,   the candidates generally did not attack him. 
One of his rivals drew applause from  the audience when he 
said,   "Mr.  Blease is a  fine old man."    Another amused the 
crowds by saying.   "I'll vote for Mr.  Blease fifty years 
from now,   for if Mr.  Blease is still  living,  he'll be 
running. .28 
26Ibid..  August  30,   September 9.   12,   1931*. 
27"Jimmy Byrnes," Lil§_.   65. 
28Ibid..  August  3,   1938. 
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Once  Cole  showed some  of his   old fire when he was 
asked about  the  use of troops to evict sit-down strikers, 
"Hell no,"     declared Blease,   "I wouldn't call out the 
militia  in case  of a  sit down strike.    We got enough 
Bleaseites to whip anybody in the state." '    Usually Cole 
argued mildly that he was not too old to be governor and 
deplored the  "woeful,  willful  extravagance in state govern- 
ment  in recent years."30    The other candidates verbally 
assaulted each other,  but Cole relied on his experience to 
give him  the nomination.     "Read you Bibles," asked Coley, 
"then  think  carefully and sanely how you are going to vote 
on August  30."31 
Finally the primary was held.    The results were 
disastrous  for Cole L.  Blease,  who for the first time in 
decades  did not  even make the run-off.    He did manage to 
place third with  only half the votes he had received in 
each of the  three previous  elections.32    Bitter at his 
worst defeat in years,  Blease asserted that he alone had 
conducted a  clean campaign by running "on his manhood and 
record."    He had never seen so much money used to debauch 
29iDid..  August 9,  1938. 
3°Ibid..  August 21,   1938. 
31"Carolina  Jubilee,"   Newsweek,   XII   (August 22, 
1938),   1*+. 
32Columbia   State.  August 31,   1938. 
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the white people of the state he said,  as was used in the 
primary.     "Whiskey,   Coca-Cola,  and other kinds  of stuff 
were  used,   besides  cash money."    If all  this evil political 
bribery did not stop, Blease believed that South Carolina 
would one day be for sale and  only those with money could 
run for office.     "I am going to cast my vote for white 
supremacy,   for   the protection of the virtue of white women 
of my state,  and for Wyndham M. Manning.    I haven't any- 
thing against any man or woman and thank God I  can truly 
33 say,  God bless all my people." 
His  endorsement of Manning was embarassing for two 
reasons.    Burnet Maybank defeated Manning in the run-off, 
thus depriving Blease of the satisfaction of throwing the 
victory to Manning,    liven worse,  Wyndham M. Manning was the 
son of Richard I. Manning, who had once been one of Cole's 
most hated political  enemies.     Defeated in four elections 
in  eight years,   Coley now retired permanently from the cam- 
paign trail. 
Living in Columbia,  Blease returned to his law 
practice for two years.    His wife Lillie had died in 193^. 
and five years  later, at the age of 71  he married Caroline 
Floyd Hoyt,  who was many years younger than he.    The 
marriage lasted only a year.     Either he was getting too 
33lbid..  September 2,   1938. 
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crotchety in his  old age or,  as some rum or-mongers would 
have it,  he was not as wealthy as his new wife had supposed 
him to be.     In 19*0 he was appointed by the General Assembly 
to a position on the state unemployment commission.    The 
term was four years,  but Cole did not live to finish it.  On 
January 19,   19*2,   he died,  following a  surgical operation. Jh 
3*Por his   obituaries  see Charleston News aM 
Courier.   January 20,   19*2,   C^lumb^ State.   January 20,   19*2, 
New York Times,   January 20,   19*2. 
CONCLUSION 
For   fifty years  Coleman Livingston Blease was 
active  in South   Carolina  politics.     After  the turn of  the 
century the state's Democrats were called upon in almost 
every  state-wide  election to decide "whether or not Blease 
shall   have  high  office. »1 He had been elected to the  State 
House   of Representatives,     the State Senate,   the Governor's 
office,  and the United States Senate.    In nearly every 
election he  entered,  he commanded a  large and loyal group 
of supporters.     Yet  this  same man did next  to nothing to 
gratify his  constituents during the three terms  he was 
elected  to high   office.     How was  it possible for such a 
politician to retain the trust  of his followers for so many 
years while providing so little in return? 
First it is necessary to place Blease in his pro- 
per context.    Ben Tillman had inaugurated a political re- 
volution in South  Carolina at the end of the nineteenth 
century.     The Bourbons   of   the state  had been challenged 
for political power and apparently defeated.    Tillman dis- 
franchised  the Negroes and made the power of the ballot 
George M.   Koester,   "Bleaseism,"  Gx^nyiiie Pied- 
mont,   September  23,   19l6. 
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available to the white masses.    The one-party system and 
the all-white primaries were designed to prevent "black 
rule."    Nonetheless  Tillman still pandered to race preju- 
dice and  established the precedent of race-baiting in South 
Carolina politics.     Despite these and other "reforms" in 
time  it became  evident that the old conservative ruling 
class had not been vanquished, but had in fact absorbed 
Tillman and his movement.     The political tradition of the 
state had not been destroyed, but instead a modification 
had  occurred.     The primary system allowed more whites to 
vote  than  ever before in the history of the state, but only 
the means of election had been changed,  not the actual 
philosophy of government. 
On one  hand Tillman's democracy on the stump cam- 
paign made it a virtual necessity for a  candidate to be a 
demogogue by appealing to the emotions  of the illiterate 
masses.     On the  other the perserverance of the traditional 
conservative political  ideology meant that little reform 
would be attempted by elected officials.    In some respects 
South  Carolina   political  practices resembled those  of the 
frontier Southwest as described by Stanley blkins and brie 
McKitrick.     In  their words  "the great tradition of the 
political barbecue"   of the Southwest tended "to focus upon 
the sense  of ceremonial participation."    Similarly,   for 
the masses  of white  South Carolina Democrats the only 
democratic practice  they exercised,   or in .any cases could 
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Lon exercise,  was voting in the primaries.    After the electii 
the majority of South Carolinians had little interest in 
politics.    Again,  Elkin's and McKitrick's observations seem 
appropriate: 
.   .   .  the end of the campaign largely marked the end 
of their  concern with government.    Whatever satis- 
faction the back-country politician had to render after 
getting into office must be understood in terms of the 
barbecue rather than of concrete local problems to 
be bargained and haggled  over.2 
In such a political  environment the rhetoric of election- 
eering was far more important than performance after elec- 
tion.    Linked to the persistent notion that the government 
was best that governed the least,   this peculiar situation 
allowed politicians to court the votes  of the lower classes 
without doing anything for them in return. 
Blease emerged from  these circumstances as the 
champion of the textile workers.    Through personal contact 
and oratory,   he won the workers'  trust and became their 
spokesman.     No other politician had ever done anything for 
the mill hands and at least Coley professed to care about 
them.    He identified himself with them and significantly, 
they identified  themselves with him.     His  enemies were 
their enemies.    Just as  they could do nothing to improve 
their condition,  neither,   so they believed,   could Blease. 
Stanley Ilkins and trie McKitrick,   "A Meaning for 
Turner's Frontier,  Part III     The Southwest Front er and 
New England,"   PnHtlcal  gfilfiflfiS Quarterly..   LXIX (uecemo     , 
195M,  577. 
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He provided the  "ceremonial participation"  for the mill 
hands at election time and continued the "barbecue" after 
his  election  to the   extent that he harassed the   establish- 
ment without tearing it down.    The Bleaseites probably did 
not expect him to destroy the old order since it was ob- 
vious that their power and his was limited.    Blease simply 
fulfilled his  constituents'  need for a  candidate who would 
voice their hostility,  bitterness,  and fear.    His success, 
when elected,  was measured by how much he antagonized and 
shocked the traditional system,  not by any stand rds  of 
positive results. 
By the same token Blease's political career can 
only be  understood  in negative terms.    His appeal was 
based on what he was against,  not for.    His oratory con- 
sisted of negative reference symbols such as miscegenation, 
Negro equality,   class privilege,   high taxes and other 
alleged  evils.    Blease never went beyond  ha ranging the 
symbols because if they were destroyed,  no negative appeal 
would exist for him.     His vision was limited to seeing him- 
self as an agent of protest,  not reform.    He could not 
preach against sin if none  existed. 
Within Blease's political  ideology another reason 
accounts for his failure to come to grips with social and 
economic problems.     Ho presented himself as a politician 
who was outside the state Democratic machine.    Unlike 
18^ 
Tillman,   he neither took over the party,  nor did he even- 
tually sell out to it.    The often repeated boast that he 
knew no  "boss or bosses" was true.    Blease remained his own 
man throughout his  entire political career.    By never com- 
promising or bargaining with the established political or- 
der,  had he proposed real reforms,  they would have been de- 
feated.    Paradoxically he shared to a large degree the 
philosophy of government of the very class he despised and 
denounced.    One finds  little difference between Blease's 
thinking and the Bourbon theory of government as described 
by Francis Butler Simkinsi 
.   ,   .  the state should be content with a minimum of 
intervention in social and economic matters,  discours- 
ing in the meantime on .   .   .  the cause of the< Con- 
federacy,   on the time-honored doctrine of tariff-for- 
revenue, and on economy in expenditures and  'viewing 
with alarm*   the encroachment of the Federal govern- 
ment upon spheres  of action marked out for the state.3 
Thus Cole not only was a product of his time and took ad- 
vantage of existing conditions, but was also a captive of 
the political tradition of the state. 
For a man whose reputation was one of crude immor- 
ality and conniving guile  typical  of a demogogue, Blease 
was also characterized by a naive honesty.    He always tried 
to fulfill the meager promises he made on the stamp when 
elected.    As  one of his  close friends eulogized several 
3simkins,  Pitchfork Ben Tillman.,   79, 
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years after his deathi 
I cannot proclaim that Colie was one of our 
greatest statesmen or one of our eminent social re- 
formers. That was the great thing about Coliej he 
was exactly what he held himself out to be—a poli- 
tician in the true sense of the word who voiced the 
opinions, hopes, aspirations and prejudices of the 
people of our state.4, 
Blease himself would probably agree that his most out- 
standing ability and the chief reason for his political 
success was his power of rhetoric. By saying what his 
supporters wanted to hear and in a style they could under- 
stand, he almost spellbound them.  Combining his knowledge 
of their feelings and thoughts with his natural gift of 
oratory, he never exceeded their level of thinking. Rather 
than enlighten the oppressed, he confirmed their aliena- 
tion.  In other words he simply thought the way they did. 
How can a politician who rarely ever accomplished 
anything for his constituents be evaluated? First it 
should be remembered that Blease never proposed to do much, 
and if he had, the chances were slim that it would have 
been enacted. Cole was an artful campaigner, but the tac- 
tics of the campaign trail and political office are not 
the same. Blease never made the distinction, he acted 
like he was campaigning even when he was elected. His 
achievements must then be measured by indirect standards, 
^Columbia Record, August 5. 19*8, 
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Johnston was an adept demogogue himself who enter- 
tained audiences  on the stump.     Rather than speak  on issues, 
he attacked  corruption in the state highway department and 
"ringsters"  who controlled state politics.    Vying with 
Blease for the textile workers'  vote,  Johnston repeatedly 
declared,   "I  was a cotton mill boy and realize fully the 
life they lead and do not hesitate to say that I  have great 
sympathy for them and shall see  justice for them." ' 
During the campaign,  textile workers went on strike 
in several piedmont mills.     In South Carolina these strikes 
were viewed as the work of Communists and "radicals."    The 
Columbia  State looked with disfavor on Blease and Johnston 
as mill workers'   candidates.     Johnston was accused of being 
a  "radical" and  "a dangerous man," while many respectable 
Democrats  still  thought of Blease as an unscrupulous crook. 
Blease denied any association with  "ringsters"  or gangsters. 
"I want what the people want." replied Johnston,   "Is there 
1.23 
anything radical  in this position?" 
After the votes were tabulated  in the primary, 
once again a  run-off was required.    Blease and Johnston led 
the other six  candidates.     Cole trailed his  opponent by 
almost 20,000 votes.2*    Once again the state newspapers had 
22Ibid..   September k,   193^. 
23Ibid..   September 5.   1934. 
24 y terary Digest.   CXVIII   (September 8,   193
1*),   6. 
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not legislation.     Despite his official record,  his influ- 
ence on South Carolina politics  cannot be easily under- 
estimated.     For thirty-two years  candidates seeking the 
Democratic nomination for governor or United States Senate 
had to  contend with Blease,   one way or the other.    To some 
decree nearly every politician in the state had to be some 
kind of a demogogue in  order to compete with such opposition. 
If the office-seekers  did not have to deal with him directly 
on the stump,   they still had to try to win some support 
from his followers  in order to succeed.    Thus Blease had 
enlarged the white  democratic movement begun by Tillman. 
The mill workers'   vote became almost as  important as the 
farmers*.     In this way he was responsible for awakening the 
workers'  political power.     Unquestionably this was his 
most valuable contribution to the history of the state. 
Unfortunately,   Blease's accomplishment came at a 
high price.     By doing nothing else for his "people,"  he 
helped perpetuate their lowly condition.    In fact he did 
little more  than aggravate  their resentment and prolong 
their wrath in the wrong direction.    Although they little 
realized it,   the mill workers paid an excessive cost to 
have  Cole L.   Blease as   their champion.     But the black man 
was  even more victimized.     It is all too easy to damn 
Blease for his racism,   but it would he a greater travesty 
to forgive him for  it.     Inescapably,  the truth is that 
■f 
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Blease would have been a political nonentity if he had not 
been a  racist demogoue.     He cannot be blamed for creating 
racial prejudice in the state,  but he deliberately culti- 
vated and nurtured it for his own ends. 
The  ugliest aspects  of his incendiary tirades 
against Negroes are the facts that his  expression of hatred 
were totally  unthinking and representative of a large num- 
ber of white South Carolinians.     The mill workers  especially 
focused their frustrations in the form of violent agression 
and intense  hatred  on the Negro.    By its very nature,  pre- 
judice is  irrational.     Due to his own narrow intellectual 
and moral  capacities,  Blease could only reflect the preju- 
dice.     Indeed that was his most  uncanny ability.    The ac- 
curacy of Wilbur J.   Cash's   observation of Blease   cannot be 
denied: 
The man was a sort of antenna,  as it were,   fit 
to vibrate in perfect  unison with their exact senti- 
ment—in his  every word and deed precisely to render 
what,   given all the forces at play on them,   they most 
secretly wanted:     the making vocal and manifest of 
their slowly gathering melancholy for and resentment 
against  their economic and social lot,  without ever 
losing  sight  of the paramount question of race.5 
By any standards Blease must be  judged as one of 
the most offensive and detrimental of Southern demogogues. 
He was an  extreme  example of the politician who thrives on 
poverty,   ignorance and blind hatred.    As much as he was a 
Wilbur J.   Cash,   Tfce Mind  of the Sojrth (New York: 
Alfred A.  Knopf,   Inc.,   195+l).  258-259. 
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product  of his time,  Blease contributed to the baser facets 
of his  time.     The longevity of his career was an indication 
of the persistence of grim and squalid conditions in South 
Carolina.     Concurrently,   the vociferous political career of 
Cole L,   Blease  contributed   to  obstructing the abolishing 
of those conditions.     In his quest for fame and notoriety, 
Coleman Livingston Blease sacrificed  the welfare  of all 
South Carolinians,  black and white.    Through ignorant con- 
ivance he betrayed the public trust.    The significance of 
his life was that he was able to accomplish the deed and 
bequeath its method as his  legacy to the history and the 
future of  his state. 
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